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This dissertation studies the causes and consequences of inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).
The first chapter identifies and explains a skill bias in the sectoral composition of inward FDI in
developing countries; that is, high-skill intensive FDI constitutes a large share of total FDI inflows
in autocracies, while low-skill intensive FDI takes a relatively high proportion in democracies. In
this chapter, I develop a political economy framework to explain the empirical pattern and argue
that the skill bias is an outcome of the interaction between a country’s underlying distribution of
skills and the logic of political survival. Distinct institutional constraints drive political leaders in
autocracies and democracies to adopt different policies toward these two types of FDI to extend
benefits to their core constituencies, thus generating a skill bias in the sectoral composition of
inward FDI across political regimes. Empirical evidence based on available sectoral FDI data in
developing countries supports my argument. To further illustrate the causal mechanisms, Chapter
2 briefly examines FDI policy in China and Taiwan. In Chapter 3, I employ a survey experiment
implemented in China to examine the distributional effects of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI
derived in Chapter 1. The results suggest that respondents’ skill level is positively and strongly as-
sociated with support for high-skill intensive FDI but has no significant effect on their support for
low-skill intensive FDI. These findings provide support for the micro-foundations of the political
economy framework developed in Chapter 1. Finally, Chapter 4 examines the relationship be-
tween economic integration and corruption in China. Using an original dataset of corruption cases
to measure corruption at the provincial level, I find that economic integration leads to a high level
of corruption in China. This finding runs counter to the conventional wisdom that economic inte-
gration helps reduce corruption and thus has important implications for both domestic and global
governance. Taken together, this dissertation aims to provide more nuanced accounts of the causes
and consequences of FDI inflows.
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Chapter 1
Domestic Political Institutions and the Skill
Composition of Inward Foreign Direct
Investment in Developing Countries,
1980-2008
Abstract
This chapter identifies and explains a skill bias in the sectoral composition of inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) across political regimes in developing countries. That is, high-skill intensive FDI
accounts for a high proportion of total FDI in autocracies, while low-skill intensive FDI takes a
large share in democracies. This empirical pattern has not been studied in the literature. I argue
that this skill bias is an outcome of the interaction between a country’s underlying distribution of
skills and the logic of political survival. Distinct institutional constraints force political leaders in
autocracies and democracies to adopt different policies toward these two types of FDI to extend
benefits to their core constituencies, thus generating a skill bias in the sectoral composition of
inward FDI across political regimes. Empirical evidence based on available sectoral FDI data in
developing countries strongly supports my argument. The results are robust and consistent across
various model specifications. This study contributes to the literature by studying the nuances of
industry-level FDI policy and inflows in developing countries.
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1.1 Introduction
Do governments in different developing countries prefer different types of inward foreign direct
investment (FDI)? If yes, what drives such heterogeneity? Inward FDI, as the single largest form
of external finance, not only brings in scarce capital, sophisticated technology and advanced man-
agerial know-how, but also creates jobs, boosts exports and stimulates economic growth in host
countries. Nowadays developed and developing countries alike are competing to lure foreign in-
vestment. In this regard, this competition is leading to a “race to the bottom” in regulations,1
because governments have little discretion in front of footloose capital.
On the contrary, governments in host countries seem to be very selective in promoting certain
kinds of foreign investment over others. Consequently, the variation in the sectoral composition of
inward FDI across countries in the developing world is striking. Most interestingly, autocracies and
democracies tend to have distinct tastes for different types of inward FDI. As shown in Figure 1.1,
for middle- and high-income developing countries,2 on average, there is no significant difference
between autocracies and democracies in terms of total FDI inflows. However, the sectoral com-
position of inward FDI across political regimes differs significantly. In other words, authoritarian
countries have received a high proportion of high-skill intensive FDI,3 while democratic countries
have taken a large share of low-skill intensive FDI.4 We can see from Figure 1.1 that high-skill
intensive FDI on average accounts for 56% of total FDI inflows in authoritarian countries, while
it takes only 43% in democratic states.5 More surprisingly, not only does the skill composition of
inward FDI in autocracies and democracies differ, but the level of FDI’s skill intensity in a given
country tends to decline as its level of democracy increases.
1For discussions of the race-to-the-bottom literature, see, e.g., Garrett (1998) and Mosley (2003).
2The World Bank classifies countries with gross national income per capita larger than $1,005 as middle- and
high-income countries.
3I.e., foreign investment that utilizes sophisticated technology and hires a high ratio of skilled to unskilled workers.
4I.e., foreign investment that uses unsophisticated technology and hires a high ratio of unskilled to skilled workers.
5Here I use Cheibub et al. (2010)’s classification of autocratic and democratic countries.
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Notes: Mean values of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI in autocracies and democracies. The sectoral
FDI data come from UNCTAD. The dichotomous regime type variable is from Cheibub et al. (2010).
In Figure 1.2, I plot the proportion of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI and level of democ-
racy for four developing countries: Argentina, Chile, Singapore and Taiwan. The graphics illus-
trate two features. First, the skill composition of inward FDI tends to be divergent across political
regimes, which resembles the pattern in Figure 1.1. Authoritarian Singapore consistently has a
higher share of high-skill intensive FDI than democratized Argentina, Chile and Taiwan. Second,
the ratio of high-skill intensive FDI decreases with democratization in Argentina, Chile and Tai-
wan. All of these suggest that there exists a “skill bias”6 in the sectoral composition of inward FDI
across political regimes in developing countries.
This skill bias in FDI, and its relation to political regimes, has not been examined in the lit-
erature. It presents an empirical puzzle because conventional wisdom attributes capital flows into
6Recently, scholars have identified a skill bias in the pattern of trade protection across countries. See Nunn and
Trefler (2006) and Milner and Mukherjee (2009).
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Figure 1.2: Ratio of High-Skill Intensive FDI and Level of Democracy in Ar-
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Notes: The solid line indicates the ratio of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI. The dashed line shows
the level of democracy. The sectoral FDI data for Taiwan come from Investment Commission, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Taiwan. The data for other countries are from UNCTAD. The ratio of high-skill intensive
FDI and level of democracy are re-scaled to range from 0 to 10.
developing countries primarily to relative factor endowments or prices (e.g., Markusen et al. 1996;
Mundell 1957; Yeaple 2003). It is economically inefficient for firms to locate activities where in-
tensively used factors are scarce. Scholars have suggested that authoritarian countries are likely
to suppress labor unions and wages, while democratic countries tend to invest in human capital
(e.g., Baum and Lake 2003). Thus, we would expect that democracies receive a high proportion
of high-skill intensive FDI in total FDI while autocracies take a large share of low-skill intensive
FDI. In addition, with the accumulation of human capital, we should expect that the skill intensity
of foreign investment grows over time. The data in Argentina, Chile and Taiwan show the exact
opposite (see Figure 1.2). The recent literature on FDI in Political Science has mainly focused
on the supply side of foreign investment and thus devoted substantial attention to exploring the
internal and external features that make countries attractive to foreign investors (e.g., Büthe and
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Milner 2008; Jensen 2003, 2006; Li and Resnick 2003).7
I approach this question from the perspective of the demand side of foreign investment. The
answer to the skill bias, I hypothesize, hinges on the interaction between a country’s skill en-
dowments and the logic of political survival. To retain office, political leaders, whether in an
autocracy or a democracy, must adjust policies to cater to their constituencies for political support
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003; Milner and Kubota 2005: 115-6). To this end, FDI policy
can be an effective instrument to extend benefits to core supporters (see Pandya 2007; Pinto 2004;
Pinto and Pinto 2008). In general, FDI inflows tend to hurt domestic capital because of increasing
competition. Crucially, however, high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI generate distinct distribu-
tional consequences for skilled and unskilled labor respectively by changing their relative demand.
Through employing a high proportion of skilled workers, high-skill intensive FDI tends to increase
the relative wages of skilled to unskilled workers. In contrast, by hiring a large share of unskilled
workers, low-skill intensive FDI generates the exact opposite income effect on both types of labor.
Given that, authoritarian leaders, who rely on support from a small winning coalition that often
includes skilled workers, have incentives to attract more high-skill intensive FDI to benefit and
co-opt skilled workers. In contrast, democratic leaders, who depend on a broad winning coalition
with a majority of unskilled workers, have incentives to attract more low-skill intensive FDI to
appeal to the unskilled median voter.
To test this argument, I construct a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset that covers 38
developing countries from 1980 to 2008 using the sectoral FDI data from the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The empirical results indicate that democracy or
an increase in the level of democracy is negatively and significantly associated with the percentage
of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI. This finding strongly supports my argument that regime
type makes a difference in the sectoral structure of inward FDI. The results are robust and consis-
7Dorobantu (2010), Pandya (2007), Pinto (2004), and Pinto and Pinto (2008) are notable exceptions.
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tent when alternative measures of political institutions and various political and economic variables
are considered.
The skill composition of FDI is an important variable that requires further examinations. Adding
this dimension will provide more nuanced insights into both the causes and consequences of FDI
inflows. The trade literature has shown that what matters to endogenous growth is not only the
average tariff, but also the structure of tariffs (e.g., Nunn and Trefler 2006). Similarly, the structure
of sectoral FDI inflows, along with the total volume of FDI, has crucial implications for our under-
standing of the consequences of FDI on income distribution, technology diffusion and economic
growth in host countries. For example, scholars have been debating whether or not FDI inflows
lead to income inequality, but empirical findings are mixed (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Jensen
and Rosas 2007). Given high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI’s distinct employment structures,
inflows of high-skill intensive FDI tend to increase income inequality while inward low-skill inten-
sive FDI is likely to decrease it. Therefore, what also matters is the skill composition of FDI. This
study suggests another channel that democracy may help to mitigate income disparity by attracting
a high proportion of low-skill intensive FDI that benefits the lower and middle classes. Yet, one
important policy implication for authoritarian countries with strong preferences for high-skill in-
tensive FDI is that governments need to increase redistribution to target the poor for their support
of globalization.8
The sectoral structure of inward FDI also sheds light on the enduring debates on the causes of
FDI inflows. Political scientists are particularly interested in exploring whether political regime
type affects a country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. Some scholars contend that democratic
governments are more attractive due to institutional constraints that help mitigate the political
risks associated with government’s opportunist behavior (e.g., Jensen 2003). Others claim that the
plurality of interests in democracies restricts politicians’ capacity to offer favorable treatment to
8There is a large literature on “embedded liberalism” which suggests that government spending is necessary to
compensate losers in order to sustain trade openness. See, e.g., Cameron (1978), Hays et al. (2005) and Rodrik (1998).
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foreign investors and facilitates lobbying for protection (e.g., Li and Resnick 2003). This chapter
highlights that political institutions not only affect overall FDI inflows but also play a crucial role
in shaping the sectoral structure of inward FDI.
In addition, this study provides a more nuanced account of the distributional consequences of
FDI. To date research on the politics of FDI has assumed that workers and in particular skilled
workers are primary beneficiaries of foreign investment because foreign firms pay higher wages
than their domestic counterparts and increase the demand for skills (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson
1997; Pandya 2010; Pinto and Pinto 2008). Nonetheless, the existing literature overlooks the
crucial differences between different types of FDI by assuming that all kinds of foreign investment
have the same employment structure. By unpacking FDI, this research suggests that high-skill and
low-skill intensive FDI are likely to engender different distributional effects on different types of
labor. This finding underlines the importance of taking into account the heterogeneity of foreign
investment in studying the politics of FDI. The heterogenous preferences among different groups
of labor could be crucial for various political economy models of FDI policy and have critical
implications for understanding labor groups’ political campaign and lobbying activities.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews relevant literature. Then, Section 1.3
proposes a political economy framework to explain the skill bias in the sectoral composition of
FDI across political regimes. Following that, Section 1.4 discusses research design and presents
systematic empirical evidence. This chapter concludes with a discussion of this study’s limitations
and future research revenues.
1.2 Literature Review
Scholars’ interests in FDI have experienced significant changes over time. In the 1960s and 1970s,
there was an influential literature on multinational corporations (MNCs), especially the oligopolis-
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tic expansion model and the dependency theory,9 both of which assumed some inherent conflicting
interests between foreign investors and host governments. The central theme in this literature was
“who gets what.” While we witnessed a boom of global FDI flows in the 1980s and 1990s, aca-
demic research on FDI actually declined. During this period, the prominent approach was the
OLI model.10 With the continuous growth of global FDI flows, developing countries now view
FDI as an important means to increase employment, acquire advanced technology and managerial
know-how, and ultimately promote economic growth. Thus, we have seen a resurgence and re-
orientation of FDI research. For the purpose of this chapter, I focus the literature review on recent
developments in the FDI literature.
One central debate in the Political Science literature is whether political regime type affects
FDI inflows. Earlier work suggests that authoritarian leaders, in order to promote industrializa-
tion, are better than their democratic counterparts at safeguarding MNCs’ oligopolistic rents by
suppressing wages and the populist demand for consumption (O’Donnell 1978, 1988). In an em-
pirical study, Oneal (1994) finds no evidence that authoritarian regimes attract more U.S. foreign
investment. Recently, Jensen (2003) has argued that democracy is more attractive to FDI because
democratic governments are more credible due to institutional constraints such as veto players
and audience costs, helping to mitigate the political risks associated with government expropria-
tion and policy instability. Focusing on developing countries, Li and Resnick (2003) suggest that
the effects of democracy on FDI are not necessarily positive. In fact, the plurality of interests in
democracies constrains politicians’ capacity to offer favorable treatment to foreign investors and
facilitates lobbying for protection from incumbent domestic firms. They find that property rights
protection associated with democracy is, in fact, the driving force behind inward FDI.
The mixed empirical findings raise one important question: whether political regimes per se
9For the oligopolistic expansion model, see, e.g., Hymer (1976), Kindleberger (1969) and Vernon (1971, 1980).
For the dependency theory, see, e.g., Evans (1979).
10OLI refers to ownership advantage (“O”), location advantage (“L”), and internalization advantage (“I”). See
Dunning (1977, 1981).
CHAPTER 1. DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF
INWARD FDI 10
or other embedded political features such as credible commitments, veto players and political
constraints actually matter to foreign investors? Recently, scholars have suggested that political
constraints on politicians help attract foreign investment. The logic is that mobile foreign capital
possesses substantial bargaining power ex ante, but becomes illiquid ex post. A large part of the
bargaining power then shifts to the host government once investment takes place. In this regard,
foreign investors prefer countries with predictable policies and transparent rules of decision mak-
ing. In order to attract FDI, politicians can offer liberal policies to foreign investors. Nevertheless,
the problem lies in how to make these policies credible given politicians’ opportunistic behavior.
Scholars have argued that veto players can perform this function by increasing checks and bal-
ances, therefore biasing policies towards the status quo. Henisz (2002) and Henisz and Zelner
(2001) have revealed evidence that infrastructure investment is higher when constraints on execu-
tion are stronger. In addition, scholars have identified that political federalism, by adding a veto
to central government, helps attract FDI (Jensen 2006; Jensen and McGillivray 2005). Existing
studies tend to conclude that credible commitments are attractive to foreign investors. Recently,
Büthe and Milner (2008) have argued that participation in international institutions contributes to
credible commitments because international institutions bind members to a basket of liberal eco-
nomic policies, therefore increasing the costs of deviation. They find that membership in the WTO
and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is positively and strongly associated with high levels of
FDI inflows.
The aforementioned literature has reshaped the landscape of FDI study and made significant
contributions to our understanding of the determinants of a country’s attractiveness to FDI. How-
ever, there are some weaknesses in the literature. First, all studies have exclusively concentrated
on the aggregate level of FDI inflows, while the sectoral variation of inward FDI has been mostly
overlooked. Why are some countries able to attract particular types of FDI rather than others? Why
do countries adopt a liberal FDI policy in some industries but not in others? Another weakness of
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this literature is that, although we call it the politics of FDI, there is little dynamic domestic pol-
itics there. Most of them attend to the supply side of foreign investment and address how certain
features of internal or external institutions determine a country’s attractiveness to foreign investors,
thereof, overlookling the significance of domestic politics including interest groups, political com-
petition, partisanship, government turnout, etc. This is in sharp contrast to the rich literature on
the political economy of trade policy.11 The trade literature has clearly shown that trade policy is
an endogenous outcome of a rent-seeking game of interest groups and politicians, which is shaped
by national institutions (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994, 2001; Mayer 1984; Milner and
Kubota 2005; Milner and Mukherjee 2009; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971). FDI inflows, like other
cross-border factor movements, generate significant distributional consequences for domestic ac-
tors (e.g., Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007; Pandya 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2004, 2005). Thus,
domestic politics is likely to play a significant role in shaping a country’s FDI policy.
Recent developments in the literature have given us many insights into the domestic politics
of FDI. In a pioneering work, Pinto (2004) argues that FDI inflows benefit domesitc labor but
hurt domestic capital. Left-wing governments that represent the interests of labor are thus likely
to welcome foreign investment. In contrast, right-wing governments representing the interests of
business groups, tend to restrict FDI inflows. Empirically, he finds that partisanship is a strong
predictor of the variation of overall FDI inflows. As an extension of this work, Pinto and Pinto
(2008) suggest that left-oriented governments encourage the type of inward FDI that complements
domestic labor while right-oriented governments support the kind of inward FDI beneficial to
domestic capital. Using the sectoral FDI data of OECD countries from 1980 to 2000, they find
empirical support. Additionally, Pandya (2007), distinguishing between horizontal and vertical
FDI, suggests that horizontal FDI’s market access nature makes domestic capital and labor unite
to oppose this type of FDI, while consumers benefit on the whole; vertical FDI tends to benefit
11See Rodrik (1995) for a review of different political economy frameworks of trade policy.
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domestic labor by increasing employment, while it exerts no impact on the domestic market given
that it is export-oriented. In the political arena, vertical FDI is likely to become a partisan issue
because left-wing parties cater to labor. In contrast, the politics of horizontal FDI centers on
regime characteristics because it leads politicians to make tradeoffs between special interest groups
and overall consumer welfare. Focusing on transition economies, Dorobantu (2010) claims that
democratic leaders are likely to liberalize FDI regulations because their broad constituencies—
workers—benefit from FDI inflows. Their authoritarian counterparts tend to restrict FDI inflows
to protect domestic capitalists from whom they derive political support. The underlying assumption
is that FDI is beneficial to domestic labor but harmful to capital.
Certainly, these studies treat FDI policies or inflows as an endogenous outcome of political
interactions that are channeled by national institutions. Although still at an early stage, this re-
search has significantly advanced our knowledge about the dynamic domestic politics of FDI and
moved FDI research into a new field in line with the traditional literature on the political economy
of trade. Nevertheless, these works have mainly focused on the aggregate level of inward FDI.12
The sectoral variation in FDI policy and flows, particularly in developing countries remains under-
explored. This chapter seeks to contribute to the literature by examining the sectoral variation of
inward FDI in developing countries.
12Pinto and Pinto (2008) focus on the sectoral variation of FDI inflows in OECD countries. Pandya (2007) distin-
guishes between vertical and horizontal FDI.
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1.3 Political Regimes and the Skill Composition of Inward FDI:
A Political Economy Explanation
1.3.1 Distributional Consequences of High-Skill and Low-Skill Intensive FDI
MNCs, the vehicles of FDI, possess proprietary and intangible assets, such as advanced technology,
brand names, managerial know-how, and access to markets, which are inefficient to directly con-
tract or license. Thus MNCs arise to overcome these inefficiencies (Caves 1996; Markusen 2002).
Investment by MNCs usually involves cross-border transfers of physical assets and changes of
factor demand, therefore generating distributional consequences on domestic actors in host coun-
tries13
Scholars often distinguish between vertical and horizontal FDI.14 When engaging in vertical
FDI, MNCs decompose various production stages into multiple countries to take advantage of
factor-price differentials. The primary motive of vertical FDI is to locate production where inten-
sively used factors are relatively cheap, which is often referred to as “efficiency-seeking.” Hor-
izontal FDI is when an MNC duplicates its production in various countries to avoid high tariffs
or trade costs, which is particularly “market-seeking.” Another dimension—MNCs’ level of skill
intensity—is also an important determinant of MNCs’ investment behavior.15 High-skill intensive
FDI involves MNCs that use sophisticated technology and hire a high ratio of skilled to unskilled
workers. In contrast, low-skill intensive FDI utilizes unsophisticated technology and employs a
13Cross-border movement of FDI could change the factor returns in both home and host countries (see, e.g., Feen-
stra and Hanson 1996, 1997). Given that the focus of this chapter is the distributional effects of FDI in host countries,
the following discussions simply ignore the influence of FDI in home countries.
14For models of vertical and horizontal FDI, see, e.g., Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), Markusen and Venables
(2000), and Markusen et al. (1996).
15For instance, it has been documented that MNCs’ skill intensity—measured by firms’ capital intensity, R&D,
advertising expenditures, or ratios of non-production to production workers—is an important determinant of their
investment strategies in various business environments. See, e.g., Henisz (2000), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Rodriguez
et al. (2005), and Uhlenbruck et al. (2006).
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high ratio of unskilled to skilled workers. Given their distinct employment structures, inflows of
these two types of FDI can have different distributional consequences.
In a variant of Jones’s (1971) specific factors model,16 let us assume a small open economy
endowed with the following factors: domestic capital (K), skilled labor (S), and unskilled labor
(L). In developing countries, L is usually much larger than S (L > S). Let us further assume that
domestic capital is industry specific (immobile) and labor is completely mobile across industries
within the country but immobile internationally. Foreign capital (F ) is completely mobile and
seeks the highest returns globally. Furthermore, suppose that there are two sectors—high-skill and
low-skill intensive—in the economy producing high-skill and low-skill goods (X , Y ), respectively.
The prices of these two goods are fixed, set by the world prices. In other words, changes in
domestic production of X and Y do not affect their prices. By definition, the high-skill intensive
sector utilizes a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled labor than the low-skill intensive sector. Put
differently, producing one unit of X requires more skilled labor than producing one unit of Y .
Supplies of domestic capital and both types of labor are fixed but supply of foreign capital is
perfectly elastic. Full employment is maintained in the economy.
Given its cross-border mobility, FDI seeks the highest returns globally. Government is able
to affect the patterns of FDI inflows into these two sectors by choosing differential FDI policies17
that could affect the expected returns of foreign capital.18 First, let us assume that the government
chooses to eliminate restrictions on FDI in the high-skill intensive sector. It may even provide
certain tax or policy incentives to attract FDI into this sector. Inflows of foreign capital raise capital
16See also Pinto and Pinto (2008). Their model allows foreign capital to either substitute or complement domestic
capital.
17These policies include not only direct taxation on foreign capital, but also other restrictions on foreign capital,
including joint venture, local ownership, and minimum export requirements, etc. See Pinto and Pinto (2008).
18The “race-to-the-bottom” literature suggests that globalization significantly constrains government policy space
and autonomy. With regard to FDI, governments (especially those in developing countries) are forced to liberalize FDI
regulations in order to compete for foreign capital. For discussions of this literature, see Garrett (1998) and Mosley
(2003).
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endowments in this sector, thus increasing demand for both skilled and unskilled labor.19 On the
one hand, since domestic capital is sector specific, entry of foreign capital decreases the returns of
domestic capital in the high-skill intensive sector due to growing competition.20 Additionally, the
consequent increase in the wage rate due to higher demand drives down the returns of domestic
capital in the low-skill intensive sector. On the other hand, growing capital endowments in the high-
skill intensive sector raise the marginal product of labor in this sector. Firms in this sector increase
the output of X by inputting more labor until labor’s marginal product is equal to its price. The
expansion of output inX increases the demand for both types of workers, thus attracting both types
of labor to move away from the low-skill intensive sector. Given that the high-skill intensive sector
utilizes a higher ratio of skilled labor, foreign capital into this sector raises the demand for skilled
labor more than that for unskilled labor. In order to compete for labor, firms’ output in the low-
skill intensive sector declines, freeing up a high proportion of unskilled workers. Consequently,
the relative demand for skilled workers in the economy increases, while the relative demand for
unskilled workers decreases. To maintain full employment, given the change of relative demand,
the relative wages of skilled to unskilled workers increase.21 Overall, inflows of high-skill intensive
FDI benefit skilled workers more than unskilled workers.
19The model assumes that foreign capital complements domestic labor. In theory, foreign capital could substitute
labor. However, the existing literature tends to support that inward FDI has a positive effect on wages. See Brown
et al. (2004) for a review of the literature.
20Here foreign and domestic capital are substitutive. More efficient foreign firms can reduce domestic firms’ market
shares, therefore increasing the production costs of domestic firms and leading to a decline in their productivity. This
situation is what Aitken and Harrison (1999) interpret as the “market-stealing” effect, or negative technology spillover.
In other cases, MNCs can also complement domestic capital through positive technology spillover or forward and
backward linkages. If this sort of complementarity is sector specific, domestic firms in the other sector still hurt
because labor is driven away. In cases where foreign capital is complementary to domestic capital in both the high-
skill and low-skill intensive sectors, both domestic labor and capital gain from inflows of foreign investment.
21This change does not necessarily lead to a decline in unskilled workers’ real wages, which is dependent on
other parameters as well. In a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model with both countries of significant size, Feenstra
and Hanson (1996, 1997) show that capital movement from North to South increases the skilled wage and decreases
the unskilled wage in both home and host countries. In their model, the less skill-intensive production that moves
from North to South is considered to be more skill-intensive than the average production in South; thus, such capital
movement increases the average skill intensity of production in both the home and host countries. For a detailed
discussion of how FDI affects factor returns in various circumstances, see Brown et al. (2004).
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Second, suppose that the government liberalizes FDI regulations in the low-skill intensive sec-
tor. While foreign firms might employ a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled labor than their do-
mestic counterparts, they still, on average, use more unskilled labor in production in this sector
than firms in the high-skill intensive sector.22 Inflows of foreign capital into the low-skill intensive
sector decrease the returns of domestic capital in both sectors due to increasing competition and
the immobility of domestic capital. Moreover, increasing capital endowments lift the demand for
both types of labor in the low-skill intensive sector. This time, the demand for unskilled labor is
larger than that for skilled labor. Due to complete labor mobility, both types of labor are driven
to the low-skill intensive sector. The relative demand for unskilled workers therefore rises in the
economy, while the relative demand for skilled workers declines. Foreign capital into the low-skill
intensive sector thereby increases the relative wages of unskilled to skilled workers.
The analysis above has shown that inflows of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI affect the
relative demand for skilled and unskilled workers and therefore their real wages. Given their dis-
tinct effects on workers’ material well-being, I expect that, ceteris paribus, skilled workers favor
high-skill intensive FDI and demand liberal FDI policies in high-skill intensive sectors, while un-
skilled workers prefer low-skill intensive FDI and demand FDI liberalization in low-skill intensive
sectors.
1.3.2 Distribution of Skills, Political Institutions and FDI Policy
Following the endogenous tariff formation framework developed by Mayer (1984), we can treat
FDI policy as an endogenous outcome of the interaction between a country’s underlying distri-
bution of skills and the processes of political participation through which economic interests are
22Foreign firms tend to be more productive and have technology advantages over domestic counterparts. For
instance, in Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996; 1997) studies of the effects of capital movement on the relative wages in
both home and host countries, one assumption is that relatively labor-intensive production moving from a developed
to a developing country is considered to be skill-intensive in the host country. However, it is also possible that MNCs
could transfer production that is less skill-intensive than the average production in the host country.
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aggregated to influence actual FDI policy. I have assumed that a country is endowed with three
factors: capital (K), skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (L). In developing countries, unskilled
labor is the mass majority, with skilled labor in the middle and capitalists at the top as the smallest
group; that is, K < S < L. Given that the primary focus of this chapter is to understand how labor
coalitions affect FDI policy, I will simply put aside capitalists in the following analysis.23 24 Now
let’s further assume that each individual in the economy only owns one of the two factors. Namely,
individuals are either skilled or unskilled workers. Each individual can be differentiated by his
or her skill level. Then, the distribution of skills in a developing country is skewed to the right
with mass unskilled workers concentrating on the left (see Figures 1.3 & 1.4). Heterogeneous skill
endowments imply that each person has an optimal FDI policy. Given the distributional effects of
high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI, I expect that skilled workers prefer high-skill intensive FDI
while unskilled workers favor low-skill intensive FDI.
According to the selectorate theory, the key distinction between autocracies and democracies is
the size of the winning coalition—a subgroup of the selectorate from whom leaders have to secure
political support (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003). Regardless of the composition of the
winning coalition, leaders in both autocracies and democracies must execute policies that appeal
to the winning coalition to remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Milner and Kubota
2005: 115). Thus to maximize political support within the winning coalition, political leaders have
to adopt policies preferred by the median voter or the representative person.25
Here, the use of “median voter” should not be read literally. As Alesina and Rodrik (1994:
23Domestic capital’s preferences over inward FDI are complex. They depend on whether foreign investment is
substitutive for or complementary to domestic capital, which is determined by the underlying market structure, foreign
and domestic firms’ skill intensity, their positions on the production chains, etc.
24Even in a country that only allows capitalists and skilled workers to participate in the political process, a social
planner who seeks to maximize the overall support of the constituencies, should cater to the representative skilled
worker, given that the size of skilled workers is often larger than that of capitalists. Thus, the ignorance of capitalists
should not be a serious concern in the analysis of how different labor coalitions affect a country’s FDI policy.
25I use median voter and representative person interchangeably. In an autocracy, it is more appropriate to refer the
median voter as the representative person.
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466-67) put:
“We appeal to this theorem simply to capture the basic idea that any government is likely
to be responsive to the wishes of the majority when key distributional issues are at stake. Even
a dictator cannot completely ignore social demands, for fear of being overthrown. Thus, even
in a dictatorship, distributional issues affect the majority of the population will influence policy
decisions.”
The majority refers to the winning coalition as per the selectorate theory. In an autocracy,
the winning coalition consists of a small group of people that often include elites, professionals,
technocrats, and other skilled workers, who exert influence on political leaders and their public
policies. There are at least two chief reasons why skilled workers are likely to be part of the
winning coalition. First, skilled workers are scarce in developing countries and they are valuable
economic resources. Skilled workers are necessary to run some key industries, high-tech and skill-
intensive sectors in particular, to generate economic rents for authoritarian leaders to sustain power.
Thus, authoritarian leaders have strong incentives to co-opt certain segments of the population that
are an important input to production (Kim and Gandhi 2010). Even in authoritarian countries
that primarily depend on rents from natural resources, skilled workers are a critical production
input as they possess necessary expertise and skills. For instance, Haber et al. (2003) suggest
that authoritarian governments tend to provide selective property rights to certain group of people
who possess specific technologies or know-how to run the industry that provides a significant
proportion of government tax revenues. Second, skilled workers, who are often educated, are
more able to organize themselves and thus could be a greater threat to authoritarian regimes.26
Moreover, skills are closely associated with wealth. In this sense, skilled workers or the middle
26The middle class is often co-opted in an authoritarian regime, as the middle class has the potential to threaten
regime stability and pressure for democratization. Modernization theory suggests that with growing economic power,
the middle class becomes increasingly aware of democratic principles and post-materialist values, intolerant of au-
thoritarian rules, and thus a driving force of democratization (see, e.g., Huntington 1991; Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer
et al. 1992).
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class is relatively easier to be co-opted by extending material benefits as their interests are closer
to the elites’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). On the contrary, unskilled workers often face the
problem of collective action and thus are less likely to impose a great threat.27
In order to retain office, authoritarian leaders have to secure the political support of the win-
ning coalition. When distributional issues are at stake, the policy that maximizes political support
within the winning coalition is the one preferred by the representative person. With a small win-
ning coalition consisting only of the population on the right side of the distribution (see Figure
1.3), the representative person is a typical skilled worker. The FDI policy preferred by the repre-
sentative person is the one that maximizes the overall well-being of the winning coalition and thus
political support. Given the distributional consequences of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI,
authoritarian leaders are likely to adopt favorable policies toward high-skill intensive FDI to target
27For instance, although there are tens of thousands protests and demonstrations by workers and peasants due to
corruption, unpaid wages and pensions, or environmental deterioration every year in China, these events have been
more narrowly focused on local and specific concerns and have not yet posed a serious, nationwide threat to the regime
(Sandby-Thomas 2011).
CHAPTER 1. DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF
INWARD FDI 20





























● Median Skill Level
skilled workers in exchange for political loyalty.
In a democracy, where the franchise is expanded, the mass poor are empowered to choose
political leaders. Moreover, political competition, one of the fundamental features of democracy,
induces political leaders to adopt policies that appeal to the majority. Under universal suffrage
and majority rule, the median voter plays a decisive role in political competition (Downs 1957;
Hotelling 1929). In order to win election and retain office, democratic leaders must adjust their
policies to be responsive to the preferences of the median voter. With a large enfranchised pop-
ulation in developing countries, the winning coalition expands to include the masses of unskilled
workers (see Figure 1.4). Consequently, the skill level of the median voter declines and the median
voter is now a typical unskilled worker. Democratization creates new coalitions that are politically
influential and weakens the political cleavages of vested interest groups (Weyland 2002: 60). With
more unskilled workers included in the winning coalition, the policy preferences of the winning
coalition differ significantly from those in an autocracy in various realms, including FDI policy.
In contrast to skilled workers, unskilled workers favor low-skill intensive FDI because this sort of
FDI is more likely to increase their employment opportunities and wages. Therefore, democratic
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leaders are likely to adopt favorable policies to attract more low-skill intensive FDI.
However, in general domestic capital is likely to hurt from FDI inflows due to increasing com-
petition.28 More efficient foreign firms can reduce domestic firms’ market shares, therefore increas-
ing the production costs of domestic firms and leading to a decline in their productivity (Aitken
and Harrison 1999). Incumbent domestic firms may actively lobby government to restrict the entry
of foreign firms (see, e.g., Chari and Gupta 2008). However, to maximize political support and
retain office, politicians have incentives to adjust FDI policy strategically. Given the underlying
distribution of skills within the winning coalition, political leaders decide how much high-skill or
low-skill intensive FDI should be attracted to maximize political support. Thus, both types of FDI
are determined simultaneously. Democracy or an increase in the level of democracy will induce
political leaders to adopt liberal policies to attract more low-skill intensive FDI. It should be noted
that, whether FDI is high-skill or low-skill intensive is relative to the average skill intensity of
existing production within a country. It is possible that low-skill intensive FDI into a relatively
developed country is more skill-intensive than that into a relatively less developed country. There-
fore, I hypothesize that:
H1: Political leaders in democracies will adopt liberal policies to attract more low-skill inten-
sive FDI and thus democracy, or an increase in the level of democracy, decreases the percentage
of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI.
28See footnote 20 for a discussion of how foreign capital can either benefit or hurt domestic capital.




To test this hypothesis, I have constructed a time-series cross-sectional dataset covering 38 devel-
oping countries from 1980 to 2008. I focus on developing countries for two reasons: (1) there
are strong theoretical reasons that FDI into developed and developing countries may be driven by
different factors. The knowledge-capital model suggests that horizontal FDI is prevalent among de-
veloped countries with similar factor endowments and market sizes, while vertical FDI originated
in developed countries is likely to go to developing countries to take advantage of factor-price
differentials (e.g., Markusen 2002; Yeaple 2003); (2) all developed countries are long-standing
democracies and experience no regime change in the period of this study. Including these coun-
tries may bias the empirical results.
The dependent variable is the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI, which is
calculated based on the sectoral FDI data obtained from UNCTAD. Since I argue that democracies
are likely to adopt a more liberal policy toward low-skill intensive FDI and thus associated with
relatively higher low-skill intensive FDI inflows, my argument suggests that political regimes affect
relative rather than absolute high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI inflows. Furthermore, what
matters to the relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers is the skill intensity of FDI relative
to the average of existing production within a country. Thus, the skill composition of FDI captures
the underlying political logic.
Ideally, for every host country in each year, we require detailed employment information about
all foreign firms that have invested and then classify them into high-skill and low-skill intensive.
Unfortunately, such data are obviously too demanding and simply do not exist. Alternatively, we
can classify FDI skill level in terms of the skill intensity of the industry to which it belongs. It is true
that firms’ skill levels vary greatly even within an industry. However, since I focus on relative labor
CHAPTER 1. DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF
INWARD FDI 23
demand, it is reasonable to assume that firms in industries such as machinery and transportation
equipment manufacturing are more skill-intensive and demand more skilled workers than those in
textile and wood manufacturing. In other words, firms in high-skill intensive sectors, on average,
employ more skilled workers than those in low-skill intensive sectors, vice versa. Based on this
assumption, I am able to classify the skill intensity of different types of FDI.
The industrial classification used in the UNCTAD FDI dataset is at the two-digit level of Inter-
national Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev. 3.1 for manufacturing sectors and one-digit
level for others.29 The classification of industrial skill intensity is based on the ratio of skilled
workers (with twelve years or more education) to unskilled workers (with less than twelve years
education). The data come from Nunn and Trefler (2006), Antweiler and Trefler (2002), and Mil-
ner and Mukherjee (2009). Among all 30 industries, 13 are classified as high-skill intensive.30
They are publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media; coke, petroleum, products and
nuclear fuel; chemicals and chemical products; machinery and equipments; electrical and elec-
tronic equipment; precision instruments; motor vehicles and other transport equipment; finance;
business activities; public administration and defense;31 education; health and social services; and
community, social, and personal activities.32 Others are classified as low-skill intensive. However,
the empirical results are not sensitive to the specific classification.33
After classifying industrial skill intensity, I calculate the percentage of FDI in high-skill in-
tensive industries to overall FDI as a measure of the dependent variable. However, there are only
a few countries reporting detailed sectoral FDI data. A lot of cases are missing. After dealing
29Due to the constraints of data availability, I am unable to go to further disaggregated industry levels.
30Some manufacturing industries are aggregated because more detailed industrial FDI data are not available. For
instance, textiles, wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur are combined as textiles, clothing and leather. Since
these manufacturing activities are closely related to each other, such kind of aggregation does not affect the classifica-
tion of skill intensity.
31Given the sensitivity of this industry, in most countries, this category is 0.
32This sector is classified as skill-intensive because it includes activities of business, employers and professional
organizations, as well as recreational, cultural and sporting activities that are clearly skilled-labor intensive.
33The results are robust and consistent within some range of skill intensity as shown in Figure 1.5 in the Appendix.
The upper bound is electrical and electronic equipment industry and the lower bound is hotels and restaurants industry.
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with these missing values,34 I am able to obtain 486 observations in total covering 38 developing
countries from 1980 to 2008 before pairwise deletion of missing values in exploratory variables.
Data coverage within countries ranges greatly, from 1 to 29 observations.35
1.4.2 Independent Variable
The key independent variable is political institutions. I employ three sets of commonly used mea-
sures in the literature: the democracy score from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2010),
the size of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), and the dichotomous political
regime variable constructed by Cheibub et al. (2010).36
The Polity IV project collects data on the political characteristics of 163 countries and economies
from 1800 to 2008. The political regime index constructed by Marshall and Jaggers (2010) com-
bines five factors measuring domestic political characteristics: (1) the competitiveness of the pro-
cess for selecting a country’s chief executive, (2) the openness of this process, (3) the extent to
which institutional constraints limit a chief executive’s decision-making, (4) the competitiveness
of political participation within a country, and (5) the degree to which biding rules govern political
participation within it. These five factors are used to construct an 11-point index of democratic
(DEMOC) and autocratic (AUTOC) scores. This measure has been widely used in the studies on
the relationship between political institutions and foreign policies (see, e.g., Jensen 2003; Li and
Resnick 2003; Milner and Kubota 2005; Milner and Mukherjee 2009; Oneal and Russett 1999).
34See the Appendix for a description on how missing values are treated.
35See Table 1.5 in the Appendix for data availability.
36Another commonly used measure of political institutions is the index of political rights constructed by Freedom
House. However, given its subjectivity and the complex items used to aggregate the seven-point scale measure, it is
unclear what this measure really captures. My argument is about the size of the winning coalition and the degree of
political competition. Questions used to construct the political rights index include: Are there free and independent
media? Are there free trade unions and other professional organization, and is there effective collective bargaining?
Is there personal autonomy? Is there equality of opportunity? Apparently, this measure contains much more infor-
mation than the size of the winning coalition and political competition. Using this index makes the underlying causal
mechanism unclear. See Cheibub et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion.
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Following the existing literature, I use the difference between DEMOC and AUTOC as a mea-
sure of political regime ranging from -10 for an extremely autocratic state to 10 for an extremely
democratic state. This measure is appropriate for testing the hypothesis, since I argue that not only
democracy but also an increase in the degree of democracy is associated with a low proportion
of high-skill intensive FDI. In addition, I utilize the political competition (POLCOMP) and the
competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP) in the Polity IV dataset to capture the level of po-
litical competition. My argument suggests that political competition, one fundamental feature of
democracy, induces politicians to appeal to the unskilled median voter. Thus I expect that more
severe political competition is associated with a higher percentage of low-skill intensive FDI.
The size of the winning coalition is central to the argument. With an increasing size of the
winning coalition, the median voter’s policy preferences shift dramatically. Following Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) and Morrow et al. (2008), I construct the size of the winning coalition
(W) as follows: three components of the Polity IV project are used, XRCOMP, XROPEN, and
PARCOMP, which measure the competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive
recruitment, and competitiveness of political competition, respectively. W is awarded one point if
XRCOMP is greater than or equal to 2, or if XROPEN is greater than 2, or if PARCOMP equals
5. W is assigned another point if it is not a military regime.37 The final W score is normalized to
range from 0 to 1.
Finally, I utilize Cheibub et al.’s (2010) dichotomous measure of democracy and dictatorship.
This measure is minimalist. A country is classified as a democracy when the four requirements are
met:
“1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popu-
larly elected.
37In the original measure, the authors use the data of non-military and non-military-civilian regimes from Banks
(1996). Given the time coverage of the sample in the chapter, I need the latest data on military regimes. Thus, I utilize
the regime variable from Cheibub et al. (2010) to code military regimes
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2. The legislature must be popularly elected.
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections.
4. An alternative in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent
to office must have taken place” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 69).
This measure is appropriate for testing the argument because the classification is based on how
the chief executive is selected. When the chief executive is chosen through popular elections,
politicians have to secure a large winning coalition and adopt policies that appeal to the majority
of voters.
1.4.3 Alternative Explanations and Control Variables
1.4.3.1 Human Capital and Skill Endowments
Obviously, national human capital and skill endowments play a critical role in determining the ge-
ographic distribution and composition of FDI (Carr et al. 2001; Yeaple 2003; Zhang and Markusen
1999). Due to comparative advantage, high-skill intensive FDI may favor locations that are rel-
atively abundant in skilled workers. If the ratios of factor endowments between MNCs and host
countries are extremely different, it might not be economically efficient to produce goods in host
countries. Yeaple (2003) finds evidence that U.S. MNCs in high-skill intensive industries favor
skill-abundant countries, while those in low-skill intensive industries prefer skill-scarce locations.
I expect that a country endowed with more human capital and skills is associated with a higher
percentage of high-skill intensive FDI inflows.
H2: Human capital and skill endowments are positively correlated with the percentage of high-
skill intensive FDI.
I utilize a country’s real GDP per capita and gross secondary school enrollment rate as proxies
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for its human capital and skill endowments. A country’s level of economic development is closely
related to its human capital and skill endowments. Clearly, economic development helps improve
education facilities and increase labor force’s literacy and sophistication, all of which contribute
to the accumulation of human capital and skill upgrading. Thus, real GDP per capita is able to
capture a country’s human capital and skill endowments. The real GDP per capita data comes from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), which is in constant 2005 international
dollars (PPP adjusted). This variable is logged to deal with skewed distribution. To some extent, the
gross secondary school enrollment rate is a direct measure of human capital. One weakness is that
the data availability is really poor for developing countries. The World Bank’s Education Statistics
only report schooling data every 5 years for the 1980s. To maximize the number of observations,
missing values are linearly interpolated, given the fact that human capital is accumulated over time.
For the last three years (2006-2008), I use schooling data from 2005.
1.4.3.2 Market Size and Economic Growth
A large market size and high economic growth rate are particularly attractive to high-skill intensive
FDI. A sizable market helps firms decrease unit cost and achieve potential economies of scale.
High-skill intensive FDI often requires large research and development (R&D) expenditures and
a high input of physical capital. In such cases, a large market is important to bring down unit
cost and obtain production efficiency. All things being equal, high-skill intensive FDI should
favor large economies. Economic growth rate is a strong signal of future economic development.
Stable economic growth increases domestic income and consumer demand for goods and services,
which enhances MNCs’ long-term commitments (Noorbakhsh et al. 2001; Root and Ahmed 1979;
Schneider and Frey 1985). In this sense, economic prospects are crucial to high-skill intensive FDI
that involves a large capital investment and long-term commitment. Therefore, it is expected that a
large market size and high economic growth rate help attract more high-skill intensive FDI than a
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small market with a low growth rate. I utilize real GDP in constant 2005 international dollars (PPP
adjusted) and annual GDP growth rate to measure a country’s market size and economic growth
rate, respectively. The data comes from WDI as well. To deal with skewed distribution, real GDP
is logged.
H3: A larger market size and higher economic growth rate help attract a larger share of high-
skill intensive FDI.
1.4.3.3 Natural Resource Endowments
Despite the fact that investment in manufacturing and service sectors constitutes the majority of
current global FDI flows (UNCTAD 1998), the availability of natural resources is still an important
determinant of FDI inflows in least developed countries with a small market size (see, e.g., Asiedu
2006). Firms in primary sectors involving mining and quarrying in developing countries tend to be
less skill-intensive.38 Thus, countries abundant in natural resources are likely to attract a relatively
high share of low-skill intensive FDI. To proxy for countries’ natural resources endowments, I use
the percentage of fuel, ores and metals exports in total exports (see, e.g., Ades and Tella 1999;
Treisman 2000). The data is from WDI as well.
H4: Natural resource endowments decrease the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI.
38The skill intensity of mining, quarrying and petroleum industry varies greatly across developed and developing
countries. In some cases, firms in primary sectors such as petroleum extraction can be high-skill intensive. The U.S.
data show that mining, quarrying and petroleum industry is high-skill intensive while the China data indicate that
it is low-skill intensive. In the sectoral FDI dataset, only a few number of countries report FDI data in the mining,
quarrying and petroleum industry. Including this industry in the construction of the dependent variable reduces the
sample size by more than 80 observations. However, the empirical results of the analysis are not sensitive to the
inclusion or exclusion of primary sectors and whether the mining, quarrying and petroleum industry is classified as
high-skill or low-skill intensive. See additional robustness checks in the Appendix.
CHAPTER 1. DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF
INWARD FDI 29
1.4.3.4 Trade Openness
Trade liberalization tends to have mixed effects on FDI inflows. On the one hand, the knowledge-
capital model suggests that restricted trade regimes are associated with more horizontal FDI due to
the “tariff jumping” motive. On the other hand, vertical FDI should be negatively affected by trade
protection, as the motivation of this sort of FDI is to take advantage of factor-price differentials
and ship intermediate or final goods back to home countries. A restricted trade system increases
the cost of vertical FDI and thus reduces its incentive to locate abroad (Carr et al. 2001; Markusen
1995). Models of MNCs speculate that horizontal FDI is more common among advanced countries
with similar market sizes and factor endowments; vertical FDI is more likely to go to developing
countries to make use of cheap labor. In this regard, a restrictive trade regime hurts FDI inflows
in developing countries. Whether liberal trade policies are more attractive to high-skill or low-
skill intensive FDI is thus dependent upon the extent to which they engage in trade. In addition,
trade openness may contribute to human capital accumulation and labor sophistication through
interactions with other countries, which can help attract high-skill intensive FDI. To control for
the effect of trade openness, I employ the standard measure of trade openness in the literature—
the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. The data is obtained from WDI. This
variable is logged to deal with skewed distribution. One concern of this measure is that openness
can be endogenous to FDI composition given that a substantial part of trade is in fact conducted
by MNCs. To mitigate this problem, as a robustness check I turn to Sachs-Warner’s dichotomous
index of trade openness that gauges a country’s trade policy orientation and is thus less endogenous
to FDI.39
H5a: Trade openness increases the ratio of high-skill intensive FDI inflows.
39The Sacks-Warner index classifies a country’s trade regime as closed if one of the five criteria is met: “(1)
Average tariff rates of 40 percent of more (TAR). (2) Nontariff barriers covering 40 percent or more of trade (NTB).
(3) A black market exchange rate at least 20 percent lower than the official exchange rate (BMP). (4) A state monopoly
on major exports (XMB). (5) A socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai 1992) (SOC)”(Wacziarg and Welch
2008: 190).
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H5b: Trade openness increases the proportion of low-skill intensive FDI inflows.
1.4.3.5 Economic Crisis
Macroeconomic instability increases the risks and uncertainty of conducting business in host coun-
tries, therefore influencing foreign investors’ expected returns. It is well documented that economic
reform is more likely to be implemented during economic crisis (e.g., Edwards 1995; Weyland
2002). Such economic reforms usually contain a basket of policies to stabilize macro-economy.
The effects of economic crisis on FDI inflows are rather complex. On the one hand, macroeco-
nomic volatility increases risks and uncertainty, thus deterring foreign investors. Moreover, stabi-
lization packages often consist of rigid fiscal policies and control of capital accounts, all of which
negatively impact FDI. On the other hand, countries in economic crisis are often forced to adopt
favorable policies toward FDI as it is a committed long-term financial source. This is especially
important for countries undergoing balance-of-payment crisis when governments are unable to ob-
tain foreign exchange through other channels. How high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI respond
to economic crisis and government favorable policies depends on their degree of risk aversion
toward macroeconomic instability. Thus, we could have two alternative hypotheses:
H6a: Economic crisis reduces the proportion of high-skill intensive FDI as it is more sensitive
to macroeconomic instability.
H6b: Economic crisis decreases the share of low-skill intensive FDI as it is more sensitive to
macroeconomic instability
Following Tornell (1998),40 two notions of economic crisis are used: (1) Economic Crisis (EC
Crisis)—either the country’s inflation rate is no less than 40% with an increase of at least 20% from
previous year, or its GDP per capita reduces by more than 25%; (2) Balance-of-Payment Crisis (BP
Crisis): the country’s total foreign reserves are less than the value of three-month imports. The data
40See also Milner and Kubota (2005).
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of inflation and total foreign reserves in months of imports come from WDI.
1.4.3.6 International Institutions
International institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and various trade agreements, bind actors to commit to a specific set of liberal eco-
nomic policies, thus mitigating the problem of “obsolescing bargain” and making government’s
commitment more credible (Büthe and Milner 2008). In this regard, membership in international
institutions helps attract FDI. Whether international institutions impact the skill composition of in-
ward FDI or not hinges on high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI’s sensitivity to the risk of govern-
ment expropriation. Most case studies on the obsolescing bargain model have focused on extractive
sectors that entail high fixed costs. Once invested, fixed capital assets become “sunk” and the bar-
gaining power starts to shift to host government (Vernon 1971, 1980). When applying the model
to manufacturing sectors, extant literature suggests that capital- and technology-intensive MNCs
have more bargaining power than labor-intensive ones, as they possess arcane and proprietary firm
assets. The complexity of R&D and the pace of technological change in skill-intensive sectors
are often beyond the reach of host countries. Consequently, the bargaining power over time shifts
towards MNCs possessing firm-specific capital, technology and managerial skills (Kobrin 1987).41
Moreover, governments in developing countries treat FDI as an important means of acquiring ad-
vanced technology and that makes the bargaining power lean towards MNCs. Thus high-skill
intensive FDI should be less vulnerable to government expropriation. Therefore, I hypothesize
that participation in international institutions increases a country’s proportion of low-skill inten-
sive FDI intake. I do a principal factor analysis on a country’s WTO membership and the number
of accumulative bilateral investment treaties signed to obtain a factor score as a measure of its
involvement in international institutions.
41For a case study of the automobile industry, see Bennett and Sharpe (1979); for pharmaceuticals, see Gereffi
(1978).
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H7: Involvement in international institutions induces more low-skill than high-skill intensive
FDI, and thus increases the fraction of low-skill intensive FDI.
1.4.4 Empirical Results
Due to missing values in the sectoral FDI data, the sample is extremely unbalanced. The number
of observations within countries ranges from 1 to 29. Given that, a multilevel model (MLM)
provides a better model fit than a classic ordinary least squares (OLS) model. OLS models with
no pooling give too much weight to groups with a few observations, resulting in bigger standard
errors and imprecise estimates (Gelman and Hill 2007). MLMs shrink the intercepts to group
means when the number of observations is low within groups (close to complete pooling) and
move intercepts to fixed effects with no pooling when the number of observations is large within
groups. The partial pooling nature of MLMs provides more reasonable parameter estimates than
pooled (random effects) and unpooled (fixed effects) designs when the number of observations
within groups is low (Gelman and Hill 2007; Shor et al. 2007).
I estimate an MLM with varying intercepts across both countries and years to control for coun-
try and year effects.42 The model is constructed as follows:
HighSkillFDIi,t = αj[i] + βt[i] + ϕ ∗ LDV + γ ∗Democracyi,t−1 + φXi,t−1 + εi,t (1.1)
αj ∼ N(µα, σ2α)
βj ∼ N(µβ, σ2β)
αj and βt are intercepts varying across countries and over time respectively, drawn from normal
distributions with means of µα and µβ and standard deviations of σα and σβ , respectively. ϕ,
42In MLMs, country and year effects are drawn from common normal distributions. In classic OLS regressions
with fixed effects, the intercepts are country- and year-specific.
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and γ are coefficients to be estimated for the lagged dependent variable (LDV) and democracy
respectively, which are constant across all units. An LDV is included to mitigate the problem of
serial correlation43 and model the dynamic process of FDI inflows.44 X is a N × K matrix of
K control variables and φ is a vector of K coefficients to be estimated. All control variables are
lagged one period to deal with possible endogeneity. Models are estimated using lmer in R.45
I start from some key determinants of the skill composition of FDI: democracy, GDP per capita,
and schooling. Model 1 in Table 1.1 presents the results. The regression coefficient of democracy
is -0.63, statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval. This result supports my argument
that an increase in the level of democracy reduces the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI. When
all other variables are held constant, one standard deviation increase of the democracy score (5.97
units in the sample, roughly corresponding to the difference of the democracy scores between
Nigeria and Uruguay in 2002) will reduce the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI by 4.12%.
The effect is substantively large. Given that the sum of the percentages of high-skill and low-
skill intensive FDI is 100%, a 4.12% decrease of the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI leads
to a 4.12% increase of the percentage of low-skill intensive FDI simultaneously. The difference
between these two percentages is actually 8.24%.
In addition, the coefficient of GDP per capita has the expected regression sign and it is statis-
tically significant beyond the conventional level. This implies that higher human capital and skill
endowments measured by per capital GDP are strongly associated with a larger share of high-skill
intensive FDI. Schooling, measured by gross secondary enrollment rate, does not have a significant
43A unit-root test for the dependent variable rejects the null hypothesis at 1% level that all panels contain unit roots.
44There are some debates about whether to include an LDV or not when estimating time-series data. Achen (2000)
suggests that adding an LDV can cause downward bias of other explanatory variables’ coefficients and even make
them insensible and insignificant. Through Monte Carlo simulations, Keele and Kelly (2006) find that in the presence
of dynamics, an OLS model without an LDV is biased and the bias could be dramatic due to model mis-specification.
They suggest that an OLS model with an LDV performs better than other models if theory implies dynamic processes.
In this case, models without an LDV do show stronger effects of democracy than those with an LDV.
45Given the controversy in calculating the P-values in MLMs, the significance levels are reported based on the
90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals obtained from 1000 simulations.
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Table 1.1: Multilevel Models with Varying Intercepts across Countries and Years
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy -0.63** -0.63** -0.64** -0.70** -0.74*** -0.67**
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33)
Lagged DV 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln (GDP per capita) 17.04*** 14.20*** 14.07*** 11.72** 10.45** 10.42**
(4.45) (4.57) (4.66) (5.06) (5.18) (5.12)
Schooling 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Ln (GDP) 4.73** 4.73* 6.2** 5.91** 7.12**
(2.44) (2.51) (2.86) (2.94) (3.08)
Economic Growth 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.04
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
Natural Resources 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Trade Openness 7.49 8.07 9.19
(6.11) (6.18) (6.23)
Economic Crisis 1.97 1.66
(6.80) (6.81)




Constant -120.87*** -211.77*** -210.66*** -257.34*** -241.34*** 277.31***
(33.38) (55.59) (56.79) (70.52) (72.44) (78.01)
Region Dummies X X X X X X
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330
Number of Countries 33 33 33 33 33 33
Number of Years 28 28 28 28 28 28
σy 22.06 22.16 22.15 22.07 22.02 22.04
σa 18.35 16.46 16.99 17.70 18.43 17.94
σb 1.85 1.88 1.95 1.99 1.42 1.67
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI. All right-hand-side explana-
tory variables are lagged one period. Coefficients of region dummies and country and year effects are not reported.
*** significant at 99% confidence interval; ** significant at 95% confidence interval; * significant at 90% confidence
interval.
effect on the skill composition of FDI, though its slope is in the right direction. It may be that its
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impact has already been captured by GDP per capita.46
In Model 2, I add GDP and economic growth rate to the regression. Including these two vari-
ables does not change the sign or magnitude of democracy’s coefficient. In addition, the results
indicate that a large market size measured by GDP is significantly associated with a high proportion
of high-skill intensive FDI. The coefficient of economic growth rate has the expected regression
sign but is not statistically significant. In Models 3, 4, 5 and 6, I add more control variables, includ-
ing natural resource endowments, trade openness, economic crisis, balance-of-payment crisis, and
membership in international institutions. We can see from Table 1.1 that, in all models, democ-
racy is negatively and strongly associated with the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total
FDI, which is consistent with the results in Models 1 and 2. Moreover, the results show that GDP
per capita and GDP are positively and significantly associated with a high proportion of high-skill
intensive FDI. Rather, balance-of-payment crisis is negatively correlated with the percentage of
high-skill intensive FDI and its coefficient is statistically significant at a 90% confidence interval.
This implies that balance-of-payment crisis tends to have a larger negative impact on high-skill
than low-skill intensive FDI. All other variables seem to have no significant effect on the skill
composition of FDI, though most coefficients have expected regression signs.
The results above have shown that democracy or an increase in the degree of democracy is
negatively and significantly associated with the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI,
which strongly supports my argument that political regime type makes a difference in the skill
composition of FDI. To check whether the results are sensitive to a specific measure of democ-
racy, I turn to alternative measures. In Models 1 and 2 in Table 1.2, I utilize political competition
(POLCOMP) and competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP) from the Polity IV project. Given
that political competition is the underlying force that drives politicians to use FDI policy to reward
their core constituencies, conceptually these two variables are better measures than the composite
46The Pearson correlation between GDP per capita and schooling is 0.58 in the sample.
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Table 1.2: MLMs: Alternative Measures of Political Institutions
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Political Competition -1.77***
(0.68)






Lagged DV 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
0.06 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln (GDP per capita) 10.48** 11.24** 12.22** 10.01*
(5.15) (5.23) (5.22) (5.25)
Schooling 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Ln (GDP) 7.32** 6.98** 7.59*** 7.27**
(3.12) (3.13) (3.08) (3.19)
Economic Growth 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Natural Resources -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Trade Openness 10.27* 9.96 9.33 8.31
(6.28) (6.29) (6.20) (6.28)
Economic Crisis 0.94 0.8 1.35 1.68
(6.79) (6.81) (6.79) (6.81)
Balance-of-Payment Crisis -7.47** -7.86** -6.24* -6.59*
(3.60) (3.63) (3.60) (3.61)
International Institutions -3.3 -4.09* -3.62 -3.61
(2.53) (2.53) (2.52) (2.55)
Constant -277.83*** -271.96*** -291.74*** -273.81***
(78.51) (78.68) (78.30) (80.06)
Region Dummies X X X X
Observations 330 330 330 330
Number of Countries 33 33 33 33
Number of Years 28 28 28 28
σy 21.95 21.96 21.91 21.93
σa 18.29 18.41 17.91 18.86
σb 1.06 1.43 2.12 2.33
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI. All right-hand-side explana-
tory variables are lagged one period. Coefficients of region dummies and country and year effects are not reported.
*** significant at 99% confidence interval; ** significant at 95% confidence interval; * significant at 90% confidence
interval.
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democracy score. Using POLCOMP and PARCOMP does not affect the overall fit of the model.
To some extent, POLCOMP and PARCOMP have even larger effects on the skill composition of
FDI. One standard deviation increase in POLCOMP and PARCOMP reduces the percentage of
high-skill intensive FDI by 4.87% and 4.79% respectively. The slopes and magnitudes of other co-
efficients do not change too much except that the coefficient of international institutions is statisti-
cally significant at a 90% confidence interval in Model 2. A country’s membership in international
institutions seems to attract more low-skill intensive FDI. In Model 3, I employ a direct measure
of the size of the winning coalition. As shown in Table 1.2, this variable is statistically significant
beyond the conventional level. When all other variables are held constant, one standard deviation
increase in the size of the winning coalition (0.26 units) reduces the percentage of high-skill inten-
sive FDI by 5.02%. Finally, in Model 4, the dichotomous measure of democracy and dictatorship
is used. The coefficient of the dichotomous variable is negatively and statistically significant at
a 90% confidence interval. This finding is pretty consistent with my argument that democracies
attract a larger share of low-skill intensive FDI. For example, ceteris paribus, a transition from
autocracy to democracy decreases the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI by 8.22%.
The analysis, so far, has shown that democracy is strongly associated with a low share of
high-skill intensive to total FDI and that the results are not sensitive to alternative measures of
democracy. However, one possible rejection is that the results may suffer from omitting unobserv-
able country-specific variables. Although we have modeled country and year effects using MLMs,
the assumption in MLMs is that country and year effects come from some normal distributions.
If we believe that countries in the world do not share any common characteristics, the results ob-
tained from MLMs may still suffer from omitted variable bias. To control for these fixed effects, I
employ an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model. A fixed effects model basically uses within-
group variation to obtain parameter estimates. In such a case, the proposed theory is about how
a change in the degree of democracy affects the difference in the skill composition of FDI. Thus
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Table 1.3: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimator











Lagged DV -0.17* -0.18* -0.18* -0.16* -0.15
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Ln (GDP per capita) -67.93* -76.91** -67.29* -62.01 -68.47
(39.46) (35.83) (37.55) (38.84) (42.92)
Schooling 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.12
(0.40) (0.36) (0.37) (0.42) (0.42)
Ln (GDP) 45.21 56.61* 50.06 45.14 46.03
(33.11) (30.69) (31.76) (33.12) (37.64)
Economic Growth 0.54* 0.50* 0.52** 0.48* 0.49*
(0.28) (0.27) (0.25) (0.29) (0.29)
Natural Resources 0.64** 0.60* 0.55* 0.64* 0.67*
(0.33) (0.31) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35)
Trade Openness 16.65 18.18* 22.36* 17.31 16.05
(10.65) (10.86) (11.55) (10.53) (10.52)
Economic Crisis 4.70 4.82 4.99 4.15 4.27
(6.94) (6.75) (6.80) (7.07) (7.17)
Balance-of-Payment Crisis -9.02 -9.65 -10.34* -8.68 -9.65
(6.33) (6.31) (6.09) (6.15) (6.40)
International Institutions 6.35** 5.37* 3.85 3.75 3.20
(2.88) (3.04) (3.40) (2.99) (3.31)
Constant -606.15 -796.89* -723.03 -644.19 -617.52
(496.55) (481.42) (483.33) (501.45) (577.16)
Observations 284 284 284 284 287
Number of Countries 30 30 30 30 31
χ2 54.06 33.31 30.41 60.45 46.33
P > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%;
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an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model is appropriate because it estimates the coefficients
of first differences. Another advantage of this model is that it uses previous first-differences as
instrumental variables for current ones, which helps mitigate possible endogeneity problems.
In Table 1.3, I present the results obtained from Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data models. We
can see that a larger increase in the level of democracy is strongly associated with a larger reduction
in the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI. In addition, all the coefficients of other political
regime variables are negative and statistically significant. These results are fairly consistent with
those in Table 1.1 and 1.2.
Finally, to further check the robustness of the findings, I run additional regressions by excluding
primary sectors, controlling for political constraints and partisanship, and using Sachs-Warner’s
trade orientation index. The empirical results are not sensitive to alternative model specifications.
All detailed discussions and results are presented in Table 1.4 in the Appendix.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the literature by identifying a skill bias in the sectoral composition of
inward FDI across political regimes in developing countries, and by providing a political economy
explanation. High-skill and low-skill intensive FDI, through employing different combinations
of and thus changing the relative demand for skilled and unskilled workers, generate distinct in-
come effects on these two types of labor. Given these distributional consequences, the motivation
for political survival shaped by domestic political institutions leads politicians in autocracies and
democracies to adopt different policies toward high-skill and low-skill FDI to extent benefits to
their core constituencies, which results in a skill bias in the sectoral composition of inward FDI
across political regimes. The empirical evidence based on available sectoral FDI data strongly
supports my argument. The results are robust and consistent across various model specifications.
CHAPTER 1. DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF
INWARD FDI 40
However, one caveat is that the results should be read as tentative given that the limited availability
of sectoral FDI data for developing countries.
Following the political economy of trade literature and recent developments in the studies on
the politics of FDI, this chapter builds an analytical framework that combines domestic interests
with the mediating role of national political institutions. Moreover, it highlights labor’s heteroge-
nous preferences toward high-skill/low-skill intensive FDI and calls for research on more nuanced
accounts of the distributional consequences of cross-border factor movements and in particular
FDI flows.
In addition, this chapter underscores the role of domestic politics in studying economic lib-
eralization. The “race-to-the-bottom” argument suggests that international economic forces have
exerted such a powerful influence that nation states have little discretion in the realm of foreign
economic policy making. Given the increasing mobility of global capital, any deviation from a
free-market policy would be punished by capital flight. However, this study suggests that the
effects of international economic forces are actually channeled by domestic politics (see also Keo-
hane and Milner 1996; Milner 1997). Politicians make strategic calculations when deciding on
economic liberalization. The findings of this research encourage scholars to further explore the
dynamic domestic political roots of foreign economic policy.
Lastly, although this study shows a skill bias in the sectoral composition of inward FDI across
political regimes, many variations within autocracies and democracies are left unexplored. Yet,
the political economy framework developed in this chapter provides a useful analytical tool for
future research. For instance, although authoritarian countries in general have smaller winning
coalitions than democratic states, autocratic leaders rely on a variety of domestic coalitions to
maintain authority. These variations should have important implications for foreign economic
policy including FDI policy, therefore providing fertile research opportunities.
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1.6 Appendix
Figure 1.5: Classification of FDI Skill Intensity
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Data Sources: Antweiler and Trefler (2002), Milner and Mukherjee (2009), and Nunn and Trefler (2006).
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1.6.1 Missing Values in the Sectoral FDI Data
In the UNCTAD dataset, there are many empty cells. Regarding these missing values, there are
two possibilities: either the country does not report the data (truly missing) or the missing value
is actually 0.47 To distinguish actual 0s from truly missing values, I first add up FDI data in the
primary, secondary, tertiary, and unspecified sectors, and then compare the sum with the total in-
ward FDI data reported by UNCTAD. If the difference between these two is less than $ 1 million,48
all missing values in the primary, secondary, tertiary, and unspecified sectors are imputed with 0s.
After replacing missing values with 0s for these four sectors, I impute 0s within the primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary sectors using the same method. If the difference between the sum of FDI in
sub-categories and total FDI in each of the three sectors is less than $ 1 million, all missing values
in sub-categories are imputed with 0s.
In doing so, I am able to obtain 486 observations in total, covering 38 developing countries from
1980 to 2008 before pairwise deletion of missing values in exploratory variables. Data coverage
within countries varies greatly, from 1 to 29 observations.49 In fact, I do not impute too many
missing values. Most are actually 0s. There are only 13 observations for which the absolute
difference between the sum of inward FDI in the primary, secondary, tertiary and unspecified
sectors and total FDI reported by UNCTAD is bigger than $ 0.5 million. Only 29 observations
have the difference larger than $ 0.1 million, which is about 5.97% of the sample size.
47In some cases, truly missing values and 0s are not distinguished in the dataset. In other cases, countries may
receive 0 total FDI or 0 FDI in particular industries in a given year.
48To increase the number of observations, we can lift the criterion to $ 2 or $ 5 million. However, in doing
so, we may introduce bias by imputing too many 0s. Thus, I use $ 1 million as the threshold. In most cases, $ 1
million only constitutes a tiny percent of total FDI inflows. For those countries that receive less than $ 1 million
FDI, it is also reasonable to treat sectoral FDI inflows as 0 because such a small amount of FDI will not affect
their economies significantly. Thus politicians have fewer incentives to manipulate FDI policies in order to reward
their constituents. For a robustness check, I exclude those cases in which total FDI is less than $ 1 million and
sectoral FDI data are missing. Actually the regression results are even stronger. The results are also supported by the
distribution of democracy scores for these countries that receive less than $ 1 million FDI. There are more autocracies
than democracies. The mean democracy score is -3.85 for the 35 observations with absolute inward FDI less than $ 1
million. When we treat these cases as 0s, the estimated coefficient of democracy is in fact biased downward.
49See Table 1.5 for data availability.
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1.6.2 Additional Robustness Checks
1.6.2.1 Primary Sectors
In the construction of the dependent variable, I classify primary sectors as low-skill intensive. It
may raise some problems given the heterogeneous skill levels in these sectors. The extraction of
coal, metal ores, and non-metallic minerals in developing countries tend to be less skill-intensive,
while petroleum and natural gas extraction can be high-skill intensive. To check whether the results
are substantially influenced by the primary sector data, I exclude primary sectors in the construction
of the dependent variable and then re-estimate Model 6 in Table 1.1. Model 1 in Table 1.4 shows
the results. Excluding primary sectors does not change the results substantially. Democracy is
negative and highly significant beyond the conventional level. By excluding primary sectors, I find
that democracy has an even stronger effect on the skill composition of FDI. All else being equal,
one standard deviation increase in the democracy score (5.97 units) will reduce the percentage of
high-skill intensive FDI by 6.81%.
1.6.2.2 Political Constraints
Scholars have suggested that democracy is more attractive to FDI because democratic institutions
such as veto players and audience costs help mitigate the political risks associated with government
expropriation and policy instability, making democratic governments more credible to investors
(e.g., Jensen 2003, 2006). Due to the plurality of interests and political competition in democra-
cies, a country’s level of democracy is positively correlated with its degree of political constraints.
The causal mechanism in the political economy framework developed in this chapter lies in the
logic of political survival and political competition. It is politicians’ incentives to retain office that
drive them to strategically use FDI policy to secure for political loyalty. If low-skill intensive FDI
actually favors countries with more political constraints and a higher level of policy predictabil-
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ity, or if high-skill intensive FDI prefers those countries with fewer political constraints, then the
empirical results may be spurious.
To check whether political constraints are actually the underlying driving force, I include the
political constraint index constructed by Henisz (2010) as a control variable (see Model 2 in Table
1.4). Adding this variable does not change the magnitude or the significance level of democracy’s
coefficient too much. Democracy has a coefficient of -0.74, which is statistically significant at
a 90% confidence interval. The political constraint variable turns out to be statistically insignif-
icant.50 These results show that it is democracy and political competition rather than political
constraints that drive the skill bias of the sectoral structure of FDI.
1.6.2.3 Partisanship
In addition, scholars have documented that government political ideology plays a significant role
in determining their FDI policy. Pinto (2004) shows that left-wing governments are more likely
to welcome FDI because FDI benefits their core constituencies—labor. Pinto and Pinto (2008)
further suggest that left-oriented governments encourage the type of FDI that complements labor
while right-oriented governments support the type of FDI beneficial to domestic capital. In this
case, we would expect that left-wing governments in developing countries will support low-skill
intensive more than high-skill intensive FDI given that the former employs a higher ratio of un-
skilled workers who are the majority.
In Model 3, I add party orientation as a control variable. The party orientation data comes
50The insignificance may be caused by the collinearity between democracy and the political constraint index. The
Pearson correlations between the democracy score and political constraint index is 0.70. I also run additional regres-
sions by replacing democracy with POLCOM, PARCOMP, the size of the winning coalition, and the dichotomous
regime variable. All the coefficients of alternative measures of democracy are negative and statistically significant.
The Pearson correlation between the political constraint index and POLCOM, PARCOMP, the size of the winning
coalition, and the democracy dummy are 0.65, 0.53, 0.63, and 0.72, respectively. At least for models using POLCOM,
PARCOMP, and the size of the winning coalition, collinearity is not a serious concern.
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Table 1.4: MLMs: Additional Robustness Checks
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy -1.14*** -0.74* -1.39*** -0.61*





S-W Openness Index 10.68**
(5.57)
Lagged DV 0.08 0.05 -0.08 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Ln (GDP per capita) 11.48** 11.01** 12.94 12.85*
(5.66) (5.38) (8.73) (6.71)
Schooling 0.06 0.01 -0.24 0.04
(0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.24)
Ln (GDP) 5.08 6.88** 4.38 4.90
(3.31) (3.16) (4.42) (3.83)
Economic Growth 0.12 0.03 -0.09 -0.01
(0.35) (0.30) (0.34) (0.36)
Natural Resources 0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.02
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14)
Trade Openness 4.60 9.4 6.29
(7.07) (6.37) (8.29)
Economic Crisis 10.62 1.8 10.54 3.44
(8.07) (6.94) (9.10) (7.18)
Balance-of-Payment Crisis -6.45 -6.68* -4.63 -8.03*
(4.24) (3.70) (4.19) (4.39)
International Institutions -1.04 -2.68 4.51 -7.19*
(2.99) (2.62) (3.47) (3.76)
Constant -220.2 -280.12*** -215.68** -210.99
(84.63) (79.90) (113.03) (93.61)
Region Dummies X X X X
Observations 330 326 227 247
Number of Countries 33 32 28 27
Number of Years 28 28 24 22
σy 26.41 22.21 20.80 21.96
σa 18.21 18.28 26.56 22.28
σb 0.48 1.18 3.77 4.07
Notes:The dependent variable is the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI. All right-hand-side explanatory
variables are lagged one period. Region dummies, and country and year effects are not reported. *** significant at
99% confidence interval; ** significant at 95% confidence interval; * significant at 90% confidence interval.
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from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions.51 The inclusion of the party orientation
variable does not change the results substantially. The coefficient of democracy is negative and
statistically significant at a 99% confidence interval. In addition, partisanship does have a negative
impact on the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI but its coefficient is not statistically significant.
1.6.2.4 Trade Openness
Another concern is the possible endogeneity between FDI and the measure of trade openness given
that a large part of trade is in fact conducted by MNCs. To mitigate this problem, I use Sachs-
Warner’s dichotomous trade openness index as a robustness check. This variable measures the
actual trade policy orientation that is arguably less endogenous to FDI flows. The data are only up-
dated to 2001 by Wacziarg and Welch (2008), which reduces the sample to 247 observations. The
results in Model 4 in Table 1.4 show that the coefficient of democracy is quite consistent with those
in other model specifications. In addition, the results indicate that trade openness has a significant
positive impact on the skill composition of FDI. All else being equal, moving from a closed to
an open trade regime will increase the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI by approximately
10.68%.
In sum, these robustness checks have shown that the empirical results are not sensitive to the
exclusion of primary sectors, the addition of the political constraint and partisanship variables, or
the possible endogeneity between FDI and trade openness.
51This variable is coded according party platforms and agendas, which may not reflect the nuances of actual policy
orientation. However, these are the most comprehensive data for developing countries from 1980 to 2008.
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Table 1.5: Data Availability
Country Year Obs. FDI High-Skill Low-Skill DEM GDP GDP PCFDI FDI
Argentina 80-04 21 4136.19 922.24 3213.95 5.29 26.48 9.16
Armenia 93-08 15 241.24 48.35 192.89 3.53 22.88 7.92
Azerbaijan 93 1 0.01 0.00 0.01 -3.00 23.72 7.89
Bangladesh 83-4,9,95-08 17 426.31 92.55 333.76 2.41 25.51 6.78
Bolivia 80-89 10 33.54 1.52 32.02 5.50 23.62 8.03
Bosnia & Herzegovina 04-08 5 1044.76 438.77 605.99 23.88 8.74
Brazil 96-00,02-08 12 24310.40 9628.16 14682.24 8.00 28.02 9.02
Cambodia 80,95-08 15 294.31 57.62 236.69 1.21 23.42 7.04
Cape Verde 88-95 7 0.22 0.00 0.22 20.23 7.42
Chile 80-08 29 2385.46 459.22 1926.23 4.14 25.45 8.99
China 07-08 2 83581.66 53436.27 30145.40 -7.00 29.58 8.57
Croatia 93-08 16 1694.53 1030.17 664.36 3.19 24.70 9.38
Dominican Republic 93-98 6 337.88 12.35 325.53 6.67 24.35 8.43
Egypt 01-04 4 385.16 280.13 105.03 -6.00 26.44 8.32
El Salvador 82 1 -1.00 0.00 -1.00 2.00 23.56 8.18
Ethiopia 92-00 9 90.08 5.00 85.08 0.78 24.09 6.20
Fiji 02 1 0.53 0.23 0.30 5.00 21.91 8.30
Guyana 80,95 2 37.50 0.21 37.29 -0.50 21.19 7.64
Kazakhstan 93-05 13 1761.88 694.78 1067.10 -4.46 25.19 8.65
South Korea 80-06 27 2604.12 1742.04 862.08 3.52 27.04 9.44
Kyrgyzstan 99-02 4 12.95 -0.60 13.55 -3.00 22.73 7.32
Macao 82,85-90,00 8 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 22.55 9.81
Macedonia 97-07 11 232.27 71.59 160.68 7.64 23.34 8.82
Madagascar 81-82,08 5 223.78 5.08 218.70 -3.40 23.17 7.00
Mauritania 96,98-06 10 171.03 0.00 171.03 -5.60 22.20 7.39
Mauritius 81,88-01 15 43.48 6.89 36.59 9.93 22.76 8.85
Mexico 94-08 15 18556.93 9746.42 8810.51 6.80 27.78 9.37
Morocco 86 1 0.55 0.00 0.55 -8.00 24.79 7.84
Mozambique 81,85 2 0.35 0.00 0.35 -8.00 22.30 5.93
Nicaragua 81,83,85-6,88,90 6 0.12 0.00 0.12 -1.17 22.90 7.76
Nigeria 90-05 16 1704.35 0.00 1704.35 -1.25 25.88 7.30
Oman 93 1 393.30 4.20 389.10 -9.00 24.22 9.69
Pakistan 02-08 7 2853.24 1322.14 1531.10 -2.57 26.54 7.68
Paraguay 80-01 21 83.19 23.64 59.55 0.05 23.55 8.29
Peru 80-90 11 41.69 14.74 26.95 7.09 25.41 8.63
Philippines 80-98 19 572.87 245.35 327.52 2.89 25.70 7.78
Russian 08 1 26900.20 8661.00 18239.20 4.00 28.37 9.60
Saudi Arabia 06-08 3 26944.33 15578.67 11365.67 -10.00 26.99 9.99
Serbia 04-08 4 2383.99 1276.03 1107.96 8.00 24.90 9.08
Singapore 81-06 23 1499.85 1371.97 127.88 -2.00 25.17 10.17
Syrian 80-84 5 0.03 0.00 0.03 -9.00 24.21 8.13
Trinidad & Tobago 80-07 28 434.13 8.22 425.92 9.25 23.50 9.47
Tunisia 80-1,4,6-0,02-08 14 828.49 77.98 750.51 -5.43 24.47 8.51
Turkey 02-08 7 8928.71 5075.71 3853.00 7.00 27.36 9.28
Tanzania 87,90-1 3 -0.15 0.00 -0.15 -6.00 23.82 6.78
Uruguay 01-07 7 701.38 130.56 570.82 10.00 24.14 9.13
Venezuela 80-07 26 1383.23 282.12 1101.11 7.77 26.06 9.20
Data source: UNCTAD.
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Chapter 2
FDI Policy in China and Taiwan: A Brief
Comparison
Abstract
This chapter briefly examines FDI policy in China and Taiwan. It suggests that different coalition
structures in authoritarian and democratic countries can have important implications for FDI policy.
In China and pre-democratic Taiwan, co-opting a skilled constituency creates incentives for both
governments to attract high-skill intensive FDI, while in democratic Taiwan, electoral concerns
induce leaders to welcome less skill-intensive FDI to benefit their broad unskilled constituencies.
Qualitative evidence revealed in this chapter is, in general, consistent with the empirical findings
in the previous chapter.
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2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that distinct institutional constraints lead political leaders in au-
tocracies and democracies to have different preferences for high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI.
Authoritarian leaders, who rely on the support from a small winning coalition that often includes
skilled workers, have incentives to attract a higher proportion of high-skill intensive FDI to ben-
efit and co-opt skilled workers. In contrast, democratic leaders, who depend on a broad winning
coalition with a majority of unskilled workers, have incentives to attract a larger share of low-skill
intensive FDI to appeal to the unskilled median voter.
The empirical evidence based on available sectoral FDI data in developing countries has sug-
gested that democracy or an increase in the level of democracy is strongly associated with a large
share of low-skill intensive FDI. This finding strongly supports my argument that political regime
type influences the skill composition of FDI in developing countries. To elucidate the causal mech-
anisms and show how different domestic coalitions in authoritarian and democratic countries affect
FDI policy, this chapter explores FDI policy in China and Taiwan. A comparison between China
and Taiwan allows me to control for many unobservable characteristics that are related to history,
culture, religion, etc. that could be endogenous to FDI policy. Thus, I am able to focus on the
key explanatory variable: political regimes. Furthermore, the change of political regime in Taiwan
allows me to examine how a democratic transition empowers the majority of unskilled workers
and thus exerts considerable influence on FDI policy.
The qualitative evidence presented in this chapter suggests that attracting high-skill intensive
FDI is an important means for both China and pre-democratic Taiwan to promote industrial up-
grading and economic development as well as to benefit and co-opt their skilled constituencies. In
democratic Taiwan, electoral concerns generate incentives for political leaders to attract the type
of FDI that can benefit their unskilled constituencies.
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2.2 China’s FDI Policy in the Era of Reform and Opening
2.2.1 FDI Policy under Deng Xiaoping’s Leadership
Before the era of reform and opening, China largely modeled its political and economic institutions
off the Soviet Union and adopted an extreme version of import-substitution development strategies.
To achieve the goal of a self-reliant industrial economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
was committed to developing capital-intensive heavy industries. The government maintained an
overvalued currency and suppressed the prices of agricultural products and industrial inputs to
subsidize heavy industries. Foreign trade was monopolized by the central government and exports
served to finance imports of industrial inputs, such as machinery and equipment. During this
period, foreign investment was, more or less, banned in China. Under such an isolated system,
the big winners were the “communist coalition,” including heavy industries, inland provinces,
the military, and the central government agencies, while agricultural sectors, light industries, and
coastal provinces that would benefit from participation in the global market were the primary losers
(Shirk 1996: 188).
When Deng Xiaopeng took power in 1978, he decided to open China up to the outside world.
China’s reform and opening came as a tremendous surprise to the world. This step toward lib-
eralization was interpreted as a strong signal that the Party had abandoned class struggle during
the period of Mao Zedong and switched to primarily promoting economic development and mod-
ernization in the post-Mao era (Dickson 2003: 89). In this sense, the reform was to re-legitimize
the regime “on a technocratic rather than revolutionary-utopian basis” (Nathan et al. 1997: 58).
Economically, after decades of isolation and an emphasis on import substitution to realize indus-
trialization, declining domestic savings could not support capital investment. Foreign exchange
reserves were exhausted due to the extreme import-substitution strategy. In June 1978, foreign
exchange reserves were only $2.61 billion, and, adding gold reserves, total reserves were approx-
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imately $6.22 billion (Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation 2008:
42; hereafter CAITEC). Undoubtedly, foreign investment could have served as an important means
to bring scarce capital and greater foreign exchange reserves into China (Cui 2008: 85-8; Lardy
1992). In addition to economic rationales, there were even more important political considera-
tions behind China’s reform and opening.1 After the death of Mao Zedong, China underwent a
contest for political power between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, who was chosen by Mao
as a successor and believed to be a champion of the traditional communist coalition. In order to
confront conservative groups in the Party and consolidate his power, Deng Xiaoping strategically
appealed to agricultural and light industries and coastal provinces that were underprivileged and
marginalized in the centrally planned economy. Given China’s abundance of unskilled labor, these
industries and regions benefited from integration into the global economy and therefore became a
strong supporting coalition for Deng. By offering these constituencies greater economic opportu-
nities in global markets, Deng was able to build a new internationalist coalition of political support
(Shirk 1993, 1994, 1996).
In 1979, the People’s Congress passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. Then, in April 1982, the attraction of foreign investment, as state
policy was incorporated into the constitution as an amendment. These laws established legal status
for foreign firms operating in China. The first joint venture, Beijing Air Catering Company, was
formed in September 1979. Meanwhile, four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were founded in
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province to attract
foreign investment by offering preferential policies, including tax incentives and a good business
environment. Soon afterward, the Chinese government opened 14 more coastal cities and estab-
lished five economic open zones, including the Pearl, Yangtze, and Min River Deltas. In 1988,
the State Council established Hainan Province as the fifth SEZ and in 1990 decided to develop
1For seminal works on the political logic of China’s reform and opening, see Shirk (1993, 1994, 1996).
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the Pudong New Area in Shanghai. Since then, thousands of open areas, economic development
zones, and science and technology parks have been set up, legally or illegally, by all levels of
government.
As a political strategy to win the political support from previously disenfranchised agricul-
tural and light industries and coastal regions, the central government delegated authority to coastal
provincial governments to conduct international trade and attract foreign investment. This pol-
icy enabled coastal provinces to reap benefits from economic integration by taking advantage of
their comparative advantages. The abundance of unskilled labor made China an attractive destina-
tion for low-skill and labor-intensive foreign investment that engages in processing trade. In the
early period of reform and opening, China mainly focused on attracting low-skill labor-intensive
FDI. Tax incentives were a primary policy used to attract foreign investment. In December 1981,
the National People’s Congress passed the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law, and, in February
1982, the Ministry of Finance issued Implementation Rules of Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law.
According to these implementation rules, all foreign firms that are scheduled to operate for more
than 10 years are eligible for an income tax exemption for the first profit-making year and a 50%
income tax reduction in the second and third years.2 At that time, China welcomed all types of
foreign investment and did not discriminate among foreign investment into different industries.
These preferential tax policies applied to all foreign investment. However, total FDI into China
was highly limited. At the early stage of reform and opening, firstly, China still held a skeptical
view about foreign investment, worrying about Western imperialism. Secondly, Western investors
were wary of China’s political atmosphere. As of 1986, the accumulative absorption of FDI was
only $8.30 billion—on average, about $1.04 billion per year. Foreign investment was mostly con-
centrated on labor-intensive processing projects, as well as hotel and service facilities (Cui 2008:
159).
2In September 1983, this policy was extended such that foreign firms were granted income tax exemption for the
first two profit-making years and a 50% income tax reduction from the third to fifth year (Cui 2008: 50).
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During this period, China made great efforts to attract overseas Chinese investment from Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Overseas Chinese were less concerned about political uncertainty and
were more willing to invest in Mainland China given their geographic advantages and close ties
with China. In addition, the Chinese government provided overseas Chinese-invested firms more
favorable treatment. For instance, in addition to all the preferential policies offered to foreign
firms, Taiwanese firms enjoyed extra tax incentives in SEZs, including an income tax exemption
for the first four profit-making years and a 50% income tax reduction in the fifth and sixth years
(CAITEC 2008: 51). The State Council issued Provisions on the Encouragement of Investments
by Compatriots from Taiwan in July 1988 and Provisions on the Encouragement of Investments by
Overseas Chinese and Compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao in August 1990. Additionally,
in September 1990, the 15th meeting of the 7th National People’s Congress Standing Committee
passed the Law of the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Returned Overseas Chinese and
the Family of Overseas Chinese. Not only did these laws and regulations protect the interests of
overseas Chinese-invested firms, they also served as strong signals that the Chinese government
was committed to establishing a positive investment environment for all foreign investors. Conse-
quently, foreign investment grew steadily in the mid and late 1980s. As of 1991, the accumulative
absorption of FDI was about $23 billion—on average, $1.9 billion per year. The majority came
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. For instance, in 1991, the total volume of FDI from these
three regions reached $2.95 billion, accounting for approximately 68% of total FDI inflows. In
light of the sectoral distribution of FDI, prior to 1986, foreign investment concentrated on low-
skill service sectors such as hotels and facilities. From 1986 to 1990, the share of productive
investment increased dramatically from about 45% to more than 90% (CAITEC 2008: 41). Pro-
ductive investment mainly concentrated on low-skill and labor-intensive industries such as textile,
wearing apparel, plastic products, metal products, household appliances, and others.
Clearly, the disenfranchised agricultural population, light industries, and coastal provinces un-
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der the centrally planned system have huge incentives to participate in the global economy. These
sectors have comparative advantages and are the primary beneficiaries of China’s initial reform
and opening policy, given the abundance of unskilled labor in China. In the 1980s, the inflows
of low-skill intensive FDI boosted exports, increased employment (for both urban and migrant
workers), and stimulated economic growth, especially in coastal provinces. In addition, the fast
growth of coastal regions had a demonstration effect. Having witnessed coastal provinces’ suc-
cesses, more and more inland provinces began demanding preferential policies from the central
government to participate in the world economy. The initial reform and opening policy created
vested interests tied to the international market. Thus, Deng was able to build a new constituency,
or an internationalist coalition, for political support to consolidate his power (Shirk 1994, 1996).
2.2.2 FDI Policy under Jiang Zemin’s Leadership
Since economic reforms began, the social base of the CCP has shifted from the proletariat to
wealthier peasants, capitalists, managers, professionals and other well-educated individuals (So
and Hua 1992; Solinger 2003). Under Mao, China created a system that guaranteed the basic needs
of workers and poor peasants, while discriminating against professionals and capitalists (Li 2003:
91). Under Deng’s leadership, official rhetoric dictated that China’s reform and opening should
encourage a portion of China’s citizens to take the lead in generating wealth. The initial openness
created a larger number of economic winners in Chinese coastal areas. Entry of foreign firms,
in addition to creating jobs for urban and migrant workers, increased the demand for managers,
professionals, and other highly skilled personnel.
In 1989, Jiang Zemin became the general secretary of the CCP. Under Jiang’s leadership, the
Party continued its transformation. During this period, the social base of the Party changed from
workers and peasants to intellectual and economic elites (Kang 2002: 2). The Tiananmen Square
events in 1989 accelerated the transformation of the Party to a substantial extent. Ever since then,
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political stability has been a top priority (Shirk 2007: 39). The Party learned from the demonstra-
tions that unsatisfied college students and intellectuals could be a significant threat to the regime.
To prevent potential political opposition, the Party has made every effort to co-opt political and
economic elites (Shirk 2007: 66). Moreover, since abandoning class struggle as its primary ob-
jective, the Party, in order to maintain its legitimacy, has increasingly relied on sustaining high
economic growth to extend material benefits to the society in exchange for political support. The
commitment to economic development has also caused the Party to appeal to entrepreneurs, tech-
nocrats, and skilled workers who possess necessary expertise and skills (Dickson 2000).
Since the events of Tiananmen Square, the Party has actively recruited and co-opted college
students who might otherwise threaten the regime. For instance, in all higher institutions directly
administrated under the Ministry of Education, only 1.2% college students were Party members
in 1990, but the figure increased to 8% in 2003.3 In 2008, it rose further to 11%. College stu-
dent members accounted for approximately 38.5% of new recruits in 2009,4 which was in sharp
contrast to the Party under Mao that discriminated against professionals with higher education
(Walder 2004). The Party also modified its membership criteria and extended its base to include
private entrepreneurs and the burgeoning middle class, so as to preempt their demands for demo-
cratic participation (Shirk 2007: 67). In the 2001 congressional speech celebrating the CCP’s 80th
anniversary, Jiang Zemin stated that the Party should welcome entrepreneurs, technicians, man-
agers in private and foreign enterprises, professionals, and individual business owners who had
contributed to economic development.5
This new policy was further developed in Jiang Zemin’s theory of “Three Represents,” which
states that the Party should represent “advanced productive forces,” “advanced culture,” and “the
3Xinhuanet News, 28 October, 2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-10/28/
content_1147377.htm (accessed August 16, 2011).
4China Education Daily, 16 December, 2010, http://www.jyb.cn/high/gdjyxw/201012/
t20101216_406269.html (accessed August 16, 2011).
5Jiang Zemin, 2001, Congressional Speech Celebrating the CCP’s 80th Anniversary. See http://news.
xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2001-12/03/content_499021.htm, accessed August 10, 2011.
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fundamental interests of the broad masses.” The “Three Represents” were developed by Jiang’s
academic followers out of the recognition of the significance of the growing middle class—a group
of people identified more with the educated and wealthy rather than workers and peasants (Nathan
and Gilley 2003: 193). Although the three categories cannot be precisely defined, the “Three Rep-
resents” might be roughly viewed as corresponding to an upper class (i.e., private entrepreneurs),
a middle class (i.e., white-collar workers), and a working class (i.e., workers and peasants) (see
Solinger 2003: 948-51). One important signal from the “Three Represents” is that the Party has
abandoned its key task of class struggle under Mao and is now committed to economic develop-
ment and modernization. To achieve this goal, the Party has actively recruited people who possess
the expertise and skills that could help meet the challenges of economic development and global-
ization. Moreover, the “Three Represents” imply that the Party “should stand for the middle classes
as much as or more than the workers and peasant” (Nathan 2003: 14). With China’s deepening
integration into the global economy, the Party is now “speak[ing] for a competitive, modern and so-
phisticated constituency, prepared to merge into and contend with superior members of the global
economy,” while the under-educated and the unskilled people have been marginalized (Solinger
2003: 952-53).
Why would the CCP transition to stand for a competitive and sophisticated constituency that in-
cludes entrepreneurs, managers, professionals, intellectuals, and other white-collar workers, while
relegating its traditional constituency of blue-collar workers and peasants? To the leftist view, this
move is a departure from orthodox Marxism that champions the interests of the broad working
class and peasants (Lawrence 2000: 35).
There are at least two chief reasons for this transition. First, the CCP learned valuable lessons
from the Tiananmen Square demonstrations as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union and former
eastern European countries. On the one hand, intellectuals and skilled workers who are often
educated are more able to organize themselves, and thus could be a greater threat to authoritarian
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regimes. Therefore, the Party actively recruits educated youth to preempt any future political
opposition movements. On the contrary, the mass unskilled workers often face the problem of
collective action. Although there are tens of thousands protests and demonstrations by workers
and peasants due to corruption, unpaid wages and pensions, or environmental deterioration every
year in China, these events have been more narrowly focused on local and specific concerns and
have not yet posed a serious, nationwide threat to the regime (Sandby-Thomas 2011).
Second, skilled workers are valuable economic resources. When authoritarian leaders are com-
mitted to economic modernization, the highly educated and skilled people, such as entrepreneurs,
managers and white-collar workers, tend to be co-opted first and their interests are thus likely to
be served, as they possess the knowledge, expertise, and skills that are necessary for economic de-
velopment. In this sense, the CCP has adapted to its new environment and challenges by co-opting
those who possess the resources and skills the Party depends on and who pose a threat to the Party
(Dickson 2003).
The shift in the Party’s constituencies has important implications for China’s economic policy,
including FDI policy. Attracting foreign investment and in particular high-skill intensive FDI has
served as an important means for the government to sustain a vibrant economy with tremendous
growth and to extend material benefits to the upper and middle classes in exchange for political
support. In 1997, the 14th Party Congress recognized the private sector—including foreign in-
vested enterprises—to be an important component of China’s “socialist market economy.” Jiang
Zemin emphasized that the private economy played an important role in meeting people’s diverse
demands, increasing employment, and accelerating economic development (CAITEC 2008: 11).
In the period of Jiang’s leadership, China strongly preferred and encouraged high-skill intensive
FDI. In the report of the 14th Party Congress made by Jiang Zemin, he said that China should ac-
tively attract foreign investment and guide investors toward infrastructure, basic industries, firms’
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technological transformation, and into capital- and skill-intensive industries.6 In 1995, China for
the first time released Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Direct Investment and Guiding Cat-
alogue of Industries for Foreign Investment.7 These two regulations explicitly express government
preferences for FDI into different industries and served as a basic guideline for FDI regulations.
These regulations stress encouraging foreign investment with new, high and advanced technology.
The Guiding Catalogue classifies all industries into four different categories for foreign investment:
encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited. Most high-tech and skill-intensive industries are
listed as encouraged. Accordingly, both central and local governments offer preferential policies,
including tax incentives, exemption of land use fees, favorable financial treatment, etc., to the
type of foreign investment classified as encouraged. In 1997, the Chinese government updated the
Guiding Catalogue and more high-tech and skill-intensive industries were added into the category
of encouraged.
Not only did these government policies help attract FDI into China, but they also guided foreign
investment into desired industries. From 1992 to 2001, the government approved 347,522 foreign-
invested firms, and the total volume of inward FDI was $370.17 billion with an average annual
growth rate of 42.1%. During this period, more and more giant multinational corporations (MNCs)
from Western countries chose China as an important investment location. The proportion of high-
skill intensive FDI increased dramatically. In 2001, among the 500 biggest MNCs in the world,
400 had made investment in China and set up many high-tech and petrochemical projects, as well
as R&D centers (CAITEC 2008: 58). In 2002, MNCs had established more than 400 R&D centers
in China, mainly in electronic communications, petrochemicals, and biopharmaceuticals. In light
of the distribution of industrial FDI inflows, for instance, the contractual FDI value8 in high-skill
6Jiang Zemin, 1992. jiakuai gaige kaifang he xiandaihua jianshe bufa, duoqu you zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi
shiye de gengda shengli (Accelerate Reform and Opening and the Drive for Modernization, Seize Greater Victory for
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics), Report of the 14th Party Congress.
7An earlier version of Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Direct Investment was issued in 1987 for internal
circulation within government agencies.
8The data of actual realized FDI value are not reported.
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industries, including petroleum products and coke, chemicals and chemical products, machinery
and equipment, transportation equipment, and electronics and telecommunications equipment, in-
creased to $19.9 billion, accounting for approximately 41% of total contractual FDI value in the
manufacturing sectors.9
Large inflows of FDI and skill-intensive investment in particular have helped China sustain a
high economic growth rate, especially in the late 1990s when half of SOEs were unprofitable and
deeply in debt (Gallagher 2002: 351). Moreover, huge inflows of capital- and skill-intensive FDI
have helped the CCP serve the interests of new constituencies by creating many high-paid jobs for
professionals, technicians, and other white-collar workers. These upper and middle classes enjoy
high incomes, own cars, and consume foreign luxury products. Working in foreign-invested firms
has been the top choice for college graduates, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s. Accord-
ing to one report by Shanghai’s labor and social security bureau, in 2003, wages of managers,
professionals, and clerical workers were among the highest. Workers with a master’s or higher
degree earned 4.4 times more than those with only middle school education. Massive foreign in-
vestment has helped expand the middle class that is in general satisfied with the status quo and has
little interest in demanding democratic participation; rather, they show greater interest in material
well-being (Li 2003).
Since the mid-1990s, the high achievers, in addition to entrepreneurs, have been managers,
professionals, and skilled employees in both the public and private sector due to an increasing de-
mand for their expertise and skills (Tomba 2004: 4). On the contrary, those of the broad working
class are the victims of China’s reform. After the 15th Party Congress in 1997, China started re-
structuring its large-scale, inefficient SOEs. The official slogan for the new policy is “Holding the
Big, Release the Small (zhuada, fangxiao)”; that is, the government would allow a huge number
of small- and medium-size SOEs to change ownership and even go bankrupt. As a consequence,
9Statistics on FDI, 2002
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millions of workers were laid off or dismissed with little compensation. A majority of them were
female and low-educated workers. A modest estimate of the nationwide unemployment rate in
2002 was about 15-20% (Forney and Gough 2002; see Solinger 2003: 945). During the restruc-
turing, FDI was welcomed to participate in the privatization and treated as a means to save SOEs
(Gallagher 2002: 351). Given the effective deflation in the late 1990s and the falling profitability
of township and village enterprises, foreign-invested export industries were the main source of
growth and job creation (Breslin 2007: 184-5). However, many laid-off employees, and especially
female and low-skilled ones, were not able to find jobs again. The unemployment rate remained
extremely high in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At that time, thousands of protests and riots
were led by laid-off workers (see Solinger 2003). According to Zheng Bijian, vice president of
the Central Party School, the restructuring of the SOEs was to promote advanced industries and
eliminate backward ones; during this process when the backward is replaced by the advanced, the
overall quality of the working class is further improved.10 However, this policy led other schol-
ars to write, “It is the unemployed factory workers and abandoned peasants who are striking and
rioting in greater numbers while most of the middle class in Beijing and Shanghai revel in their
newfound comfort” (Li 2003: 93).
2.2.3 FDI Policy under Hu Jintao’s Leadership
In 2002, General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiaobao came to power. Decades after
reform and opening began, the CCP’s political legitimacy increasingly rests upon sustaining eco-
nomic growth and generating material benefits for society. These circumstances have prompted
the Party to appeal to entrepreneurs and high-skilled workers for economic development and mod-
ernization. In the post-Jiang period, the Party has explicitly used the term “middle class” for its
10Zheng Bijian, “sange daibiao zhongyao lunshu yu mianxiang ershiyi shiji de zhongguo gongchandang (Three
Represents Important Discourse and the CCP Facing the 21st Century,” People’s Daily, May 18, 2000.
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goals of social change. The Party intends to build a large middle class because a small number of
wealthy elites are viewed to be politically unstable (Breslin 2007: 180-1; Tomba 2004). In 2002,
the 16th Party Congress launched a new agenda to build a well-off society in an all-around way
(quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui). To this end, high-tech and skill-intensive FDI could serve as
one important vehicle, since this type of foreign investment could help upgrade China’s industrial
structure and create high-quality jobs for the growing middle class.
During this period, China has consistently encouraged high-tech foreign investment. Hu Jintao
stated in several speeches that China should selectively guide industrial foreign investment, make
efforts to attract MNCs to transfer high-technology and high value-added production stages and
R&D centers, and deepen China’s openness to foreign investors in high- and new-tech industries
and advanced manufacturing sectors.11 In order to attract more high-tech and skill-intensive foreign
investment, in 2003, China issued the Catalogue of Encouraged High- and New-Tech Products for
Foreign Investment. In 2007, a new version of the Guiding Catalogue of Industries for Foreign
Investment was released, which emphasized encouraging more foreign investment into high- and
new-tech industries, modern service sectors, high-end production, modern agricultural industries,
and infrastructure.
Since the early 2000s, the dramatic increase of college graduates has created additional incen-
tives for the government to attract more skill- and knowledge-intensive FDI to generate employ-
ment opportunities for college graduates. In 1999, the State Planning and Development Commis-
sion and the Ministry of Education decided to expand higher education enrollment by 0.46 million
to 1.53 million in total,12 which was a 42% increase from the previous year—the largest annual
11See zai xinde lishi qidianshang jixu kuoda duiwai kaifang (Continuing the Expansion of Openness at the New
Historical Starting Point), http://www.southcn.com/nflr/zhongxinzu/gcxx/content/2007-09/
30/content_4253456.htm (accessed August 17, 2011); zhonggong zhongyang guanyu wanshan shehui zhuyi
shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding (Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Several Issues Con-
cerning the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/
1024/2145119.html (accessed August 17, 2011).
12The actual number of newly enrolled students was 1.60 million in 1999 (China Statistical Yearbook).
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Figure 2.1: Number of New Students and Graduates in Higher Education Institu-
















































































Data Source: Statistical Yearbook of China.
increase since 1978. This sudden expansion of higher education is considered to be a policy instru-
ment for stimulating domestic consumption and thereby promoting economic growth. We can see
from Figure 2.1, the number of new students in higher education institutions grew steadily from
0.40 to 1.08 million from 1978 to 1998, with an annual growth rate of about 10%. However, from
1999 onward, the number of new students has expanded even more dramatically. The new enroll-
ment numbers in higher education institutions increased to 6.4 million in 2009. As a consequence,
millions of college graduates have entered the job market every year from the early 2000s onwards,
which has posed the serious challenge to the government of creating enough jobs for these students.
Given the experience of the Tiananmen Square student demonstrations, unemployed college stu-
dents are particularly worrisome because they could potentially organize opposition movements
that threaten political stability (Shirk 2007: 30). The government has thus taken active measures
to increase college students’ employment, including developing knowledge- and skill-intensive in-
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dustries and service sectors, subsidizing universities to create more research associate positions,
and providing occupational training.13
In particular, the government seeks to attract foreign investment into the service outsourcing
sector14 to create job opportunities for college graduates. In October 2006, the Ministry of Com-
merce, jointly with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Science
and Technology, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Finance, released the Notice of
Ministry of Commerce on Implementing the “Thousand-Hundred-Ten Project” of Service Out-
sourcing. According to the Notice, the goal of the “Thousand-Hundred-Ten Project” is to develop
10 internationally competitive hubs for outsourced services, promote 100 world famous MNCs to
outsource to China, and cultivate 1000 medium- and large-size service outsourcing companies with
international qualifications.15 In addition, the Notice states that government will allocate special
funds for training college graduates (including junior college graduates) to enhance their expertise
and skills; government encourages service outsourcing companies to develop training programs
for new graduates, graduating students, and newcomers; furthermore, the goal is to create 200,000
to 300,000 job opportunities for college graduates in five years, effectively solving the problem
of qualified personnel shortages in this industry and the issue of employing college graduates.
Accordingly, the government provides service outsourcing firms with no more than 4,500 RMB
training support for every new college student recruit with at least a one-year contract.16 In the
13“Wen Jiaobao: wuxiang xincuoshi bushu jinnian daxuesheng jiuye (Five New Measures to Arrange This
Year’s College Students’ Employment),” Zhongguang Jiaoyu, 26 May, 2011, http://www.cnr.cn/jy/jyzs/
201105/t20110526_508035690.html (accessed July 20, 2011).
14Firms in this sector are skilled-labor intensive. They are outsourcing services—including information technology
outsourcing (ITO), business process outsourcing (BPO), and knowledge process outsourcing (KPO)—vendors. In
order to reduce costs and increase competitiveness, firms and MNCs in particular have increasingly chosen to outsource
some business activities to more specialized services providers in countries such as India and China.
15Ministry of Commerce. 2006. Notice of Ministry of Commerce on Implementing the “Thousand-
Hundred-Ten Project” of Service Outsourcing, http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/n/200610/
20061003463779.html (accessed January 2, 2012).
16Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce. 2009. Several Suggestions on Strengthening the Service
Outsourcing Personnel Training and Promoting College Graduates’ Employment, http://file.mofcom.gov.
cn/moffile/search/pages/detail.jsp?seqno=13212 (accessed January 3, 2012).
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new version of the Guiding Catalogue of Industries for Foreign Investment released in 2007, the
service outsourcing industry is listed as encouraged. With strong government support and prefer-
ential policies, FDI into the service outsourcing industry has increased dramatically. One official
in the Ministry of Commerce’s Department of Foreign Investment Administration emphasized that
the service outsourcing industry had become an important channel for college students’ employ-
ment; among the 0.7 million newly hired employees in this industry, 0.5 million (71.4%) were
college graduates, which was about 12% of total college graduates in the same period.17
2.2.4 Industrial FDI Policy in China since the Mid-1990s: A Closer Look
The above analysis has suggested that the change in the CCP’s underlying social base has impor-
tant implications for China’s FDI policy. During the early period of reform and opening, in order
to build a new coalition of political supporters, Deng Xiaoping strategically appealed to agricul-
tural and light industries and coastal regions. At that time, the government focused on attracting
low-skill and labor-intensive FDI to benefit these industries and regions. Under Jiang Zemin, the
CCP gradually transformed itself to represent the private entrepreneurs and the emerging middle
class. In this process, the Chinese government actively attracted FDI and high-skill intensive FDI
in particular to promote economic development and extend benefits to the upper and middle classes
in exchange for their political support. Under Hu Jintao, the government has continued to encour-
age high-tech and skill-intensive FDI. Additionally, the sudden increase in the number of college
graduates has magnified the government’s incentive to attract high-skill intensive FDI to increase
job opportunities for these students as the government is well aware of the fact that unemployed
college students could pose a considerable threat to political stability.
Since systematic sectoral FDI data are not available, I am not able to track the pattern of the
17“zhongguo quannian chengjie fuwu waibao hetong zhixing jine chao 100 yi meiyuan (China Undertakes More
Than $10 Billion Contract Execution Value in Service Outsourcing throughout the Year),” NetEase, 23 June, 2010,
http://tech.163.com/10/0623/14/69SCA4GC00094DFU.html (accessed August 17, 2011).
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skill composition of inward FDI over time. Alternatively, I have coded an original dataset of
industrial FDI policy since the mid-1990s. This dataset allows me to examine the relationship
between industrial skill intensity and openness toward FDI.
Up until now, the Chinese government has issued six Guiding Catalogues of Industries for
Foreign Investment in 1995, 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007, and 2011 (effective January 30, 2012), re-
spectively. These Guiding Catalogues classify all industries into four categories for foreign in-
vestment: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited. These Guiding Catalogues serve as
the basic guidelines for FDI regulations. Accordingly, the central and local governments design
specific promotion or restriction policies, including various tax incentives, exemption or reduction
of land use fees, bank loan support, joint venture requirement, etc. Clearly, foreign investment in
encouraged industries is granted preferential policies, while investment in restricted industries does
not enjoy such policy favoritism and is subject to strict government screening. Based on the five
Guiding Catalogues released from 1995 to 2007, I have coded an original dataset of FDI policy
at the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, Rev. 4) 4-digit level. In the coding, I
assign a score of 1, 2, 3, or 4 to each respective industry classified as prohibited, restricted, permit-
ted, or encouraged. Therefore, a higher score indicates that the industry is more open to foreign
investment. However, items listed on the Guiding Catalogues are much more disaggregated than
industries at the ISIC 4-digit level. To deal with this problem, I adopt the following strategy. First,
each industry at the 4-digit level receives a score of 3 by default. Then if there are any items
within each 4-digit level industry listed as either prohibited, restricted, or encouraged, this indus-
try receives another score of 1, 2, or 4. For instance, if there are some subcategories within one
ISIC 4-digit level industry classified as encouraged, this industry receives another score of 4. If
there are still other subcategories classified as restricted, this industry is assigned a third score of 2.
Therefore, it is possible that one industry may receive multiple scores, as some subcategories may
be encouraged while others restricted or even prohibited. In these cases, I take the mean value of
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these multiple scores as a measure of each industry’s level of openness toward foreign investment.
Table 2.1: Industry-Level Skill Intensity and FDI Openness in China
Model (1) (2) (3)
Skill Intensity 1.34*** 0.89*** 1.49***
(Skilled/Unskilled Workers) (0.21) (0.24) (0.37)
Capital Intensity -0.01* -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industrial Concentration -1.09*** -1.38*** -3.42***
(0.36) (0.36) (0.69)
State-Owned Enterprises -0.88*** -0.55** -0.98**
(0.25) (0.26) (0.43)
WTO 0.77*** 0.59*** 0.38*
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
Constant 2.94*** 2.88*** 2.92***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
Fixed Year Effects × X X
Fixed Industry Effects × × X
Observations 926 926 926
Number of Industries 189 189 189
Number of Years 5 5 5
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%;
With this data, I then examine whether a higher level of skill intensity is associated with a higher
level of openness toward FDI at the industry level. Industry-level skill intensity is measured by the
ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in each industry. Skilled workers are defined as those with
junior college education or higher. In the regression, I control for industry-level capital intensity
(fixed assets per capita), industrial concentration (ratio of firms with assets of at least RMB 100
million), share of SOEs’ assets, and a dummy variable of WTO, which is equal to 1 if the industry
is opened up under WTO rules. All data come from 2004 and 2007 China Economic Census
Yearbooks. That means I only have two periods of data for all explanatory variables. Therefore,
the data of 2004 census are used for the period of 1995 to 2002, and those of 2007 census for
the period of 2004 to 2007. Since data for explanatory variables are available at the ISIC 3-digit
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level, I aggregate the dependent variable by taking the means of FDI openness scores at the 4-
digit level for each 3-digit level industry. All results are presented in Table 2.1.18 We can see that
level of skill intensity is positively and strongly associated with openness toward FDI, even when
both fixed industry and year effects are considered. For the substantive effect, take Model 1 for
example, when other variables are held constant, an increase in the level of skill intensity from
its mean to maximum value will raise the score of FDI openness by 1.01. The results illustrate
that China is more open toward FDI in more skill-intensive industries. However, one caveat is
that skill intensity could be endogenous to FDI inflows, as FDI into skill-intensive industries will
increase the demand for skilled workers in these industries. In addition, the results indicate that
more concentrated industries are less open to FDI, and a large presence of SOEs is associated with
a low level of openness toward FDI. Capital intensity seems to have no effect on FDI openness.
All these results are sensible.
2.3 FDI Policy in Taiwan
What is the pattern of FDI inflows in a democracy? How does a democratic transition affect
government FDI policy? And how does political competition shape FDI policy in Taiwan? In this
section, I will briefly examine FDI policy in Taiwan.
In Figure 2.2, I plot the levels of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI inflows into Taiwan from
1968 to 2007.19 As illustrated in the graph, before democratic transition, Taiwan received more
high-skill intensive FDI than low-skill intensive FDI.20 When democratic transition began in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the volume of high-skill intensive FDI declined, while inward low-skill
18Service sectors are excluded from the analysis, as most service sectors are still highly restricted to foreign invest-
ment due to considerations such as national security and public propaganda.
19To control for short-term volatility, data are averaged over four-year spans.
20It should be noted that “high-skill” and “low-skill” are relative to the average skill intensity of existing production
within a country. Thus, low-skill intensive FDI into Taiwan can be more skill-intensive than low-skill intensive FDI
into China, as Taiwan is more developed and endowed with more human capital and skills.
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intensive FDI continued growing. In the late 1990s and 2000s, inflows of low-skill intensive FDI
exceeded high-skill intensive FDI. In other words, after its democratic transition, Taiwan received
a higher proportion of low-skill intensive FDI relative to high-skill intensive FDI.
The bivariate Pearson correlation between democracy and the percentage of high-skill inten-
sive FDI to total FDI is -0.63, statistically significant beyond the conventional wisdom. To further
examine whether an increase in the level of democracy is associated with a reduction of the propor-
tion of high-skill intensive FDI, I conduct some simply regression analyses.21 In the regressions,
I control for GDP per capita, GDP, economic growth rate, trade openness, a time trend, and two
dummy variables respectively indicating the periods of WTO negotiation and membership.22 All
results are presented in Table 2.2.23 The regression results show that an increase in the level of
21Taiwan’s data are not used in the cross-national analysis as they come from a separate data source.
22I do not control for human capital in the regressions because human capital—measured by the ratio of population
with junior college or higher education—is highly correlated with GDP per capita. The Pearson correlation between
these two variables is 0.96.
23Dicky Fuller tests for all models reject the null hypothesis that there is no co-integration.
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Table 2.2: Democracy and Skill Composition of FDI in Taiwan
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy -1.61** -2.02*** -1.60** -2.66***
(0.62) (0.71) (0.62) (0.89)
Lagged DV 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Ln (GDP per capita) 7.32 -47.24 19.88 7.56
(6.84) (45.99) (14.14) (7.58)
GDP 0.14 0.51 0.05 0.15
(0.18) (0.36) (0.20) (0.27)
Economic Growth 1.18* 1.65** 1.29* 1.41**









Constant -34.46 374.11 -115.86 -46.13
(61.03) (345.98) (100.75) (62.44)
Observations 40 40 40 40
R2 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.54
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI. Dicky Fuller tests for all
models reject the null hypothesis that there is no co-integration. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%;
** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
democracy reduces the percentage of high-skill intensive FDI to total FDI. These results are robust
and consistent when alternative explanations are considered. However, one question still remains:
How does a democratic transition affect FDI policy-making in Taiwan? In order to have a direct
comparison with China, I will focus on the period since Chiang Ching-kuo rose to power in the
early 1970s.
Following its defeat in the civil war and retreat to Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT, the Chi-
nese Nationalist Party) transformed itself into a quasi-Leninist party, with a goal of reunifying
CHAPTER 2. FDI POLICY IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 70
Mainland China in the near future. Martial law was already declared in 1948 prior to the retreat.
Under the goal of retaking Mainland China, the KMT pursued an import-substitution development
strategy. The government relied heavily on SOEs and had tight control over the entire economy.
The government also maintained an overvalued currency. Agricultural and light industries were
suppressed to subsidize heavy industries for industrialization. Although the government promul-
gated the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals in 1954 and the Statute for Investment by
Overseas Chinese in 1955, Taiwan did not attract too much foreign investment in the 1950s due
to government emphasis on import substitution and the development of indigenous firms. In the
1960s, Taiwan embarked on an export-led growth strategy.24 In 1960, the government issued the
Statute for the Encouragement of Investment that offered preferential policies including a five-year
tax holiday, 18% tax reduction after five years, and four-year tax exemption for reinvested earnings
to foreign firms that exported most of their output and met local content requirements (see Ku et
al. 2009: 10). Consequently, foreign investment that engages in processing trade grew rapidly in
the 1960s.
In the early 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo assumed leadership of the KMT after the death of Chi-
ang Kai-shek. During the period of Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT underwent extraordinary trans-
formation. Within the KMT elites, the elder Mainlanders were gradually replaced by a younger,
better-educated, and more technologically sophisticated generation. There are several factors that
caused such a transformation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the KMT had almost abandoned
its revolutionary goal of retaking Mainland China and made local Taiwan affairs and economic
modernization its primary objectives. To meet this new goal, the KMT was in need of person-
nel who possessed relevant economic expertise and skills. According to Bruce Dickson, Chiang
Ching-kuo initiated this transformation in order to build a new coalition of supporters. Although
Chiang Ching-kuo had held many posts in the government and security system before, he did not
24See Haggard (1990: 77-99) for a discussion of Taiwan’s transition from import-substitution to export-led growth.
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have a strong support base within the party at the time of the power succession. He strategically
used organizational changes to recruit educated youth and create a supporting coalition (Dickson
1997). In addition, in the early 1970s, there was an increasing demand for political participation
by intellectuals, claiming that specialists should have more power and rights. To preempt their
political opposition movements, the KMT actively recruited educated young people with political
ambition, especially local Taiwanese (Cheng and White 1990: 6-7). For instance, from 1967 to
1976, a third of college students were recruited into the KMT, accounting for more than 57% of all
new recruits (Dickson 1997: 126).
This transformation coincided with a change in the KMT’s economic strategy to deepen export-
oriented industrialization (Cheng 1990: 169). In the 1970s and 1980s, the Taiwanese government
decided to upgrade its industrial structure and develop high-tech and skill-intensive industries. On
the one hand, this strategy prompted the KMT to appeal to entrepreneurs, technocrats, and high-
skilled workers. The recruitment of young intellectuals and technical experts was responsible for
the KMT expertise and skills necessary for economic development and modernization. On the
other hand, co-opting the emerging elites and middle class gave the government strong incentives
to develop high-tech and skill-intensive industries to create job opportunities for and bring benefits
to its new constituency.
During this period, the Taiwanese government strongly encouraged foreign investment into
electronics, machinery, and petrochemical industries. In the 1970s, the government modified the
Statute for the Encouragement of Investment to offer extra tax incentives to capital- and skill-
intensive foreign investment. In 1981, the government announced its goal of developing strategic
industries and selected information, electronics, machinery, etc. as key strategic industries. To at-
tract high-tech and skill-intensive foreign investment, the Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park was
established in 1980. Investors in the park receive a fix-year tax holiday, import duty exemption, and
other favorable financial and foreign exchange arrangements. To be eligible for these investment
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incentives, foreign investment must be in the new emerging industries, in line with the govern-
ment’s domestic industrial development goals, and hire a reasonable quantity of skilled workers
(Ku et al. 2009: 13). From 1980 to 1991, more than 100 firms invested in the park, primarily in-
volved in manufacturing computers, integrated circuits, and communications and optical products;
these firms generated more than 200,000 jobs (Ku et al. 2009: 21). In addition to creating jobs for
the emerging middle class, large inflows of high-tech and skill-intensive FDI provided opportuni-
ties for highly skilled talent, overseas returnees in particular, to start their own firms.25 Domestic
entrepreneurs also benefited from the entry of high-tech firms. Many high-tech local firms such
as Acer, Lite-On, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, and United Microelectronics
grew to be global competitors.
Democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s has reshaped the political landscape in Tai-
wan.26 With democratization, the masses have a chance to voice their preferences that political
leaders have to be responsive to. In 1990, Taiwan started its bid for GATT membership. Accord-
ingly, Taiwan launched large-scale economic reform and liberalization, opening up many industries
to foreign investors. During the WTO negotiation process, the public’s support played a critical
role in resisting domestic firms’ lobbying.27 Chi Schive, the former WTO negotiator for the service
sectors, gave one example of the parcel delivery industry. At the time, domestic carriers strongly
lobbied the government and opposed the entry of foreign competitors, including UPS, FedEx, and
DHL. Nonetheless, the public and media overwhelmingly supported the government’s decision in
belief that it was beneficial to Taiwan.28 Evidently, the masses’ demand was one of the driving
forces of economic liberalization in the 1990s.
In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took power, marking the government’s first
25This impression comes from most government officials and experts whom I interviewed.
26A close examination of democratization in Taiwan is beyond the scope of this study. For works of democratization
in Taiwan, see, e.g., Nathan (1987), Nathan and Ho (1993), Tien and Chu (1996), and Tien (1996).
27Chi Schive, personal interview.
28Ibid.
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party change in Taiwan’s history. Meanwhile, an unprecedented economic crisis from the bursting
of the IT bubble in the United States swept over the island’s economy. Exports fell dramatically,
and the unemployment rate skyrocketed. According to official statistics, the unemployment rate
soared to 5.28% in November 2001, reaching its highest level in decades.29 Most of the unem-
ployed workers were poorly educated. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that firms in
Taiwan’s manufacturing industries were increasingly relocated to Mainland China. Since then, job
creation has moved to the top of both the DPP and KMT agendas.
To increase employment, particularly for the unskilled and lower educated population that
is often viewed as the political base of the DPP, the government launched a series of economic
programs. In the short term, the government focused on temporary projects, including a 20 billion
NTD public service expansion program to create 115,000 jobs for elder and unskilled workers
within one year.30 These public service jobs included digitalizing library resources, cleaning streets
and public facilities, and killing mosquitoes in tropical areas. Moreover, the government subsidized
small enterprises to hire unemployed workers.31 In the long term, the government aimed mainly to
deal with the problem of three zhongs (zhongnanbu, zhongxiaoqiye, zhongxiajiecheng, i.e., central
and southern areas, medium and small enterprises, and the middle and lower classes) by developing
the Central Taiwan Science Park and Southern Taiwan Science Park, balancing government budget
allocation between the north and the south, investing in public infrastructures in the south, and
encouraging Taiwanese firms located in Mainland China to invest domestically, even in the name
of foreign investment.32
With these government plans, the unemployment rate declined to around 4% in subsequent
years.33 Nonetheless, the economic situation in the 2000s did not significantly improve. In 2008,
29Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan.
30Ho Mei-yueh, former minister of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, personal interview.
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
33Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan.
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the KMT won the election and took office again. Later that year, the unemployment rate started to
increase again and reached more than 6% in July 2009. Although the KMT is traditionally closer
tied to big enterprises and social elites, electoral competition has led the KMT to cater to the middle
and lower classes. In order to stimulate Taiwan’s economy, Ma Ying-jeou immediately started
talks with Mainland China to normalize cross-strait economic and trade relations. On June 30,
2009, the government decided to open up 192 items on the list of Taiwan’s industrial classification
to investment from the Mainland. Among them, 64 items are within manufacturing sectors that
include automobiles, textiles, and rubber and plastic products; 117 items are within service sectors,
including wholesale and retail, tourism, and transportation; the other 11 items are public facilities
projects (Ku et al. 2009: 104). Most high-tech and high-skilled manufacturing and service sectors
remain closed or restricted to foreign investment from the Mainland. One year later on June 29,
2010, after a series of negotiations, Taiwan and China signed a preferential trade agreement called
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to reduce tariffs and trade barriers.
This step has been viewed as the most significant agreement since Taiwan split from Mainland
China in 1949.34
These economic policies have encountered harsh criticism from the opposition party (DPP)
and pro-independence groups that worry products and investment from Mainland China will un-
dermine Taiwan’s “sovereignty” and increase market competition.35 Up to now, China’s outward
FDI has mainly concentrated on the low-end manufacturing sectors of textiles, apparel, and metal
products, as well as labor-intensive service sectors, such as wholesale and retail, construction, and
transportation. According to Tung Chen-yuan, the former deputy minister of Mainland Affairs
Council, the current decisions to open Taiwan’s market to Mainland China are, to a large extent,
related to employment issue in Taiwan. The government intends to use the Mainland’s resources
34“Taiwan and China Sign Landmark Trade Agreement,” BBC News, 29 June, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/10442557 (accessed August 18, 2011).
35For instance, on April 25, 2010, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen (the Chair of the DDP) held a television debate
on the possible impact of the ECFA on Taiwan.
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to stimulate the economy.36 Additionally, Ma Ying-jeou has emphasized that Taiwan’s openness
to investment from the Mainland can help create a more dynamic employment environment.37
The brief comparative case studies of China and Taiwan suggest that domestic coalition build-
ing has important implications for FDI policy. In the case of China, during the period of initial
reform and opening, Deng Xiaoping strategically appealed to previously disenfranchised agricul-
tural and light industries and coastal provinces to build a new supporting coalition. By delegating
more authority to these industries and regions to conduct international trade and attract FDI, Deng
was able to win the support from the new constituencies to confront the conservative groups in the
CCP and consolidate power. Under Jiang Zemin’s leadership, the Party transformed itself to rep-
resent a competitive, modern, and sophisticated constituency including entrepreneurs, managers,
professionals, intellectuals, and other white-collar workers. Events of Tiananmen Square accel-
erated this transition. Since then, the CCP has actively recruited college students and co-opted
the middle class to preempt political opposition. Furthermore, the Party intends to build a large
middle class that is believed to buttress social stability. To meet these goals, attracting FDI and
high-skill intensive FDI in particular serves as an important means. Large inflows of high-tech
and skill-intensive FDI not only have contributed to economic growth, but also have helped serve
the interests of the new constituencies. During the period of Hu Jintao, the sudden surge in the
number of college students has magnified the CCP’s incentive to attract more knowledge- and
skill-intensive FDI to create job opportunities for college graduates.
In the case of pre-democratic Taiwan, the KMT under Chiang Ching-kuo abandoned its revolu-
tionary goal of retaking Mainland China, switching its central aims to economic development and
modernization, as well as transforming itself to stand for elites and the emerging middle class. The
KMT actively recruited educated youth and co-opted social and economic elites to build strong
36Tung Chen-yuan, personal interview.
37Xinhua News, 23 February, 2011, http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.
com/tw/2011-02/23/c_121115523.htm (accessed August 18, 2011).
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support from the upper and middle classes. This transformation led to a change in Taiwan’s eco-
nomic strategy to develop high-tech and skill-intensive industries. During this period, the govern-
ment strongly encouraged high-skill intensive FDI to stimulate economic development and extend
benefits to the emerging middle class. Democratic transition in the early 1990s has reshaped Tai-
wan’s political landscape. With electoral competition, both the KMT and DPP have moved to the
center to appeal to the majority—the working class. Political competition has driven both parties
to focus efforts on attracting the type of FDI that can create jobs and bring benefits to unskilled
workers. The high unemployed rate among the elder and unskilled workers throughout the 2000s
has reinforced this incentive.
Both cases indicate that authoritarian regimes tend to build a small domestic coalition con-
sisting of entrepreneurs, managers, professionals, intellectuals, and white-collar workers for both
political and economic reasons. This type of domestic coalition building shapes the economic
policies—including FDI policy—pursued by authoritarian regimes. In order to sustain political
support from this coalition, authoritarian leaders prefer high-skill intensive FDI to stimulate eco-
nomic growth and extend benefits to their skilled constituencies. In contrast, democratization
makes political leaders appeal to the mass majority, i.e., unskilled workers. Thus, democratic lead-
ers have incentives to attract the type of FDI that can create jobs for their unskilled constituencies.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter briefly examines FDI policy in China and Taiwan, providing preliminary evidence that
different coalition structures in authoritarian and democratic regimes have important implications
on FDI policy. In China and pre-democratic Taiwan, in addition to promoting economic develop-
ment and industrialization, co-opting the emerging middle class creates additional incentives for
both governments to encourage inflows of high-skill intensive FDI to extend material benefits to
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skilled constituencies. In democratic Taiwan, political competition leads both the KMT and DPP
to welcome less skill-intensive FDI to appeal to broad unskilled constituencies. Evidence from
both China and Taiwan suggests that coalition buildings under different political regimes are likely
to play a role in shaping government FDI policy.
However, it should be noted that, one important motivation for both China and Taiwan to attract
high-skill intensive FDI is to promote technological progress, industrial upgrading, and economic
development. This motivation, together with the distributional consequences of high-skill intensive
FDI, reinforces authoritarian leaders’ incentives to attract this type of FDI. In democratic regimes,
although political leaders have incentives to attract high-skill intensive FDI for the purpose of
industrial upgrading and economic development, political competition induces leaders to cater to
the majority of unskilled workers. Attracting less skill-intensive FDI is one means to achieve this
goal. Nevertheless, one should not consider low-skill intensive FDI into Taiwan to be necessarily
the same as that into China. Factor endowments still play a critical role in determining FDI inflows
into developing countries (e.g., Markusen 2002; Yeaple 2003). Therefore, we should expect that
FDI into Taiwan is in general more skill-intensive, since Taiwan is more developed and endowed
with more human capital and skills. What matters is the skill intensity of FDI relative to the average
skill intensity of existing production within the country.
An important caveat is that democratization and economic liberalization, including FDI liber-
alization, can happen simultaneously rather than constitute a causal relationship between the two
variables. However, the Taiwan case study provides evidence that democratization empowers the
masses to voice their preferences and thereby exert an influence on FDI policy. To address this
argument, further research needs to examine FDI policy in countries that have experienced both a
transition to democracy and reverse transition to authoritarianism.
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Chapter 3
Individual Skill Endowments and Attitudes
toward High/Low-Skill Intensive FDI:
Evidence from a Survey Experiment
Abstract
This chapter examines individual preferences toward two different types of inward foreign di-
rect investment (FDI)—high-skill and low-skill intensive. Using a variant of the specific-factors
model, I show that inflows of these two kinds of FDI generate distinct distributional consequences
for skilled and unskilled labor in host countries. High-skill intensive FDI, through employing a
high ratio of skilled labor, increases the relative demand and wages of skilled workers. In contrast,
low-skill intensive FDI, by employing a large proportion of unskilled labor, raises the relative de-
mand and wages of unskilled workers. Given these distributional effects, I hypothesize that skilled
workers are more likely to support inflows of high-skill intensive FDI, whereas unskilled work-
ers prefer more inflows of low-skill intensive FDI. Empirical results from a survey experiment in
China generally support my argument. This study underscores people’s heterogeneous preferences
toward different types of FDI and has direct implications for understanding the politics of FDI.
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3.1 Introduction
Cross-border flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) are one crucial aspect of globalization.
Multinational corporations (MNCs)—the vehicles of FDI—are now playing a significant role in
the world economy. For instance, in 2009 MNCs’ foreign affiliates contributed 11% of global
GDP and hired 80 million workers (UNCTAD 2010, xviii). Nowadays, both developed and devel-
oping countries are competing to lure foreign investors. The growth of inward FDI is particularly
phenomenal in developing and transition economies (UNCTAD 2010, xviii).
Scholars have devoted much effort to understanding the causes and consequences of FDI. Po-
litical scientists in particular are interested in why some countries are able to attract more FDI
than others. Scholars have proposed many explanations highlighting both the internal and external
features that make a country attractive to foreign investors. These explanations include democratic
institutions, rule of law, political risks, membership in international institutions, and many others
(see, e.g., Büthe and Milner 2008; Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003).
Recently, some scholars have begun to use an “open economy politics” paradigm to study FDI
and model FDI policy or the pattern of FDI flows as an endogenous outcome of the interactions
between interest groups and politicians (see, e.g., Pandya 2007; Pinto 2004; Pinto and Pinto 2008).
FDI inflows, like other cross-border economic activities, engender significant distributional con-
sequences on domestic actors (see, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1997; Pandya 2010). Thus,
domestic societal interests are likely to play an important role in shaping a country’s FDI policy,
as rational politicians must adopt policies to respond to the preferences of their constituencies in
order to retain office. This literature deviates from previous research that focuses on the supply
side of FDI (investors) to the demand side (workers, interest groups, and politicians), which has
provided novel insight into the politics of FDI.
In examining the politics of FDI, understanding domestic actors’ preferences for FDI policy
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is critical, as these preferences serve as the micro-foundations of individuals or groups’ political
behavior, such as voting and lobbying. Even in an authoritarian country, a social planner needs to
know the distribution of policy preferences in order to maximize political support. Recently, there
has been a growing body of literature relying on public opinion data to study individual preferences
toward foreign economic policies, trade and immigration policies in particular.1 These studies
have provided deep insight into the determinants of people’s foreign economic policy preferences
and lent support to political economy frameworks of foreign economic policy decision-making.
However, little work has been done to examine the public’s preferences toward FDI.2
In this chapter, I examine individual preferences toward two different types of FDI: high-skill
and low-skill intensive. Using a variant of the specific-factors model, I show that inflows of high-
skill intensive FDI, through employing a high ratio of skilled labor, increase the relative demand
for skilled workers and thus their real relative wages. In contrast, low-skill intensive FDI, by
employing a high ratio of unskilled labor, raises the relative demand for unskilled workers and
thus their relative wages in real terms. Given these material consequences, I hypothesize that
skilled workers are more likely to support high-skill intensive FDI, while unskilled workers favor
low-skill intensive FDI more. To test this hypothesis, I adopt a survey experiment implemented in
China in which respondents were randomly assigned one of two attitudinal questions about high-
skill and low-skill intensive FDI, respectively. Empirical results show that people with higher skill
levels are significantly more likely to support high-skill intensive FDI; to some extent, support for
low-skill intensive FDI decreases along with individual skill level. Nonetheless, the difference is
not statistically significant. The latter finding could be because skilled labor is scarce in China.
Given their scarcity, skilled workers could benefit sufficiently from a relatively small demand from
1On trade policy preferences, see, e.g., Baker (2005), Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006, 2007, 2010), Mayda and
Rodrik (2005), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), and Scheve and Slaughter (2001b). On immigration policy preferences,
see, e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010), Mayda (2006), and Scheve and Slaughter (2001a). On FDI policy
preferences, see, e.g., Pandya (2010).
2Pandya (2010) is an exception.
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low-skill intensive FDI.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the literature studying individ-
ual preferences over foreign economic policy. In Section 3.3, I use a variant of the specific-factors
model to derive the distributional effects of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI and proposes
testable hypotheses. Next, Section 3.4 discusses the design and implementation of the survey
experiment and empirical results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Political economy frameworks usually model foreign economic policies as an interactive outcome
of interest groups’ demand and politicians’ supply.3 These models rely critically on the assump-
tions made about the distribution and aggregation of individual policy preferences. Therefore,
examining these underlying economic policy preferences is crucial in validating these assumptions
and ultimately understanding foreign economic policy-making. There has been a growing body
of literature that uses survey data to investigate individual preferences toward foreign economic
policies. The findings in this literature have provided strong support for the micro-foundations of
political economy models on foreign economic policy-making.
A central theme in this literature is whether material interests are the main driving force of
individual preferences. Much work has gone into testing the predications of two seminal models
in the trade literature: the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (or the Heckscher-Ohlin model)4 and the
specific-factors model.5 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem that assumes factors of production (e.g.,
capital and labor) are completely mobile domestically, asserts that owners of abundant factors
3For studies of trade policy, see, e.g., Dutt and Mitra (2002), Mayer (1984), Milner and Kubota (2005), Milner and
Mukherjee (2009). For FDI policy, see, e.g., Pandya (2007), Pinto (2004), and Pinto and Pinto (2008). For exchange
rate policy, see, e.g., Frieden (1991) and Frieden et al. (2010).
4See Stolper and Samuelson (1941).
5See Jones (1971) and Mussa (1974, 1982).
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(e.g., capital in developed countries or labor in developing countries) benefit from free trade, while
owners of scarce factors (e.g., labor in developed countries or capital in developing countries)
suffer. Thus, preferences over trade policy are likely to vary with factors or classes. In contrast,
the specific-factors model, in which one or more factor is assumed to be industry-specific, predicts
that specific factors in export industries gain from free trade, while those in import-competing
industries lose.6 Returns to specific factors are dependent upon the fortunes of the industry where
they are employed. Therefore, domestic coalitions tend to form in line with industries or sectors.
Overall, the literature finds that individual skills are positively and significantly associated with
preferences toward free trade, which is interpreted as evidence to support the factor endowments
model or the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (see, e.g., Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott
2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001b). These findings provide solid micro-foundations for political
economy frameworks that use class coalitions to explain trade policy outcomes.
Although there is a growing interest in examining people’s preferences over economic global-
ization, trade and immigration in particular, research on individual attitudes toward FDI is surpris-
ingly scarce. There are at least two chief reasons for this scarcity. First, the relationships between
different types of FDI and domestic factors are rather complex. The distributional consequences of
FDI inflows depend upon a variety of parameters and are thus not well understood.7 In contrast, the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem (or the Heckscher-Ohlin model) and the specific-factors model in the
trade literature have clear predictions about people’s material well-being under trade liberalization.
Second, comprehensive survey data on FDI policy are not largely available,8 which significantly
constrains research on public opinion about FDI.
With scholars’ growing interest in FDI and an emerging literature studying the political econ-
6In these models, returns to the mobile factor increase relative to imported goods but decrease relative to exported
goods. Whether owners of this factor gain or lose from trade depends on the pattern of their consumption (see Hiscox
2002: 594).
7For the distributional effects of FDI inflows, see, e.g., Blonigen and Slaughter (2001), Brown et al. (2004),
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997), Pandya (2010), Pinto and Pinto (2008), and Scheve and Slaughter (2005).
8Questions about FDI are rarely included in within- or cross-country public opinion surveys.
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omy of FDI flows and policy, there is a demand for a better understanding of the determinants of
individual preferences toward FDI. Pandya (2010) utilizes survey data from Latinobarometer to
investigate public opinion about FDI, finding that individuals’ skill levels are a strong predictor of
their support for FDI, since inflows of FDI increase the demand for skills and MNCs tend to pay
a higher wage premium to skilled workers. This finding provides evidence for the proposition that
domestic labor, skilled workers in particular, in host countries benefit from inward FDI and thus
become a driving force of FDI liberalization.
However, the literature tends to overlook the differences between different types of FDI that
are likely to generate different distributional consequences on domestic factors. Individual pref-
erences could vary with the kind of FDI that flows into the country. For instance, people’s views
about MNCs with different employment structures may differ depending on how these firms affect
the domestic labor market. These heterogeneous preferences could be critical to understanding
government policies toward different types of FDI. This chapter seeks to contribute to the litera-
ture by collecting original survey data on FDI and by studying individual preferences toward two
different types of FDI: high-skill and low-skill intensive.
3.3 Distributional Consequences of High-Skill and Low-Skill
Intensive FDI 9
The global movement of commodities generates significant distributional effects on domestic ac-
tors, which can lead to potential political conflicts (see, e.g., Rogowski 1987). Similarly, interna-
tional flows of FDI, one key aspect of globalization, can generate both distributional and political
consequences (see, e.g., Pandya 2010; Pinto 2004; Pinto and Pinto 2008).10 MNCs possess propri-
9Please note that most parts of this section are identical to those in Section 1.3.1 in Chapter 1.
10According to the factor-price equalization theorem, given perfect factor mobility, factor prices are solely deter-
mined by changes of commodity prices. The Rybczynski theorem states that any change in factor endowments will be
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etary and intangible assets, such as advanced technology, brand names, managerial know-how, and
access to markets, which are inefficient to directly contract or license. Thus MNCs arise to over-
come these inefficiencies (Caves 1996; Markusen 2002). Investment by MNCs usually involves
cross-border transfers of physical assets and changes of factor demand, therefore generating distri-
butional consequences on domestic actors in host countries11
Not all types of FDI are the same. Scholars often distinguish between vertical and horizontal
FDI.12 When engaging in vertical FDI, MNCs decompose various production stages into multiple
countries to take advantage of factor-price differentials. The primary motive of vertical FDI is
to locate production where intensively used factors are relatively cheap, which is often referred
to as “efficiency–seeking.” Horizontal FDI is when an MNC duplicates its production in various
countries to avoid high tariffs or trade costs, which is particularly “market–seeking.” Another
dimension—MNCs’ level of skill intensity—is also an important determinant of MNCs’ invest-
ment behavior.13 High-skill intensive FDI involves MNCs that use sophisticated technology and
hire a high ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. In contrast, low-skill intensive FDI utilizes un-
sophisticated technology and employs a high ratio of unskilled to skilled workers. Given their
distinct employment structures, inflows of these two types of FDI can have different distributional
consequences.
absorbed by the change in the output mix. These results together imply that changes of factor endowments do not have
an independent effect on factor prices (see, Leamer and Levinsohn 1995). Actually this circumstance is a very special
case, and there are many possibilities for factor prices not to be equalized—at least in the short term. For instance, an
increase in capital stock will raise the wage in a specific-factors model with mobile labor and two kinds of immobile
capital (see Brown et al. 2004; Pinto and Pinto 2008). In addition, a lot of research has shown that cross-border fac-
tor flows—changes of factor endowments—affect factor returns (Borjas 2001; Borjas et al. 1996, 1997; Facchini and
Mayda 2009; Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a).
11Cross-border movement of FDI changes the factor returns in both home and host countries (see, e.g., Feenstra
and Hanson 1996, 1997). Given that the focus of this chapter is the distributional effects of FDI in host countries, the
following discussions simply ignore the influence of FDI in home countries.
12For models of vertical and horizontal FDI, see, e.g., Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), Markusen and Venables
(2000), and Markusen et al. (1996).
13For instance, it has been documented that MNCs’ skill intensity—measured by firms’ capital intensity, R&D,
advertising expenditures, or ratios of non-production to production workers—is an important determinant of their
investment strategies in various business environments. See, e.g., Henisz (2000), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Rodriguez
et al. (2005), and Uhlenbruck et al. (2006).
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In a variant of Jones’s (1971) specific factors model,14 let us assume a small open economy
endowed with the following factors: domestic capital (K), skilled labor (S), and unskilled labor
(L). In developing countries, L is usually much larger than S (L > S). Let us further assume that
domestic capital is industry specific (immobile) and labor is completely mobile across industries
within the country but immobile internationally. Foreign capital (F ) is completely mobile and
seeks the highest returns globally. Furthermore, suppose that there are two sectors—high-skill and
low-skill intensive—in the economy producing high-skill and low-skill goods (X , Y ), respectively.
The prices of these two goods are fixed, set by the world prices. In other words, changes in
domestic production of X and Y do not affect their prices. By definition, the high-skill intensive
sector utilizes a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled labor than the low-skill intensive sector. Put
differently, producing one unit of X requires more skilled labor than producing one unit of Y .
Supplies of domestic capital and both types of labor are fixed but supply of foreign capital is
perfectly elastic. Full employment is maintained in the economy.
Given its cross-border mobility, FDI seeks the highest returns globally. Government is able
to affect the patterns of FDI inflows into these two sectors by choosing differential FDI policies15
that could affect the expected returns of foreign capital.16 First, let us assume that the government
chooses to eliminate restrictions on FDI in the high-skill intensive sector. It may even provide
certain tax or policy incentives to attract FDI into this sector. Inflows of foreign capital raise capital
endowments in this sector, thus increasing demand for both skilled and unskilled labor.17 On the
14See also Pinto and Pinto (2008). Their model allows foreign capital to either substitute or complement domestic
capital.
15These policies include not only direct taxation on foreign capital, but also other restrictions on foreign capital,
including joint venture, local ownership, and minimum export requirements, etc. See Pinto and Pinto (2008).
16The “race-to-the-bottom” literature suggests that globalization significantly constrains government policy space
and autonomy. With regard to FDI, governments (especially those in developing countries) are forced to liberalize FDI
regulations in order to competing for foreign capital. For discussions of this literature, see Garrett (1998) and Mosley
(2003).
17The model assumes that foreign capital complements domestic labor. In theory, foreign capital could substitute
labor. However, the existing literature tends to support that inward FDI has a positive effect on wages. See Brown
et al. (2004) for a review of the literature.
CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL SKILL ENDOWMENTS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
HIGH/LOW-SKILL INTENSIVE FDI 86
one hand, since domestic capital is sector specific, entry of foreign capital decreases the returns of
domestic capital in the high-skill intensive sector due to growing competition.18 Additionally, the
consequent increase in the wage rate due to higher demand drives down the returns of domestic
capital in the low-skill intensive sector. On the other hand, growing capital endowments in the
high-skill intensive sector raise the marginal product of labor in this sector. Firms in this sector
increase the output ofX by inputting more labor until labor’s marginal product is equal to its price.
The expansion of output in X increases the demand for both types of workers, thus attracting
both types of labor to move away from the low-skill intensive sector. Given that the high-skill
intensive sector utilizes a higher ratio of skilled labor, foreign capital into this sector raises the
demand for skilled labor more than that for unskilled labor. In order to compete for labor, firms’
output in the low-skill intensive sector declines, freeing up a high proportion of unskilled workers.
Consequently, the relative demand for skilled workers in the economy increases, while the relative
demand for unskilled workers decreases. To maintain full employment, given the change of relative
demand, the relative wages of skilled to unskilled workers increase.19 Overall, inflows of high-skill
intensive FDI benefit skilled workers more than unskilled workers. However, given the abundance
of unskilled labor in developing countries, unskilled workers could be worse off.
Second, suppose that the government liberalizes FDI regulations in the low-skill intensive sec-
tor. While foreign firms might employ a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled labor than their do-
18Here foreign and domestic capital are substitutive. More efficient foreign firms can reduce domestic firms’ market
shares, therefore increasing the production costs of domestic firms and leading to a decline in their productivity. This
situation is what Aitken and Harrison (1999) interpret as the “market-stealing” effect, or negative technology spillover.
In other cases, MNCs can also complement domestic capital through positive technology spillover or forward and
backward linkages. If this sort of complementarity is sector specific, domestic firms in the other sector still hurt
because labor is driven away. In cases where foreign capital is complementary to domestic capital in both the high-
skill and low-skill intensive sectors, both domestic labor and capital gain from inflows of foreign investment.
19This change does not necessarily lead to a decline in unskilled workers’ real wages, which is dependent on
other parameters as well. In a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model with both countries of significant size, Feenstra
and Hanson (1996, 1997) show that capital movement from North to South increases the skilled wage and decreases
the unskilled wage in both home and host countries. In their model, the less skill-intensive production that moves
from North to South is considered to be more skill-intensive than the average production in South; thus, such capital
movement increases the average skill intensity of production in both the home and host countries. For a detailed
discussion of how FDI affects factor returns in various circumstances, see Brown et al. (2004).
CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL SKILL ENDOWMENTS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
HIGH/LOW-SKILL INTENSIVE FDI 87
mestic counterparts, they still, on average, use more unskilled labor in production in this sector
than firms in the high-skill intensive sector.20 Inflows of foreign capital into the low-skill intensive
sector decrease the returns of domestic capital in both sectors due to increasing competition and
the immobility of domestic capital. Moreover, increasing capital endowments lift the demand for
both types of labor in the low-skill intensive sector. This time, the demand for unskilled labor is
larger than that for skilled labor. Due to complete labor mobility, both types of labor are driven
to the low-skill intensive sector. The relative demand for unskilled workers therefore rises in the
economy, while the relative demand for skilled workers declines. Foreign capital into the low-skill
intensive sector thereby increases the relative wages of unskilled to skilled workers.
The above analysis has shown that inflows of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI affect the
relative demand for skilled and unskilled workers differently, therefore generating distinct income
effects on skilled and unskilled workers. These material consequences are likely to drive individual
preferences toward these two types of FDI. Thus, I hypothesize that:
1. Skilled workers more than unskilled workers favor high-skill intensive FDI.
2. Unskilled workers more than skilled workers prefer low-skill intensive FDI.
However, it should be pointed out that, since skilled workers are scarce in developing countries,
the effect of low-skill intensive FDI on the relative demand for skilled labor might be mitigated by
the scarcity of this type of labor. In a country where skilled labor is scarce, the relatively small
demand for skilled labor from low-skill intensive FDI could be sufficient. I thus expect that high-
skill intensive FDI is more likely than low-skill intensive FDI to generate divided opinions about
FDI between skilled and unskilled workers.
20Foreign firms tend to be more productive and have technology advantages over domestic counterparts. For
instance, in Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996; 1997) studies of the effects of capital movement on the relative wages in
both home and host countries, one assumption is that relatively labor-intensive production moving from a developed
to a developing country is considered to be skill-intensive in the host country. However, it is also possible that MNCs
could transfer production that is less skill-intensive than average production in the host country.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Experimental Design
To test the above hypotheses, I employ a survey experiment to study people’s attitudes toward
these two types of FDI.21 A representative sample of the population aged between 18 and 60 was
drawn in China’s 10 major cities22 based on probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling. The
survey was fielded through face-to-face interviews.23 Each individual was randomly asked one
of the two attitudinal questions about high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI respectively. In other
words, each individual has an equal probability to receive each question. Randomization ensures
in expectation that all distributions of the covariates and unobserved characteristics are balanced
to allow direct comparisons. All tests suggest that covariates are balanced in these two samples.24
The two questions were worded as follows:
1. Do you agree or disagree that the Chinese government should encourage more high-skill
intensive foreign firms (i.e., firms that use sophisticated technology and employ a high ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers) to come and invest?
2. Do you agree or disagree that the Chinese government should encourage more low-skill
intensive foreign firms (i.e., firms that use unsophisticated technology and employ a high
ratio of unskilled to skilled workers) to come and invest?
Answer options:
21The survey was granted exemption by the Institutional Review Board at Columbia University.
22They are Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen, Dalian, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Wuhan, Shenyang, Jinan, and Xi’an.
23The survey was conducted through the Horizon Consultancy Research Group in China. The response rate was
33.08%
24Both one-tailed and two-tailed t-tests suggest that the differences of means are not statistically significant.
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1. Strongly disagree 2. Somewhat disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Somewhat agree 5. Strongly agree
8. Refused 9. Don’t know


























Encourage more High−Skill FDI? Encourage more Low−Skill FDI?
The difference between the two questions is minimized to avoid framing bias.25 The option
of “Don’t know” was included to distinguish persons who didn’t understand the concepts of these
two types of FDI from those who had neutral preferences. In total, the survey received a sample
of 1,097 responses. Among them, 530 individuals received Question 1 and 567 had Question 2.26
Figure 3.1 shows the distributions of support for high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI respectively.
The graph illustrates two features. First, people’s opinions on FDI are divided. If all respondents
25See Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) for a similar desgin to study attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled
immigrants.
26Within the first group, 37 respondents chose “Don’t Know” and two refused to answer. In the second group, 13
chose “Don’t Know” and one refused to answer.
CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL SKILL ENDOWMENTS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
HIGH/LOW-SKILL INTENSIVE FDI 90
in both groups are pooled together, about 46% respondents somewhat agreed or strongly agreed
that the Chinese government should encourage more foreign firms to come and invest, while 27%
respondents somewhat disagreed or strongly disagreed. Second, Figure 3.1 shows that high-skill
intensive FDI is in general preferred to low-skill intensive FDI. A simple t-test suggests that the
difference is statistically significant. This could be a reflection of the Chinese government propa-
gandizing its strong preference toward high-skill intensive FDI.
3.4.2 Measures of Respondents’ Skill Levels
Since I hypothesize that skilled workers support high-skill intensive FDI more, and unskilled
workers, in contrast, favor low-skill intensive FDI, individuals’ skill levels are a key determi-
nant of their preferences toward these two types of FDI. Following the existing literature (e.g.,
Baker 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Pandya 2010; Scheve and
Slaughter 2001a,b), I utilize two measures of individual skills: educational attainment and market-
oriented skills. Educational attainment is a categorical measure of respondents’ formal education
level: primary school or less, middle school, high school, junior college, and college or above.
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006, 2007) suggest that in addition to job skills educational attainment
may also capture the influence of other factors such as exposure to economic ideas, information
about various economic phenomena, and cultural values (e.g., tolerance and cosmopolitanism).
Furthermore, Baker (2005) points out that formal education level overlooks “(1) experience-based
or post-schooling acquisition of skill, (2) massive domestic and international variation in schooling
quality, (3) differences in achievement within equivalent education levels, and (4) the fact that not
all skills acquired through formal education are market-relevant” (927). Thus, following Baker
(2005), I construct a variable of market-oriented skills obtained from a principal component factor
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analysis of formal education,27 monthly personal income28 and occupation.29 This measure only
reflects “the income- and occupation-relevant aspects of formal education” (Baker 2005: 928).
3.4.3 Alternative Explanations and Control Variables
Existing research suggests that individual economic knowledge is a significant predictor of public
opinion on economic policies (e.g., Walstad 1997; Walstad and Rebeck 2002). In particular, a
college economics course has the most lasting effect on people’s attitudes toward economic issues
(Gleason and Scyoc 1995; Saunders 1980; Walstad 1997; Walstad and Rebeck 2002). College
graduates are more likely to be exposed to key economic concepts such as market competition,
technology spillover, and comparative advantage, and thereof have a better understanding of the
complex effects of economic policies.30 This point is especially important for understanding the
consequences of FDI policies due to the multifaceted impact of FDI on domestic capital, labor, and
the national economy. To measure respondents’ economic knowledge, I asked the question: “Have
you taken a course in economics or business?”31 The dichotomous economic knowledge variable
is coded 1 if respondents said “Yes,” and 0 if otherwise.
Information plays a central role in public opinion formation. People usually judge public
policies in terms of the expected utility for themselves, their families or community (Page et al.
27I exclude respondents with primary school or less as this group of population is unlikely to be employed by
foreign firms. See more discussions in the section of Empirical Results.
28Monthly personal income is a categorical variable. Respondents were asked to place themselves into one of
the 18 categories of their monthly personal income ranging from 500 RMB or less to more than 10,001 RMB. The
question was worded as follows: “We would like to know to which level of your monthly income is equivalent. Here
income refers to your wages, earnings from part-time jobs, and other material gains.”
29I transfer respondent occupations into an ordinal variable as follows: (1) farmers, (2) service and sales workers,
(3) manual workers, self-employed, and armed forces and police, (4) clerical workers in firms and government, (5)
junior managers in firms and junior administrators in the government, (6) senior managers in firms and senior admin-
istrators in the government, and (7) professionals. See Baker (2005). Since this format is used to construct a measure
of market-oriented skills, I exclude respondents who are not active in the labor market.
30See Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
31In China, only colleges or graduate schools offer courses in economics and business. Thus, if respondents
answered “Yes,” we can expect that they took economics or business courses in either college or graduate school.
CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL SKILL ENDOWMENTS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
HIGH/LOW-SKILL INTENSIVE FDI 92
1987: 23). The calculation of costs and benefits hinges on “beliefs about the state of nature, that
is, beliefs about present and future facts and causal relationships” (Page et al. 1987, 23-24; see
also (McCubbins and Page 1984)). Thus the kind information to which citizens are exposed is
crucial in shaping their opinions on policy issues. Recent evidence shows that information expo-
sure exerts a critical influence on individuals’ trade policy preference formation (Hainmueller and
Hiscox 2006). In reality, it is costly for individuals to obtain detailed information about various
government policies. Sometimes, the costs are so high that individuals lose interest in acquiring
such information. Alternatively, most people tend to rely on cheaper information sources, includ-
ing newspapers, radio and television, etc. Thus, citizens with more media exposure are more likely
to be influenced by the kind of information revealed. To control for the information effect, I used
a question that asked respondents how often they listen to, read, or watch economic or business
news. Respondents were required to place themselves into one of the four categories: (1) Never,
(2) One or Two Days a Week, (3) Three or Four Days a Week, or (4) Almost Every Day.32 Since
FDI is believed to be a major driving force of China’s economic growth, the Chinese government
has a strong pro-FDI stand in its propaganda. I therefore expect that the more the respondents are
exposed to the media, the more likely they are to support FDI in general.
Nationalism can trigger anti-foreign sentiment and thus antagonism toward foreign investment.
Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) find that national pride is positively
and significantly associated with individuals’ trade protectionist attitudes. In her study of individ-
ual preferences over FDI, Pandya (2010) only finds limited evidence that nationalism is associated
with opposition to FDI. To measure nationalism, I employed one similar question used by Mans-
field and Mutz (2009):33 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, “In
China, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.”
In addition, pubic employees may suffer from FDI inflows. In China, reforming unprofitable
32The question also included answer options of “Refused” and “Don’t Know.”
33The question was originally used in Rankin (2001).
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) lies at the top of the government’s agenda. Foreign firms are en-
couraged to participate in the privatization of SOEs and treated as a vital means to save these
firms (Gallagher 2002). Public employees could lose from privatization due to the retrenchment
of workers in the process of improving SOEs’ efficiency and competitiveness. In fact, large-scale
unemployment has led to numerous protests and social unrest (see Cai 2002; Chen 2000). Thus, I
expect that public employees are less likely to have favorable attitudes toward FDI. Respondents
are treated as public employees if they are employed by either SOEs or collective-owned enter-
prises.
FDI inflows may enhance market competition and thus drive down the price of consumer goods.
Moreover, FDI can benefit consumers by increasing the variety of products, which is especially no-
ticeable for high-income population, as more high-end durable consumer goods become available
in the market. Therefore, income can be positively associated with individuals’ support for high-
skill intensive FDI while negatively for low-skill intensive FDI, since the latter is more likely to
bring in cheap low-end products that dominate the poor’s consumption basket.
Finally, I also control for respondents’ age and gender, given that the literature studying in-
dividual trade policy preferences suggests that female and older people are less likely to support
trade liberalization (see, e.g., Burgoon and Hiscox 2008; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and
Sinnott 2001).
3.4.4 Empirical Results
3.4.4.1 Educational Attainment as a Proxy for Skills
First, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the distributions of individual preferences for high-skill and low-
skill intensive FDI, respectively. I exclude the category of primary school or less because this group
of people is unlikely to be hired by foreign firms and their responses might be noisy. We can see
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Figure 3.2: Support for High-Skill Intensive FDI by Respondents’ Educational
Attainment
Middle School High School Junior College College or above
Strongly Agree
Agree
























from Figure 3.2 that for high-skill intensive FDI, the proportion of respondents stating “Strongly
agree” or “Somewhat agree” increases with their education levels. However, the relationship is not
completely linear. Respondents with only middle school education have a higher share of “Some-
what agree” than those with only high school education. The fraction of respondents choosing
“Neither agree nor disagree,” “Disagree,” or “Strongly disagree” does not reveal a clear pattern.
For low-skill intensive FDI (Figure 3.3), we can see a somewhat opposite pattern. The share of
“Strongly agree” or “Somewhat agree” decreases with the level of educational attainment, while
the fraction of ”Disagree” and ”Strongly disagree” increases with the level of educational attain-
ment. Again, the relationship is, to some extent, non-linear. Respondents at the college education
level or above have a smaller proportion of “Somewhat disagree” than those with junior college
degrees; people with only middle school education have a higher fraction of “Strongly disagree”
than the group with high school education. The distributions of individual FDI preferences are
in general consistent with the predictions in the specific-factors model that skilled workers more
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Figure 3.3: Support for Low-Skill Intensive FDI by Respondents’ Educational
Attainment
Middle School High School Junior College College or above
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than unskilled workers prefer high-skill intensive FDI, while unskilled workers more than skilled
workers favor low-skill intensive FDI.
To systematically examine the determinants of individual preferences for these two types of
FDI, I estimate an ordered probit model. We do not have strong reasons to believe that a move,
for instance, from “Strongly disagree” to “Somewhat disagree” is the same as that from “Some-
what agree” to “Strongly agree.” However, these five categories do represent respondents’ ordinal
preferences. Thus, an ordered probit model is appropriate, which also estimates the unobserved
thresholds between categories. The model is constructed as follows:
ProFDIi = α+β ∗HSIFRAME+ϕ ∗Skilli ∗HSIFRAMEi+ γ ∗Skilli+φXi+ εi (3.1)
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Where i = high− skill intensive FDI or low − skill intensive FDI
ProFDI is an ordinal variable of FDI preferences ranging from 1—strongly disagree to 5—
strongly agree. HSIFRAME is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if respondents were
assigned a question about high-skill intensive FDI, otherwise 0. Skill is a variable measuring
respondents’ skill endowments. X is a N ∗K matrix of control variables. α is the constant, and β
is the skill premium that respondents attach to high-skill intensive FDI. ϕ and γ are coefficients to
be estimated for the interaction term and the skill variable. φ is a coefficient vector for X . ε is the
error term.
The key hypothesis we want to evaluate is whether an individuals’ skill level affects their
attitudes toward high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI. First, I run separate regressions for the
group assigned the question about high-skill intensive FDI and the one assigned the question about
low-skill intensive FDI. Then I pool data together treating the former as the treatment group and
the latter as the control group.34 In Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.1, I respectively regress respondents’
attitudes toward high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI on educational attainment (a proxy for skills)
and a set of control variables. In Model 1, the coefficient of educational attainment is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level. In contrast, in Model 2, the slope of education is negative,
but it is almost 0 and statistically insignificant. These results support my argument that skilled
workers are more likely than unskilled workers to support high-skill intensive FDI. However, I do
not find significantly differences in respondents’ attitudes toward low-skill intensive FDI across the
skill spectrum, though the regression sign is in the expected direction. One possible interpretation
for this finding might be that the declining relative demand for skilled workers resulting from
inflows of low-skill intensive FDI could be mitigated by their scarcity in China. It is possible that
scarce skilled workers could benefit sufficiently from low-skill intensive FDI.
To interpret the substantive effects of the coefficients from the ordered probit regressions, I
34See Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) for similar model specifications.
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Table 3.1: Support for High/Low-Skill Intensive FDI: Educational Attainment





FDI FDI FDI FDI
EDUCATION 0.12* -0.00 -0.03 0.13* -0.03 -0.06





FEMALE 0.18* 0.21** 0.22*** 0.18* 0.20** 0.21***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
AGE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE -0.52*** -0.12 -0.27*** -0.50*** -0.11 -0.25***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09)
NEWS EXPOSURE 0.13** 0.05 0.09** 0.12** 0.07 0.10**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
NATIONALISM 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.30***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09
(0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
CUT1 -0.43 -0.42 -0.21 -0.61 -0.47 -0.29
(0.47) (0.46) (0.34) (0.45) (0.44) (0.32)
CUT2 0.65 0.51 0.73** 0.48 0.45 0.65**
(0.46) (0.46) (0.34) (0.44) (0.44) (0.32)
CUT3 1.53*** 1.27*** 1.52*** 1.36*** 1.20*** 1.44***
(0.47) (0.46) (0.34) (0.44) (0.44) (0.32)
CUT4 3.19*** 2.75*** 3.08*** 3.02*** 2.71*** 3.00***
(0.48) (0.47) (0.35) (0.45) (0.46) (0.33)
Region Dummies X X X X X X
Obs. 476 521 997 462 509 971
Log Likelihood -571.35 -709.68 -1303.07 -555.21 -692.76 -1269.36
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08
χ2 79.79 103.34 225.45 76.30 98.56 215.13
P > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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simulated the marginal probability of encouraging FDI (i.e., “Somewhat agree” or “Strongly agree”
that FDI should be encouraged). For each simulation, I calculated the difference in the probabilities
of supporting FDI when moving education level from primary school or less (the lowest level) to
college or above (the highest level) and fixing all other variables at their median values. Basing
on the 1000 simulations, I then obtained the mean and a 90% confidence interval of the 1000
differences. In Model 1, the marginal effect of education is 0.17 [0.01,0.34],35 which suggests
that moving respondent education level from primary school to college or above will increase the
probability of supporting high-skill intensive FDI by 17% when all other variables are held at their
medians. In contrast, the same increase in education level reduces respondent support for low-skill
intensive FDI by 1.5% with a 90% confidence interval of [-0.17, 0.14].
Regarding other control variables, women are more likely than men to support both types of
FDI. Women are 6.49% [0.57%, 12.76%] and 8.03% [0.82%, 14.16%] more likely than men to
support high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI respectively. This finding is contradictory to those
in the literature that women tend to have stronger anti-globalization sentiment. One possible ex-
planation for the positive correlation might be that female consumers welcome foreign investment
because it increases product variety and brings in high-quality goods. In addition, respondents’
economic knowledge is found to be associated with opposition to FDI. When all other variables
are at their medians, having taken a course either in economics or business decreases the proba-
bility of supporting high-skill intensive FDI by 19.84% and low-skill intensive FDI by 4.58%, but
only the former is statistically significant. The negative coefficients of the economic knowledge
variable in both models, in itself, are interesting, as it is often expected that people exposed to
economic ideas tend to have favorable opinions about globalization. The negative correlation be-
tween respondents’ economic knowledge and support for FDI could be because individuals knowl-
edgeable in economics or business are more likely to pay attention to the adverse effects of FDI
35Numbers in brackets are the 90% confidence interval. The 95% confidence interval is [-0.01, 0.36].
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inflows, such as market competition, environmental deterioration, and income inequality.36 News
exposure, in contrast, increases respondents’ support for FDI, especially high-skill intensive FDI.
This finding can potentially be explained by the Chinese government’s pro-FDI propaganda. Inter-
estingly, nationalism is strongly correlated with favorable attitudes toward both types of FDI and
both coefficients are statistically significant beyond the conventional level. One unit increase from
its median value raises the probability of supporting high-skill intensive FDI by 9.89% [6.96%,
12.99%] and low-skill intensive FDI by 12.48% [9.61%, 15.60%] when all other variables are held
at their medians. This positive relationship contradicts the existing findings that national pride
triggers anti-globalization sentiment. One potential explanation for this positive correlation is that
Chinese people may have a strong belief that FDI is conducive to China’s economic development,
and therefore national pride in fact spurs public support for FDI. This claim is reinforced by anec-
dotal evidence that the Chinese government justifies its liberalization of FDI policy with the aim
of building a strong, modern nation state. Finally, older people are less likely to be in favor of
FDI in general; family income is positively associated with support for high-skill intensive FDI but
opposition to low-skill intensive FDI; public employees tend to oppose FDI. All these findings are
sensible, but their coefficients are not statistically significant.
In Model 3, I treat the respondents receiving the question about high-skill intensive FDI as the
treatment group and those having the question about low-skill intensive FDI as the control group.
HSIFRAME is a dummy variable indicating the treatment, which measures the premium that
respondents attach to high-skill intensive FDI. According to the predictions in the specific-factors
model, we expect that the coefficient of education is negative while the one of the interaction
term between education and HSIFRAME is positive. Results are presented in Model 3 of Table
3.1. A negative slope of education and a positive coefficient of the interaction term support my
argument that individuals’ support for low-skill intensive FDI decreases, while support for high-
36In China, Western economic textbooks are widely used in college education. A considerable number of college
teachers in economics or business departments actually have Ph.D. degrees from Western countries.
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skill intensive FDI increases with their skill levels. The interaction term is statistically significant
at 10%. Since HSIFRAME and the interaction term are highly correlated,37 I test the joint
significance of education,HSIFRAME, and their interaction term. The results yield a chi-square
statistic of 85.61 and a p-value of 0.00.















































MNCs usually own technology advantage over domestic firms and their employees need to
possess a minimum level of skills. Thus, people with only primary school education or less are
unlikely to be employed by foreign firms. In addition, given their limited level of formal education,
we do not know how these respondents answered the questions. To deal with these possible noises,
I exclude respondents with primary school education or less and re-estimate every model.38 We
can see from Models 4, 5 and 6, all results are substantively the same as those in Models 1, 2 and 3,
37The Pearson correlation between these two variables is 0.95.
3832 respondents reported that they obtained only primary school education or less, which is 2.92% of the sample.
Including or excluding these people does not affect the regression results substantively.
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except that the significance level of the interaction term between education and HSIFRAME in
Model 6 increases to the 95% level. To better interpret the substantive magnitudes of education’s
coefficients, in Figure 3.4, I graph the predicted probability in favor of high-skill and low-skill
intensive FDI (answers “Somewhat agree” and “Strongly agree”) in Model 6 along with the 90%
and 95% confidence intervals across respondents’ education levels. The results were obtained from
1000 simulations. The graph clearly shows that the probability of favoring high-skill intensive FDI
increases, while the probability of supporting low-skill intensive FDI decreases with respondent’s
skill level. These results are rather consistent with the predications in the specific-factors model.
Additionally, the figure reveals that overall, high-skill intensive FDI is preferred to low-skill inten-
sive FDI.
In brief, I find that individual skill level measured by educational attainment is positively and
strongly associated with support for high-skill intensive FDI, but only find limited evidence that
unskilled individuals have more favorable attitudes toward low-skill intensive FDI than skilled peo-
ple. Additionally, the empirical results show that women strongly favor both types of FDI; national
pride increases the probability in favor of FDI; economic knowledge raises respondents’ opposi-
tion to high-skill intensive FDI, while news exposure increases individual support for high-skill
intensive FDI. Both economic knowledge and news exposure do not exert a significant influence
on people’s attitudes toward low-skill intensive FDI.
3.4.4.2 Market-Oriented Skills
One possible rejection to the findings is that educational attainment used to measure skills may cap-
ture other factors such as economic knowledge, information, and cultural values.39 This concern
can be mitigated given the following facts. First, in the regressions, I have explicitly controlled
for respondents’ economic knowledge and degree of information exposure. Both variables have a
39See Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006, 2007).
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significant effect on respondents’ attitudes toward FDI. Second, the slope of education is positive
in the group of high-skill intensive FDI and negative in the group of low-skill intensive FDI, while
both coefficients of economic knowledge are negative. Therefore, it is unlikely that education
only captures the effect of respondents’ exposure to economic ideas in college. Third, if people
with college education are more likely to tolerate foreign cultures and have cosmopolitan views,40
education should be positively correlated with pro-FDI attitudes in general. In fact, the results
reveal a slightly negative relationship between respondents’ level of education and their support
for low-skill intensive FDI.
To further check whether the results are sensitive to the measure of skills that I have chosen,
following Baker (2005), I constructed a variable of market-oriented skills.41 I conducted a principal
component factor analysis on respondents’ education, occupation, and monthly personal income,
and one factor was loaded with eigenvalue greater than 1. This skill variable “capture[s] only
the income- and occupation-relevant aspects of formal education” (Baker 2005: 928). As before,
I first run separate regressions for these two groups and then model them simultaneously. All
results are shown in Table 3.2. In the group of high-skill intensive FDI, the coefficient of market-
oriented skills is 0.15 and statistically significant at 10% level, while the one in the group of
low-skill intensive FDI is 0.05 and statistically insignificant. These findings are consistent with
those using formal educational attainment as a measure of skills. In Model 3 of Table 3.2 where
two groups are pooled together, the coefficient of the skill variable is almost 0 and the slope of
the interaction term between the market-oriented skill variable and HSIFRAME is 0.14 with
a p-value of 0.052. This finding illustrates that respondents’ support for high-skill intensive FDI
40The Pearson correlational between educational attainment and nationalism is 0.01 in the sample.
41Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006, 2007, 2010) split their samples into respondents in the labor force and those out
of the labor force. The rationale behind this method is that the material effects or self-economic interests mainly result
from participation in the job market; however, the influence of economic knowledge and cultural values should be
carried on even when people are out of the labor force. Thus, we should expect that education has different effects
on respondents’ attitudes toward economic policies for people in the labor force and those out of the labor force.
Unfortunately, I am unable to employ this method given data constraints; I do not have observations of respondents
who hold a college degree or above and are currently out of the labor force.
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Table 3.2: Support of High/Low-Skill Intensive FDI: Market-Oriented Skills
MODEL (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES High-Skill FDI Low-Skill FDI FDI






FEMALE 0.22* 0.24** 0.25***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08)
AGE -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
FAMILYINCOME -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE -0.53*** -0.11 -0.26**
(0.16) (0.14) (0.10)
NEWS EXPOSURE 0.13** 0.06 0.09**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
NATIONALISM 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.29***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES -0.19 -0.09 -0.13
(0.13) (0.12) (0.09)
CUT1 -1.22*** -0.44 -0.30
(0.45) (0.44) (0.31)
CUT2 -0.18 0.51 0.64**
(0.44) (0.44) (0.31)
CUT3 0.70 1.24*** 1.42***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.31)
CUT4 2.39*** 2.69*** 2.98***
(0.45) (0.45) (0.32)
REGION DUMMY X X X
Obs. 404 440 844
Log Likelihood -480.11 -601.72 -1101.49
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.07 0.08
χ2 79.89 88.26 203.79
P > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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increases significantly with their market-oriented skill levels, whereas their support for low-skill
intensive FDI almost does not change across the skill spectrum. The magnitudes and significant
levels of all other control variables are not substantively different from those in Models 3 or 6 in
Table 3.1. These results suggest that respondents’ preferences for these two types of FDI are driven
by their material concerns other than their exposure to economic information or cultural values.








































































































In Figure 3.5, I graph the predicated probability in favor of high-skill and low-skill intensive
FDI by respondents’ market-oriented skill levels along with the 90% and 95% confidence intervals.
These results are based on 1000 simulations using the coefficients in Model 3 of Table 3.2. The two
graphics clearly show that when all other variable are held at their median values, the probability
of supporting high-skill intensive FDI rises with the respondent’s skill level, while the probability
of supporting low-skill intensive FDI almost does not change across the skill spectrum. The re-
sults strongly support my argument that skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to
support high-skill intensive FDI. As discussed before, the insignificant difference in respondents’
support for low-skill intensive FDI could be a result of the fact that skilled labor is scarce in China.
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3.4.4.3 Non-Linear Relationships
Finally, I explore possible non-linear relationships between education and individual preferences
for FDI. Alternatively, I estimate the following model:
ProFDIi = α + γ1 ∗MiddleSchooli + γ2 ∗ JuniorCollegei + γ3 ∗ Collegei+
ϕ1 ∗MiddleSchooli ∗HSIFRAMEi + ϕ2 ∗ JuniorCollegei ∗HSIFRAMEi+
ϕ3 ∗ Collegei ∗HSIFRAMEi + β ∗HSIFRAMEi + φ ∗Xi + εi (3.2)
Where i = high− skill intensive FDI or low − skill intensive FDI
High school education is the reference category. Again, I first run separate regressions for the
groups of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI and then pool the data together. All results are
presented in Table 3.3. In Model 1, respondents with college education or above have a signifi-
cantly higher probability of supporting high-skill intensive FDI than those with only high school
education. The coefficients of junior college and middle school education are both positive but
not statistically significant. In the group of low-skill intensive FDI (Model 2), people with ju-
nior college education are less likely to favor this sort of FDI. Nonetheless the coefficient is not
statistically significant. Individuals with only middle school or at least college education are not
very different from those with only high school education in terms of the probability of supporting
low-skill intensive FDI. In Model 3 where the two groups are modeled simultaneously, we can
see that the coefficients of junior college and college or above are negative, but their interactions
with HSIFRAME are positive. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the two interaction terms’ co-
efficients increase with the level of education. The slope of middle school education is almost 0
(0.03), and the slope of its interaction term with HSIFRAME is much smaller than those of the
other two interaction terms, although it is positive. The interaction term between college or above
and HSIFRAME is statistically significant at the 1% level, and all three interaction terms are
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Table 3.3: Support for High/Low-Skill Intensive FDI: Non-Linear Relationships
MODEL (1) (2) (3)
High-Skill FDI Low-Skill FDI FDI
MIDDLESCHOOL 0.11 0.06 0.03
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
JUNIORCOLLEGE 0.11 -0.13 -0.16
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)










FEMALE 0.20* 0.20** 0.22***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.07)
AGE -0.00 -0.01 -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
FAMILYINCOME 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE -0.57*** -0.11 -0.28***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.10)
NEWS EXPOSURE 0.13** 0.07 0.10**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
NATIONALISM 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.30***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES -0.13 -0.06 -0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
CUT1 -0.80* -0.44 -0.20
(0.42) (0.41) (0.29)
CUT2 0.30 0.48 0.74**
(0.41) (0.41) (0.29)
CUT3 1.20*** 1.24*** 1.53***
(0.41) (0.41) (0.30)
CUT4 2.86*** 2.75*** 3.10***
(0.43) (0.43) (0.30)
REGION DUMMIES X X X
Obs. 462 509 971
Log Likelihood -551.38 -692.16 -1265.59
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.08
χ2 83.97 99.78 222.66
P > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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jointly significant with a p-value of 0.06.
Figure 3.6: Support for High/Low-Skill Intensive FDI by Respondents’ Educa-


















































To further illustrate the results, I graph the predicted probability of supporting FDI along with
the 90% and 95% confidence intervals by respondents’ educational attainment (see Figure 3.6).
The figure does show some non-linear relationships between individual educational attainment and
support for high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI. Respondents with college education or above
are significantly more likely to support high-skill intensive FDI than other groups; in contrast,
respondents with junior college and college education or above are less likely to support low-skill
intensive FDI, but the differences are not statistically significant. In addition, the graph confirms
the previous finding that, in general, people prefer high-skill to low-skill intensive FDI.
To sum up, the results from the survey experiment show that individuals’ support for high-skill
intensive FDI is positively and significantly associated with their skill level; to some extent, support
for low-skill intensive FDI is negatively correlated with respondents’ skill level, but the correlation
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is not statistically significant. On the one hand, in China, the increase in the relative demand for
unskilled workers resulting from inflows of low-skill intensive FDI could be moderate given the
abundance of unskilled labor. On the other hand, skilled workers could benefit sufficiently from
this type of FDI given their scarcity. This might explain why we do not see a significant difference
in respondents’ attitudes toward low-skill intensive FDI across different skill levels. Overall, these
findings are consistent with the predications about the distributional effects of high-skill and low-
skill intensive FDI in the specific-factors model. In addition, I find that women are more likely
than men to support both types of FDI, contradictory to the notion that women are likely to be
disadvantaged by globalization. The results also show that respondents with more knowledge
in economics or business tend to oppose FDI. This anti-FDI sentiment is especially strong toward
high-skill intensive FDI. Furthermore, I find strong nationalism is correlated with a high probability
of supporting FDI. News exposure increases a respondent’s likelihood to favor FDI, and this effect
is statistically significant for high-skill intensive FDI. Finally, I do not find any significant effects
of age, family income, and the status of public employees on respondents’ preferences toward FDI.
3.5 Conclusion
International Political Economy scholars are in particular interested in investigating individual
preferences over foreign economic policies, as these preferences serve as the micro-foundations
of interest groups’ political behavior, such as voting and lobbying. Undoubtedly, the existing lit-
erature relying on survey data has provided important insights into the determinants of people’s
foreign economic policy preferences. Given the fact that FDI flows are one essential part of glob-
alization and MNCs are now playing a critical role in the world economy, the research on indi-
vidual FDI policy preferences is surprisingly scarce. Therefore, there is a demand for the study of
individual FDI preferences to further understand the politics of FDI.
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This study contributes to the literature by examining individual preferences toward two distinct
types of FDI: high-skill and low-skill intensive. Using a variant of the specific-factors model, I
have shown that high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI can generate different distributional conse-
quences for skilled and unskilled labor by changing their relative demand. Inflows of high-skill
intensive FDI increase the relative demand for skilled workers and thus the relative wages of skilled
to unskilled workers. In contrast, inflows of low-skill intensive FDI exert the opposite effect on the
relative wages. Empirically, I employ a survey experiment implemented in China to examine these
distributional consequences of these two types of FDI. The findings from the survey experiment
are consistent with the predictions in the model. The probability of supporting high-skill intensive
FDI increases with the respondent’s skill level, measured by either formal educational attainment
or market-oriented skills; whereas, to some extent, the likelihood of supporting low-skill intensive
FDI decreases across respondents’ skill spectrum.
The existing literature studying the political economy of FDI tends to treat labor as a single
group that benefits from FDI inflows. This literature has certainly provided important insights into
the relationships between foreign capital and domestic labor. However, it seems to oversimplify
the connections between the two. This chapter has shown that the labor-market effects of FDI
may depend on foreign firms’ skill intensity relative to the average of existing production in the
host country. These findings have important implications for studying the politics of FDI. On the
one hand, inflows of high-skill and low-skill intensive FDI could result in potential social conflicts
among different segments of labor. On the other hand, the distributional effects of high-skill and
low-skill intensive FDI give politicians strong incentives to appeal to one or the other in order to
privilege their core supporters.
Additionally, this study speaks to the literature studying individual preferences over trade and
immigrant policies in several ways. First, scholars have suggested that information and economic
knowledge play a critical role in determining individual preferences. In particular, the pro-trade
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sentiment may be driven by people’s exposure to economic ideas and cultural values such as tol-
erance and cosmopolitanism (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). Findings in this chapter confirm the
crucial role played by information in public opinion formation. New exposure has a significant
impact on people’s attitudes toward both types of FDI. The results also suggest that respondents’
economic knowledge does not necessarily lead to pro-FDI attitudes. People more knowledgeable
in economics or business might pay more attention to the negative consequences of FDI inflows.
Second, this research suggests that women are not always disadvantaged from globalization. A
lot of research on the public’s attitudes toward trade policy has identified that women tend to op-
pose trade liberalization (e.g., Burgoon and Hiscox 2008; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and
Sinnott 2001). Burgoon and Hiscox (2008) suggest that women’s protectionist attitudes may result
from the fact that they are less likely to be exposed to economic knowledge and information. In this
chapter, I found that women in fact have stronger pro-FDI sentiment than men, which may suggest
that women and men can have different opinions about different aspects of globalization. Finally,
the strong and consistent positive correlation between nationalism and pro-FDI preferences im-
plies that in certain circumstances nationalism can facilitate globalization, which runs counter to
the existing findings that nationalism is harmful to economic integration.
Finally, this chapter underscores the significance of individual heterogeneous preferences over
different types of FDI. To explore the complex roots of people’s attitudes toward FDI, future re-
search needs to dig more deeply into various categories of FDI. Given the heterogeneity in MNCs’
levels of technological sophistication, employment structures, and motives for overseas investment,
we have no reasons to assume that all kinds of MNCs have the same influence on domestic actors.
Future research on the politics of FDI needs to assess such differences.
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Chapter 4
Economic Integration and Corruption: The
Case of China
Abstract
This chapter argues that higher levels of economic integration in terms of more inward foreign
direct investment and trade flows could be associated with more corruption. To test this argu-
ment, I conduct a case study on China and draw from original data on the objective corruption
cases reported by the procuratorate (jian cha yuan) to construct measures of corruption. Empiri-
cal evidence strongly supports my argument. This finding holds when the frequency of residents’
witnessed corruption and the level of perceived corruption are used as alternative measures. More-
over, these results are robust and consistent even after law enforcement, possible endogeneity, and
various political and economic variables are considered. The findings in this chapter contradict the
conventional notion that economic integration contributes to decrease corruption and have impor-
tant implications for domestic and global governance.
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4.1 Introduction
How does economic integration—inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade—
affect corruption activities in host countries? Given the significant role that multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) and trade are playing in the world economy and the substantive attention that
both scholars and international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations have
given to good governance, it is of great importance to understand the connections between eco-
nomic integration and corruption. The general account in the literature is that deepening economic
integration lowers the level of corruption because integration increases market competition and
efficiency, reduces rents, and promotes the diffusion of good governance in host countries.
However, cross-border economic activities are not immune from corruption. For instance, cor-
ruption scandals involving foreign firms have frequently made headlines in China. MNCs, such
as Avery Dennison, Avon, Daimler, Diagnostic Products, IBM, Lucent, Siemens, and UTStarcom,
all have been found to be corrupt in China.1 In 2006, the Transparency International (TI) surveyed
11,232 business executives in 125 countries, asking them about their experience with the business
practices of firms from 30 leading exporting countries in their countries. The report shows that for-
eign firms from giant exporting countries have a considerable propensity to pay bribes in operating
countries, especially in low income countries.2
The extant literature has overlooked the strategic interactions between foreign firms and host
governments. FDI is different from other forms of capital flow, such as remittances and portfolio
1For instance, in 2008, Siemens agreed to pay total fines and penalties of approximately 1 billion Euros in Ger-
many and the U.S. because of paying bribes to foreign government officials to obtain business contracts. In China,
Siemens paid bribes to government officials for businesses of metro trains and signal devices, high voltage transmission
lines, and medical devices. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2008. Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft. http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm
(accessed August 28, 2010). Between 2003 and 2007, Siemens paid bribes of 23.40 million U.S. dollars to five state-
owned hospitals; through bribing government officials, Siemens obtained a contract of 838 millions U.S. dollars in
high voltage transmission lines and 1 billion U.S. dollars in metro trains. China Youth Online, August 3, 2009.
2Transparency International. 2006. Bribe Payers Index Analysis Report. http://www.transparency.
org/news_room/in_focus/2006/bpi_2006 (accessed March 13, 2011).
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investment, in the sense that it involves the transfers of physical assets, human resources and tech-
nology, while demanding deep engagement and long-term commitment from parent companies. In
this regard, MNCs—the vehicles of FDI—are sensitive to the political and economic conditions
in host countries. Footloose foreign capital becomes illiquid ex post, under the risk of opportunis-
tic government and joint-venture partner’s expropriation (Vernon 1971, 1980). These distinctive
characteristics of FDI give MNCs incentives and opportunities to exert potent influences on host
countries. Existing studies have, for instance, shown that FDI inflows affect government spending
and taxation (e.g., Garrett and Mitchell 2001), income distribution (e.g., Jensen and Rosas 2007),
and labor rights (e.g., Mosley and Uno 2007). Yet, few studies address the impact of inward FDI
on corruption.
Empirical evidence based on firm-level surveys indicates that MNCs are as likely as their do-
mestic counterparts to engage in corruption (Hellman et al. 2000, 2002; Søreide 2006). Due to
FDI’s ex post immobility and the risks of expropriation, MNCs employ various strategies to pro-
tect their interests in host countries (see, e.g., Henisz 2000; Javorcik and Wei 2009; Rodriguez
et al. 2005; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). It is also possible for MNCs to resort to bribery as a means of
obtaining business contracts, government services and advantages over their competitors, conse-
quently exacerbating the problem of corruption. Likewise, trade may be connected to corruption as
well. On the one hand, trade protection, especially the distribution of import licenses and quotas,
gives government officials opportunities for corruption; on the other hand, competition for im-
port licenses and quotas may take illegal forms of bribery (see Krueger 1974; Shleifer and Vishny
1993).
This chapter examines the relationship between economic integration and corruption in the
context of China, one of the largest FDI recipients and trade nations, and a relatively underde-
veloped country. It argues that economic integration leads to a high level of corruption in China.
The regulations of investment and trade give rise to greater rent-seeking activities that lead to
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more corruption. Furthermore, economic integration that brings in capital and resources expands
opportunities for bribery and boosts up the level of bribe payments.
Testing the argument presents challenges of how to measure corruption in China. I rely on the
“objective” corruption cases reported by the procuratorate (jian cha yuan) and collect an original
dataset on the number of filed corruption cases, the amount of recovered corrupt funds and the
number of senior cadres disciplined (at or above the county or division level, xian chu ji) for each
province for each year from 1998 to 2007 to construct the measures of corruption at the provincial
level. To deal with the fact that these measures are a mixed reflection of true corruption and the
efficacy of law, in the empirical analysis, I control for several variables that influence government’s
anti-corruption efforts. As robustness checks, I turn to survey data and use the frequency of resi-
dents’ “witnessed” corruption that is arguably a more objective and reliable measure, and the level
of perceived corruption as alternative measures. The empirical evidence strongly supports my ar-
gument that economic integration increases the level of corruption in China. The results are robust
and consistent even when we take into account possible endogeneity, selection bias and various
political and economic variables.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant literature. Then Section
4.3 discusses the mechanisms through which economic integration affects corruption in operating
countries by focusing on inward FDI and presents the testable hypothesis in the context of China.
Following that, Section 4.4 addresses the research design and measurement of corruption. Then in
Section 4.5 systematic empirical analyses are conducted to examine the determinants of corruption
in China. Section 4.7 concludes with a discussion of this study’s implications and future research
revenues.
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4.2 Literature Review
Corruption is generally defined as the “misuse of public office for private gain” (Bardhan 1997;
Rose-Ackerman 1999). The publication of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by the TI has
greatly contributed to the empirical research of corruption. Existing empirical studies have, for
instance, shown that corruption undermines public goods provision, impairs domestic investment
and retards economic growth (see, e.g., Fisman and Svensson 2007; Mauro 1995). In addition,
a growing body of literature suggests that corruption negatively affects FDI inflows, because not
only does bribery increases the costs of doing business, but also the secrecy of corruption adds
uncertainty and risks (e.g., Malesky and Samphantharak 2008; Wei 2000; Wei and Shleifer 2000).
Yet, few studies address the impact of economic integration in general, inward FDI in particular, on
corruption. Among the existing studies, scholars tend to assert that deepening economic integration
lowers the level of corruption because integration increases market competition and efficiency,
reduces rents, and promotes the diffusion of good governance in operating countries.3 The causal
mechanisms typically suggested in the literature can be classified into one of two broad categories:
competition and diffusion.4
The competition argument hypothesizes that increasing competition from foreign products and
firms reduces the rents enjoyed by domestic firms, thus decreasing the incentives for corruption
(Ades and Di Tella 1999; Sandholtz and Gray 2003, 765-6; and Treisman 2007, 236). International
competition drives down firms’ profits. If bribes are treated as extra taxes on firms, in the case of
low marginal gains due to fierce competition, then corruption means higher business costs that can
drive firms out of the market. Moreover, in a globalized world with high capital mobility, corrupt
3Robertson and Watson (2004) find that a rapid rate of increase or decrease in FDI leads to a high level of perceived
corruption.
4In addition to these two arguments, scholars suggest that MNCs often have high corporate responsibilities and
well-established internal corporate codes, and face regulatory pressures and legal constraints from both home countries
and international anti-bribery conventions, all of which deter MNCs from engaging in corruption in host countries.
See, Kwok and Tadesse (2006) and Rose-Ackerman (2002).
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officials’ ability to extract rents may be largely restricted because capital can simply choose to leave
and look for alternative investment locations. According to this argument, competition associated
with economic integration tends to decrease corruption.
Economic integration can also affect corruption through diffusion. Scholars argue that “[t]he
interactions associated with trade and cross-border investment may also be mechanisms for the
communication of ideas, values, and norms” (Sandholtz and Gray 2003, 767). Since advanced
Western countries dominate both international trade and foreign investment, norms and values—
such as democratic governance, rule of law and property rights protection—will be promoted glob-
ally through cross-border economic activities. Thus, the expectation is that the more deeply a
country integrates into the global economy, the higher the likelihood that it will adopt these norms
and values and will therefore be less corrupt. Moreover, neoliberal policies are found to be associ-
ated with a lower level of political corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2005). If globalization helps
diffuse these policies, we should expect countries that are more integrated into the world economy
to be associated with less corruption.
All of the above explanations are plausible. However, the strategic interactions between for-
eign firms and the host countries are much more complex than what has been suggested in the
literature. Evidence based on firm surveys indicates that MNCs are as likely as their domes-
tic counterparts to engage in corruption (Hellman et al. 2000, 2002; Søreide 2006), and have a
considerable propensity to pay bribes in operating countries, especially in low income countries
(Transparency International 2006). That MNCs adopt different entry modes in the host countries
with differing levels of political and contractual risks has been widely documented (e.g., Henisz
2000; Javorcik and Wei 2009; Rodriguez et al. 2005; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). Likewise, MNCs are
likely to adjust their investment strategies according to the relative costs and benefits of corruption.
It is possible that MNCs engage in corruption in the host countries where the legal infrastructure
is underdeveloped and the government regulations are ineffective. Their activities consequently
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make corruption worse. MNCs’ activities can be “directed into illicit channels with highly detri-
mental social and economic consequences” (Hellman et al. 2000, 7). In a cross-national analysis,
Pinto and Zhu (2008) finds that FDI inflows are likely to increase the level of corruption in less
developed non-democracies while reduce corruption in advanced democracies.
Empirically, the existing literature studying economic integration and corruption relies heavily
on the “subjective” measures of perceived corruption constructed by institutions such as the TI and
the World Bank. Knack and Azfar (2003) point out that existing empirical work suffers from sam-
ple selection bias because small countries are less likely to be covered by most available corruption
perceptions indices, and they tend to be more open given their small domestic markets. By includ-
ing more small countries in their sample, they find that trade openness does not affect corruption
significantly. Thus, the empirical evidence from cross-national analyses may be a function of the
sample size in the regressions. Thus, a within-country research design that may limit the scope of
generalization helps deal with the sample selection bias in cross-national analyses.
4.3 Inward FDI, Trade and Corruption
Both FDI inflows and international trade (especially imports) could affect corruption positively
in host countries. In this section, I will discuss the causal mechanisms through which economic
integration can affect corruption by focusing on inward FDI because scholars have already paid
attention to the positive effect of trade regulations on corruption (e.g., Krueger 1974; Shleifer and
Vishny 1993).
The first and most direct way that FDI inflows may cause corruption is that FDI regulations
give rise to rent-seeking activities that may take illegal forms such as bribery. Host countries adopt
various FDI policies that consist of rules and regulations governing the entry of foreign investors.
These policies include investment pre-screening and approval, firm registration, business licensing,
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etc. On the one hand, FDI regulations give government officials opportunities to demand bribes.
On the other hand, foreign firms may have incentives to pay extra money in order to facilitate
the approval process. For instance, a long waiting period means considerable costs to firms and
even may result in the loss of business opportunities. In countries where legal infrastructure is
underdeveloped and government regulations are ineffective, these rent-seeking activities could lead
to more corruption.
Secondly, FDI inflows could affect corruption in host countries by bringing in capital and re-
sources. Corruption is prevalent, and it is often a part of business practices in many developing
countries. Resources accompanied with FDI inflows expand opportunities for bribery and hence
increase the level of corruption (Robertson and Watson 2004). By bringing in more foreign money,
FDI can boost up the level of bribes simply because there are now more resources available in the
local economy. Furthermore, MNCs possess advanced technology, managerial skills and access
to foreign markets, all of which are usually scarce in developing countries. Entry of foreign firms
helps release these constraints faced by domestic firms or local governments, and thus helping
extract more rents from the local economy that could potentially be shared between government
officials and foreign investors (Pinto and Zhu 2008). This distinguishes FDI from domestic invest-
ment because indigenous firms in many developing countries usually do not have the technology to
exploit local resources. In this sense, MNCs are more capable than domestic firms of internalizing
the costs associated with local corruption. It should be noted that more rents do not necessarily
lead to more corruption. Rent-seeking activities can take legal forms such as lobbying. However, in
countries where legal infrastructure is underdeveloped and government regulations are ineffective,
rent-seeking activities may take illegal forms such as bribery, thus leading to more corruption.
Thirdly, foreign firms’ incentives to avoid uncertainty and risks in operating countries can lead
to corruption activities.5 Investing in less developed countries involves considerable risks. Mobile
5Getz and Volkema (2001) suggest that in high uncertainty-avoidance cultures where people prefer stability and
strong institutions, corruption tends to be rampant.
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foreign capital possesses substantial bargaining power ex ante, but becomes illiquid ex post. The
“obsolete bargain” model suggests that the bargaining power starts to shift to the host government
at the moment when foreign investment takes place (Vernon 1971, 1980). A counter argument is
that footloose capital can simply choose to exist and thus possesses considerable bargaining power
over domestic government. However, FDI usually involves the transfers of physical assets, human
resources and technology, while demanding deep engagement and long-term commitment from
parent companies. It therefore becomes much less mobile after investment takes place. In host
countries MNCs face a variety of political and economic hazards including information asymme-
try, insecure property and contractual rights, frequent shifts of government regulation, expropri-
ation from opportunistic joint-venture partner or host government, etc. Nonetheless, this kind of
uncertainty and risks does not necessarily deter foreign investors. MNCs, in fact, actively adjust
their entry modes to cope with the uncertainty and risks in host countries (e.g., Henisz 2000; Ja-
vorcik and Wei 2009; Rodriguez et al. 2005; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). A consistent finding in the
literature is that MNCs are more likely to partner with domestic firms and enter with a minority
ownership in politically risky environments.
Likewise, it is possible that MNCs may manage uncertainty and risks in host countries through
bribing public officials. In most developing countries, public goods (such as property and contrac-
tual rights protection) are under-provided, government regulations are discretionary, and policy
shifts happen frequently. MNCs may therefore prefer to offer private payments to public officials
in exchange for secure property and contractual rights and information about government policies
and regulations. For instance, foreign firms are found more likely to be engaged in state capture
to influence the formulation of public laws and government policies in transition economies (Hell-
man et al. 2000). Thus, MNCs’ incentives to avoid uncertainty and risks may intensify corruption
activities in host countries.6
6It is also possible that corruption may induce more uncertainty and risks. However, whether corruption increases
or decreases uncertainty and risks depends on the characteristics of corruption. Highly institutionalized or predictable
corruption can be treated as taxes on firms. After paying bribes, firms receive government services. In such cases,
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We have discussed that inward FDI could increase corruption in operating countries. Inter-
national trade may also be connected to corruption (see, e.g., Krueger 1974; Shleifer and Vishny
1993). Government regulations on trade activities, especially the distribution of import licenses
and quotas, generate huge rents in the market. On the one hand, government trade regulations
give officials opportunities to demand bribes. On the other hand, rent-seekers compete for import
licenses and quotas; these rent-seeking activities may take place through legal channels such as
lobbying; however, in many cases it may take illegal forms such as bribery. Thus, international
trade, especially imports under a restrictive trade regime,7 may cause corruption.
It should be noted that the above mechanisms through which economic integration increases
the level of corruption are more likely to exist in less developed countries where legal infrastruc-
ture is undeveloped and government regulations are ineffective. In such countries, corruption is
rampant and often a part of standard business practices; the likelihood of getting caught is low
while the potential benefits of engaging in corruption could be potentially high. Therefore, eco-
nomic integration may exacerbate the problem of corruption by bringing in more resources and
expanding opportunities for bribery.
4.3.1 Economic Integration and Corruption in China
Since China’s reform and opening begain in 1978, FDI has flowed in steadily and trade has ex-
panded quickly. Now China has become one of the largest FDI recipients and trade nations in the
world. It is widely believed that inward FDI and trade have been the major engines of China’s
economic miracle. At the beginning of the reform and openness era, in order to safeguard foreign
investors and attract FDI, China adopted a special economic zone (SEZ) policy. In the SEZs, the
government provides investors with preferential packages, infrastructure support, flexible institu-
bribery can help reduce uncertainty and risks. By contrast, arbitrary or unpredictable corruption may be associated
with uncertainty and risks. See, e.g., Malesky and Samphantharak (2008), Wei (1997), and Uhlenbruck et al. (2006).
7In order to promote exports, government usually has fewer restrictions on exports.
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tional arrangements, etc. This policy has been demonstrated to be an enormous success. In the
1980s and early 1990s, FDI into China came primarily from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas
Chinese because of their familiarity and personal contacts with China. With China’s successful
experience with FDI and the spread of SEZs throughout the country, high-tech, long-term com-
mitment and market-seeking FDI poured in gradually. Since the mid-1990s, OECD countries have
become one of the major sources of FDI in China. Another feature of China’s inward FDI is its
extremely uneven geographic distribution. The provinces in the costal areas have taken the lion’s
share of China’s inward FDI, and those in the mid-western and northeastern regions have received
a minor part.
With the rapid growth of inward FDI, international trade has greatly expanded. In 1979, the
total volume of international trade was only 18% of GDP, while the number in 2008 was more
than tripled, approximately 62% of GDP. In China, trade is closely related to FDI. After China
had adopted its reform and opening policy, SEZs were set up to attract foreign investment. In the
earlier period, many SEZs were actually export processing zones, where foreign firms imported
raw materials and exported assembled products by taking advantage of China’s cheap labor. Until
1991, all output of FIEs was for export, and in 1992 China began to give significant access to the
market-oriented FDI (Naughton and Lardy 1996, 278-9). As a consequence, a considerable share
of trade in China is actually through FIEs. For example, exports and imports conducted by FIEs,
on average, accounted for approximately 53% and 56% of total national exports and imports from
1998 to 2007.8
Nonetheless, the booming FDI inflows and international trade have generated some unintended
consequences. In 2008, a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) was arrested
for corruption of approving foreign investment. This case involved several high-ranking officials
in government agencies in charge of regulating FDI, including the MOC, State Administration for
8Author’s calculation based on the data from China’s Statistical Yearbook.
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Industry and Commerce and State Administration of Foreign Exchange. In and of itself, the case
is not unique. In 2004, a report by one private consulting firm pointed out that in the 500,000 cor-
ruption cases investigated by the Chinese government over the past ten years, 64% were related to
international trade and foreign firms.9 In China, MNCs have been known to bribe officials through
a variety of ways including offering government officials direct cash payments, occupational train-
ings, foreign trips, and oversea education opportunities for the officials’ children.10
As discussed in the previous section, the positive effects of economic integration on corrup-
tion are more likely to exist in countries with underdeveloped legal infrastructures and ineffective
government regulations. In China, despite the dramatic economic decentralization that have taken
place during the past few decades, foreign investment and international trade are still highly reg-
ulated (Huang 2003), which can generate ample rent-seeking opportunities. Furthermore, MNCs
have brought in scarce capital, technology and managerial know-how, and contributed signifi-
cantly to economic development. Meanwhile, these foreign firms have generated huge profits from
China’s market.11 The high rents enjoyed by foreign firms are likely to boost the level of bribes.
Up until now, the political system in China is still restrictive, and free press is limited. The costs
of engaging in corruption are thus relatively low while the potential benefits are relatively high.
Therefore, I hypothesize that deeper economic integration in terms of more inward FDI and trade
flows leads to higher levels of corruption in China.
9China Youth Online, July 24, 2009.
10South China Morning Post, October 8, 2007.
11Thanks to the rapid economic growth during the past few decades, China’s market has become a ma-
jor revenue source for most MNCs. One prominent example is China’s automobile industry. Overseas car
markers such as Volkswagen, Ford, GM, Toyota and Honda have entered the China market since 1984,
just a few years after China’s adoption of the reform and opening policy. Now around 70% of the cars
sold in the China’s market are carrying non-indigenous brand names. China has become the biggest mar-
ket and revenue source for many giant car markers. For instance, for the second-quarter of 2010, Volk-
swagen’s operating profits in China were 518 million Euros, approximately 41% of the Group net income
in the same period. Bloomberg, July 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-29/
volkswagen-posts-biggest-quarterly-profit-in-two-years-on-golf-a5-demand.html
(accessed September 5, 2010).
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4.4 Research Design
To test my hypothesis, I adopt a within-country sub-national research design and treat China’s
provinces as units of analysis. The within-country design allows me to deal with the sample se-
lection problem in the cross-national analyses. As China’s economy has been decentralized during
the reform and openness era, provincial governments have obtained more and more policy auton-
omy. Despite its authoritarian regime, China is by far one of the most decentralized countries in
the world (Landry 2008). Montinola et al. (1995) argue that China is a de facto federal system and
the economic decentralization is “market preserving,” thus a driving force of economic growth.
All of these justify the use of provinces as units of analysis.
4.4.1 Measuring Corruption at the Provincial Level
The biggest challenge is how to measure corruption within China. Two measures of corruption—
“subjective” and “objective”—are commonly used in empirical studies. Subjective measures of
corruption are indices of perceived corruption constructed by institutions such as the TI and the
World Bank. These indices are aggregated from different surveys of international and local busi-
nessmen as well as country experts and residents. Objective measures use the actual number of
corrupt convictions as proxies for corruption. The quality and reliability of both measures are ques-
tionable.12 Subjective indices are measures of opinions of corruption which are largely influenced
by the respondents’ cultural backgrounds, identification, and social norms.13 The opinions of in-
ternational businessmen and country experts are also biased because the majority of them come
from advanced Western countries. The problem of objective measures is that they are a mixed
reflection of true corruption and the efficacy of enforcement. Recently, scholars have turned to
12See, e.g., Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Treisman (2007) for discussions of available sources of corruption mea-
sures and their problems.
13This problem is mitigated in a within-country setting.
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another “objective” measure that surveys people or firms’ experienced corruption, such as the TI’s
Global Corruption Barometer and the World Bank Business Environment Survey. The experienced
corruption is arguably a more reliable measure because it is based on the respondents’ or firms’
own experience.
To deal with these problems in measuring corruption, I adopt several strategies to check the
robustness of the findings. First, I rely on objective corruption cases as a proxy.14 These measures
based on corruption cases give me advantages to capture different aspects of corruption, includ-
ing the level of bribes in each corruption case, the per capita corruption burden and the frequency
of high-ranking officials involved in corruption, all of which are critical to understand the conse-
quences of cross-border economic activities. To deal with the fact that objective corruption cases
are a mixed reflection of true corruption levels and law enforcement, I explicitly control for law
enforcement in regression models. Then I turn to survey data and use “witnessed” corruption that
is based on respondents’ personal experience. This variable is arguably a more objective and re-
liable measure of the prevalence of corruption, and is unlikely to be affected by law enforcement.
Finally, perceived corruption is used as a robustness check as well.
The procuratorate (jian cha yuan), part of the government’s judicial system, is responsible for
the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. The procuratorate at the provincial level re-
ports corruption cases investigated within its jurisdictions yearly. Corruption is usually defined as
the misuse of public office for private gain. However, in China corruption is defined more broadly.
It is “virtually any form of ‘improper’ behaviour by either a state official or a member of the Com-
munist Party” (Wedeman 2004, 896-7).15 Since 1997,16 corrupt cases reported by the procuratorate
have included graft, bribery, and misappropriation of public property, as well as violations of civil
14This approach has been widely used in the studies of corruption in states in the U.S., and recently in the research
of national corruption in China. See, e.g., Glaeser and Saks (2006), Guo (2008), Meier and Holbrook (1992), and
Wedeman (2004, 2005).
15For a discussion of the definition of corruption in China, see Wedeman (2004, 896-9).
16In 1997, China modified its criminal procedure law and the new law excluded copyright theft and fraud, tax
evasion and resistance, and illegal imprisonment by non-state employees from corruption.
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rights and official malfeasance by state employees. Apparently graft, bribery and misappropriation
of public property are in accordance with the conventional definition of corruption. Ideally, the
cases of the first three categories should be used as a measure of corruption. However, available
data are not detailed enough to allow me to disaggregate corruption cases for each province.17 For-
tunately, according to the available national data, the first three types of corruption accounted for
an average of 82% of total corrupt cases filed by the procuratorate from 1998 to 2007. Thus, even
if corruption is narrowly defined, the filed corrupt cases reported by the procuratorate can still be
a good proxy.
To understand how corruption cases are investigated, it is important to elucidate the legal pro-
cedure. The procuratorate is responsible for both investigating and prosecuting economic crimes
and criminal violations of discipline. It conducts an initial investigation to decide whether or not to
accept a case (shou’an) for formal investigation. Based on a complete investigation of the accepted
cases, the procuratorate files cases (li’an) with the People’s Court if there is adequate evidence of
crime, and it then serves as the prosecutor (Wedeman 2004, 910-911; see Du and Zhang 1990). The
procuratorate investigates corruption cases from several sources: cases disclosed or reported by the
public, cases referred by the supervisory bureaus that have the responsibility to monitor public of-
ficials and maintain administrative discipline, and those turned in by the disciplinary inspection
committees that are responsible for investigating malfeasance of Party members.18 Therefore, the
politicians’ willingness and political strategies as well as the public awareness of corruption can
all affect the investigation of corruption cases.
The information revealed in the Procuratorial Yearbook of China includes the total number of
filed corruption cases, senior cadres disciplined (at or above the county and division level, xian
chu ji), corrupt cases or persons involving the Party, administrative, judicial, and the economic
17Some provinces do have disaggregated data reported in the Procuratorial Yearbook of China.
18In practice, the supervisory bureau and the disciplinary inspection committee conduct joint investigations because
most state officials are Party members. Due to a lack of judicial authority, both authorities are limited to investigating
non-criminal violations of administrative discipline and Party law (Wedeman 2004, 905).
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supervision systems, and total corrupt funds recovered, and so on. Not all data are available for
each province for each year. The most comprehensive and consistent data are the total number
of filed corruption cases, the amount of corrupt funds recovered, and the number of senior cadres
disciplined. I have thus collected the data on these three categories by reading various annual
procuratorial reports for each province, from 1998 to 2007, to construct the measures of corrup-
tion.19
To understand what the data is measuring, it is important to clarify what the term “degree of
corruption” means. Consider a simple example given by Lambsdorff: “10 percent of all public
servants take a bribe of $200 each, 5 times a year in exchange for awarding a contract that results
in a gain of $500 each for corrupt private contractors” (Lambsdorff 2000, 4). In this case, the level
of corruption can be understood as “the frequency of corrupt acts, the amount of bribes paid or
the overall gain that contractors achieve via corruption.” Since it is almost impossible to assess
the overall gain that contractors obtained through corruption, I focus on the frequency of corrupt
activities and the amount of the bribes. According to Wedeman (2004, 2005), corruption in China
has intensified in terms of the amounts of corrupt money and “major cases,” but the total number
of corruption cases has remained mostly unchanged since the 1989-90 anticorruption campaign.
To capture the severity of corruption, I first utilize corrupt funds recovered per filed case as a
measure of corruption that explicitly addresses the level of bribes involved in each case. Second,
total recovered corrupt funds are used to capture overall bribes. This variable is normalized by
total population20 so that it gauges the per capita losses or burden of corruption. Finally, the level
of corruption could be high because more high-ranking officials were involved. I employ senior
cadres disciplined per 10,000 public employees to capture this dimension of corruption.
19Since the numbers of corruption cases of different categories are reported in the text of annual reports and there
are no summary tables, for each province for each year, data were collected by the author and one research assistant
separately to ensure accuracy. If any conflict arose, the author went back to the original Procuratorial Yearbook of
China and made necessary corrections. China modified its criminal procedure law in 1997 and redefined the definition
of corruption, so the statistics before and after 1997 are not comparable.
20Empirical results are consistent if total recovered corrupt funds are normalized by GDP.
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Figure 4.1: Corrupt Funds Recovered per Filed Case, 1998-2007
Notes: Corruption at the provincial level, measured by the natural logarithm of recovered corrupt funds per
filed case. This variable is averaged from two 5-year periods: 1998-2002, 2003-2007.
It should be noted that corruption takes time to detect and the whole process of investigation and
prosecution may last a few years. In addition, the actual number of corruption cases investigated
each year may depend on leaders’ political strategies and willingness. Thus, the annual number
reported by the procuratorate may not well reflect each year’s actual level of corruption. The
temporal variation in the dataset could be misleading.21 To deal with this problem, I rely on
cross-sectional variation and take an average of these three corruption variables for two periods,
1998-2002 and 2003-2007.22 To maximize the number of observations, I average the variables
for each province that has at least one observation within each of the two 5-year spans. All three
variables are logged in order to deal with skewed distributions.
Based on these three measures, Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 respectively show the spatial variation
21Simple OLS regressions with fixed effects based on panel data show that the results are consistent with those
obtained from cross-sectional regressions.
22They are also consistent with government officials’ terms in China.
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Figure 4.2: Corrupt Funds Recovered per capita, 1998-2007
Notes: Corruption at the provincial level, measured by the natural logarithm of corrupt funds recovered per
capita. This variable is averaged from two 5-year periods: 1998-2002, 2003-2007.
of the level of corruption across China between 1998 and 2007. We can see that all three figures
show that the provinces located in the coastal, middle and southwestern areas tend to have high
levels of corruption. Tibet, in particular, stands out as a corrupt province in the western areas,
especially in terms of the corrupt funds recovered per filed case and per capita corruption losses.
The advantage of the data is that the reporting and classifying procedures are standard across
provinces and consistent over time. Moreover, the data allows us to explore different dimensions
of corruption. The major concern of these measures based on corruption cases is that they are a
mixed reflection of true corruption and the effectiveness of law enforcement. The gap between the
discovered and the true corruption levels is a function of the efficacy of law enforcement. To deal
with this problem, I construct several measures of local government’s anti-corruption efforts. In
addition, I rely on survey data and use experience-based corruption index that is more objective
and reliable and the level of perceived corruption as robustness checks.
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Figure 4.3: Senior Cadres Disciplined per 10,000 Public Employees, 1998-2007
Notes: Corruption at the provincial level, measured by the natural logarithm of senior cadres disciplined per
10,000 public employees. This variable is averaged from two 5-year periods: 1998-2002, 2003-2007.
4.4.2 Independent Variable: Economic Integration
The independent variable is economic integration, which is measured by the percentages of inward
FDI23 and imports to GDP.24 I focus on the import part of trade because government rarely has
restrictions on exports and the literature suggests that import restriction is more likely to be asso-
ciated with corruption (Krueger 1974; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). As discussed before, in China
more than 50% imports are actually conducted by foreign invested firms and a substantial part of
imports is intermediate inputs. In this sense, imports to a large extent reflect foreign firms’ activi-
ties rather than market competition. In addition, imports are still highly regulated in China (Huang
2003). A Higher volume of imports is likely to generate more opportunities for corruption that
23The use of FDI inflows allows us to capture the corruption related to the regulations of foreign firms’ entry
which is, according anecdotal evidence, a serious issue in China. It is also a good proxy for FDI stock given that the
correlation between FDI inflows and stock is 0.94 for the period of this study. Empirical results are substantively the
same if we use FDI stock.
24The data comes from China Data Online. Both variables are logged to deal with skewed distribution.
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Figure 4.4: Levels of Economic Integration in China’s Provinces, 1998-2007
Notes: Economic integration at the provincial level is measured by the factor score of the natural logarithms
of the percentages of inward FDI and imports to GDP. This variable is averaged from two 5-year periods:
1998-2002, 2003-2007.
is related to customs clearance and competition for import licenses and quotas. I thus conduct a
principle component factor analysis of these two variables to obtain a factor score as a measure of
economic integration. One factor component is loaded with Eigenvalue greater than 1. This factor
component explains the 82.43% of the combined variance of these two variables. Figure 4.4 shows
the spatial variation of economic integration across China. We can see that coastal provinces have
higher levels of economic integration than inland provinces.
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4.4.3 Law Enforcement
Since the measures based on corruption cases are a mixed reflection of true corruption levels and
the efficacy of law, to estimate the direct effect of economic integration on corruption, we need
to control for law enforcement in the regression equation. I use several measures to capture law
enforcement and local government’s anti-corruption campaigns. The first is a measure of “bu-
reaucratic integration.” Recently, scholars have suggested that China’s central government has
resorted to control provincial officials through its monopoly power of cadre appointment (Huang
1996; Sheng 2007, 2010). Huang and Sheng’s studies find that the pro-center provincial leaders are
more likely to implement policies in accordance with central government, fighting harder against
inflation and getting less favorable fiscal treatment. “Bureaucratic integration gauges the propen-
sity of provincial officials to comply with central policy directives by virtue of their future career
prospects or prior career trajectories” (Sheng 2007, 414). Since anticorruption has been one of
the central government’s top priorities (Wedeman 2005), I expect that the more centrally-oriented
provincial leaders are, the more vigorously they fight against corruption.
I use the bureaucratic integration variable initially constructed by Huang and extended by
Sheng as one of the proxies for provincial leaders’ anticorruption efforts. According to their posi-
tions in the party system and relevant work experience, provincial leaders are placed into one of the
four categories: provincial leaders holding a concurrent position at the center are assigned a score
of 4; those who have at least three years of work experience at the ministerial or vice-ministerial
level in the central government are given a score of 3; provincial officials who have worked at least
three years in other provinces get a score of 2; and lastly, “localists” who are promoted within the
province are scored 1 (Sheng 2007, 414-17). High scores represent more centrally-oriented lead-
ers, who thus are expected to devote more resources to fighting against corruption. This variable is
only available up to 2005. For the period of 2003 to 2007, the data are averaged from year 2003 to
2005. I expect the bureaucratic integration variable to be positively correlated with the dependent
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variables constructed from corruption cases, given that the more resources government devotes to
fighting against corruption, the more corruption cases it detects.
The second measure is a dummy variable of the four municipalities directly administrated by
the central government. Given their unique positions in the administrative system, I expect that
the central government monitors these four municipalities more closely, and thus they fight harder
against corruption and detect more corruption cases. The third measure of the local government’s
anticorruption efforts concerns the geographical distance between Beijing and other provincial
capitals. The rationale is that, the further a province is from the national capital, the harder it is
for the central government to watch the local government’s policy compliance and malfeasance.
Therefore, the provincial leaders’ anticorruption efforts should diminish with the distance to Bei-
jing.25 I expect that the dummy variable is positively while the distance to Beijing is negatively
correlated with corruption.
Alternatively, I could use the expenditure on public security agency, procuratorial agency, and
the court of justice as a proxy for local government’s anticorruption campaigns. However, this
variable is problematic for at least two chief reasons. First, it is extremely highly correlated with
total government expenditure that is commonly used to measure the size of government in the
literature.26 Second, more expenditures could result in more corruption rather than greater anti-
corruption efforts.
4.4.4 Other Control Variables
Regarding the determinants of corruption in the literature, the most significant finding is that higher
GDP per capita—a proxy for economic development—is associated with lower corruption levels
even when possible endogeneity is considered (Treisman 2007). This finding has been confirmed
25The distance is calculated using the ArcGIS 9.3 program.
26The Pearson correlation of these two variables is 0.94 for the period of this study, which renders it impossible to
identify the underlying causal mechanism.
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by many other studies in both cross-national and within-country analyses (see, e.g., Ades and
Di Tella 1999; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Knack and Azfar 2003; Sandholtz and Gray 2003). Eco-
nomic development not only leads to the rationalization of economic and political systems, but it
also contributes to the spread of education and literacy, all of which should help reduce corruption.
However, GDP per capita is likely to be endogenous to both economic integration and corruption.
Both FDI inflows and trade contribute to economic development, thus leading to the growth of
GDP per capita. The endogeneity makes the causal relationship between economic integration
and corruption ambiguous. To deal with this problem, I take advantage of a natural experiment
created by China’s reform and opening. Before the reform and opening, China had no foreign in-
vestment and few trade flows. Thus, I utilize the data from two periods before China’s reform and
openness: 1969-1973 and 1974-1978 as proxies for GDP per capita in 1998-2002 and 2003-2007
respectively. The pre- reform and opening GDP per capita variable not only helps mitigate the en-
dogeneity problem, but it also helps reduce the collinearity between GDP per capita and economic
integration. Moreover, it is a good proxy for GDP per capita from 1998 to 2007 as the Pearson
correlation between these two GDP per capita variables is 0.84. Additionally, I include total GDP
to account for the effect of the economic size, as the scale of an economy is also a critical determi-
nant of the total amount of rents in the market. Again, I use GDP before the reform and opening
era as a proxy to deal with possible endogeneity problem. Both GDP per capita and GDP data
come from China Statistical Yearbook.
In addition, corruption may rise with the size of government, as bigger government means that
officials have more resources under their control, thereby more opportunities for bribery (Glaeser
and Saks 2006). Government size is measured by the percentage of government expenditure to
GDP and the share of employees in state-owned units that include government agencies, Party
organs, social organizations, and state-owned enterprises.27 Education is believed to help reduce
27Public employees in China are more broadly defined. For instance, managers and directors in state-owned en-
terprises and social organizations usually obtain the same status as government officials and sometimes are promoted
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corruption because people’s political participation and civic engagement are positively related to
their education levels (see, e.g., Glaeser and Saks 2006; Treisman 2000). This variable is mea-
sured by the percentage of population aged 6 or above who have at least some college education.
Scholars also suggest that the relatively high wages of public sectors to private sectors decrease
the incentives for corruption (e.g., Treisman 2000). When a public employee has a high paying
position, s/he has less incentive to jeopardize it by engaging in corruption. Thus we should expect
that higher relative wages of public employees should be associated with less corruption. This
variable is measured by the ratio of average wages of state-owned units to private sectors. Scholars
have also found that gender impacts corruption (e.g., Swamy et al. 2001). Specifically, women
tend to be more disciplined and less tolerant of corruption. Therefore, a government with more
female employees should be less corrupt. I use the share of female employees in state-owned units
to capture the influence of gender. Finally, I include a dummy variable for the second period to
account for the effect of time trend given that corrupt funds tend to grow over time.
The data used to measure education, government expenditure, the size of public employees,
and public employees’ relative wages, all come from China Statistical Yearbook. Gender (the
share of female public employees) is measured based on the data from China Labor Statistical
Yearbook. Government expenditure is lagged a 5-year period to deal with possible endogeneity,
and all other variables are averaged as the same periods of the dependent variables. The descriptive
statistics and the correlation matrix of explanatory variables are shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 in the
Appendix.
4.4.5 Endogeneity and Selection Bias
Scholars have documented that MNCs adjust entry mode in terms of political and economic risks
in host countries (Henisz 2000; Javorcik and Wei 2009; Rodriguez et al. 2005; Uhlenbruck et al.
into the government and Party systems.
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2006). Furthermore, empirical studies suggest that high levels of corruption are associated with
less inward FDI (e.g., Malesky and Samphantharak 2008; Wei 1997, 2000). Thus, it is possible
that corruption “selects out” investors of high quality at the first place and leads to less inward
FDI. In addition, corruption may also make countries less likely to engage in trade relationships.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that since this chapter argues that economic integration increases
corruption, if the selection at the first stage were corrected, we would observe higher levels of
economic integration in more corrupt areas. In such cases, OLS regressions tend to underestimate
the positive effect of economic integration. Thus endogeneity should not be a serious concern
here. To precisely estimate the coefficient of economic integration and to deal with the possi-
ble endogeneity and selection biases, I take advantage of the spatial variation in China’s levels of
economic integration and use the geographic distance as an instrumental variable for economic
integration. Following Jensen and Rosas (2007), Larraı́n and Tavares (2004) and Pinto and Zhu
(2008), I construct an instrumental variable (IV) for China’s provincial economic integration using
the weighted geographic distance between China’s provincial capitals and five major economic
centers28 around China. This instrumental variable is rooted in the gravity models of international
trade and FDI flows (see, e.g., Carr et al. 2001; Caves 1996; Frankel and Romer 1999; Loungani
et al. 2002; Markusen 1995; Rose 2004). Countries tend to trade more with their neighbors and
FDI originated from wealthier countries is more likely to flow into closer regions.29 I weigh the
geographic distance by these five economies’ real GDP per capita to capture the fact that more
28They are Hong Kong, Seoul, Singapore, Taipei, and Tokyo.
29That geographic distance affects trade patterns is one of the most robust empirical regularities in the economic
literature (see, e.g., Frankel and Romer 1999; Rose 2004). With regard to FDI, the knowledge-capital model suggests
that efficiency-seeking (vertical) FDI tends to decrease with trade costs such as geographic distance, while market-
seeking (horizontal) FDI increases with trade costs (Carr et al. 2001; Markusen 1995). In China, before 1992, the
Chinese government gave no access to market-oriented foreign firms and thus all FDI was efficiency-seeking. Since
1992 when China started to open its market to foreign firms, efficiency-seeking FDI has still remained a considerable
share. For market-seeking FDI in China, firms also tend to locate in areas that are closer to home countries, which give
them advantages to import parts and components from parent firms. For instance, Japanese and Koreans firms tend
to concentrate in north China, such as Beijing, Liaoning, Shandong and Tianjian, while firms from Taiwan and Hong
Kong operate mainly in southeastern China, such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang. Thus, geographic distance is a
good predictor of economic integration in China.
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developed countries tend to export more products and capitals. On average these five economies
together accounted for approximately 59% of China’s FDI inflows and 41% of imports from 1998
to 2007. We have reasons to believe that exogenous geographic distance and the five economies’
real GDP per capita are unlikely to have a direct effect on China’s provincial corruption except
through the channel of economic integration.30 Sensitivity analysis is used to assess to what ex-
tent the empirical results are sensitive to the potential violation of the exclusion restriction. The






× GDP per capitaj,t (4.1)
where i = 1, 2, ..., N , j = 1, ..., 5, and t = 1, 2.
This instrumental variable measures the geographic closeness of China’s provinces to the five
economic centers. Thus, I expect that the closer a province is to these five cities, the more eco-
nomically integrated it is. Geographic distance is calculated using the ArcGIS 9.3 program. Real
GDP per capita data of the five economies between 1998 and 2007 are from the Penn World Table.
30Geographic distance impacts corruption through the activities that are related to distance. We have reason to
believe that geographic distance has an effect on corruption primarily through the two major transnational economic
activities—foreign investment and trade. However, it is possible that geographic closeness has an impact on corruption
through labor movement, migration, or even the media. This kind of effects should be at margin because the cross-
border movement of labor and migration is still limited in China and the government highly restricts foreign media. In
addition, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are all considered to be less corrupt than China. Thus we
should expect a negative effect of geographic closeness on corruption through labor movement, migration, and foreign
median. If this is the case, the 2SLS models tend to underestimate the positive coefficient of economic integration on
corruption.
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4.5 Empirical Results
To examine the effects of economic integration on corruption, I estimate the following two-stage
least square (2SLS) model:
EcoIntegrationi,t = δ + θ ∗GeoClosenessi,t +Xi,tπ + µi,t (4.2)
Corruptioni,t = α + β ∗ EcoIntegrationi,t +Xi,tγ + εi,t (4.3)
Where i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, 2
Equation 4.2 and 4.3 represent the first and second stage regressions respectively.
E[EcoIntegration, εi,t] 6= 0 andE[GeoClosenessi,t, εi,t] = 0. To deal with possible heteroskedas-
tic errors, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used in 2SLS estimation.31
4.5.1 “Objective” Corruption Cases as a Proxy
Given the small sample size, I start with some key determinants of corruption: economic inte-
gration, GDP per capita, GDP, government expenditure, the size of public employees, and a time
dummy. Model 1 in Table 4.1 presents the OLS regression results. We can see here that economic
integration has a positive and significant correlation with corruption measured by corrupt funds
recovered per filed case.
To deal with the reverse causality and selection bias, in Model 2, I fit a GMM 2SLS regression
model using weighted geographic closeness as the instrumental variable for economic integration.
In the first stage regression (Model 2a in Table 4.5 in the Appendix), the instrumental variable
strongly predicts provincial level of economic integration and the F-statistic of the (excluded) in-
31All models are estimated using outreg2 command with gmm option in Stata 11.
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Table 4.1: DV: Corrupt Funds Recovered per Filed Case
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Economic Integration 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.48***
(Factor Score) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Ln (GDP per capita) -0.50** -0.53** -0.52** -1.02*** -0.46** -0.79*** -0.71**
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.20) (0.26) (0.31)
GDP 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln (Government Expenditure, 1.09*** 1.11*** 1.09*** 1.35*** 1.17*** 1.30*** 1.08***
% GDP) (0.36) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30)
Public Employees 6.57 6.74 5.72 8.28** -0.91 1.78 7.25
(5.24) (5.07) (4.91) (4.00) (5.17) (5.28) (4.82)
Time 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.12 -0.08 0.26
(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27)
Bureaucratic Integration 0.14* 0.04 0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Dummy of Four Municipalities 0.77*** 0.50** 0.61***
(0.23) (0.20) (0.24)








Constant 6.94*** 7.18*** 6.82*** 10.07*** 8.88*** 10.19*** 7.84***
(1.59) (1.51) (1.65) (1.62) (1.34) (1.58) (2.25)
N 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
R2 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.51
F − Statistic
58.53 56.11 59.49 56.93 53.99 60.66
(Excluded Instrument)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
strument is 58.53,32 which shows that the instrumental variable is valid and strong (see, Bound et al.
32All exogenous variables (included instruments) from the second stage regression are included in the first stage
regression. In the following 2SLS regressions, all F-statistics of (excluded) instruments in the first regressions are well
above 10. See Table 4.5 in the Appendix for first stage regression results.
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1995; Staiger and Stock 1997). After accounting for possible reverse causality and selection bias,
the coefficient of economic integration increases from 0.44 to 0.46 and statistically significant at
1%, which supports my argument that economic integration raises the level of corruption in China.
Compared with the regression results in the OLS model, the regression resigns and magnitudes of
other explanatory variables’ coefficients do not change significantly.
Given that the dependent variable is a mixed reflection of true corruption and the efficacy of
law, to estimate the direct effect of economic integration on corruption, we need to control for law
enforcement. In Models 3, 4 and 5, I thus add three variables—bureaucratic integration, a dummy
variable of the four municipalities directly administered by the central government, and the geo-
graphic distance between provincial capitals and Beijing—as proxies for local government’s anti-
corruption efforts. We can see that all three of these variables have expected regression signs and
their coefficients are statistically significant, which suggests that centrally-oriented government of-
ficials are more likely to comply with the central government’s anticorruption directives and thus
detect more corruption cases; the four municipalities fight harder against corruption; while remote
provinces are less likely to do so. After we control for local government’s anticorruption efforts,
economic integration still has a positive impact on corruption and its coefficient is statistically sig-
nificant beyond the conventional level. Model 6 controls for the three variables simultaneously. In
Model 7, I add more controls—education, public employee’s relative wages and gender. Again,
economic integration positively and significantly affects corruption. Substantively, take Model 7
for example, when all other variables are held constant, one standard deviation increase of eco-
nomic integration will raise the level of corruption by 0.48 units, which are about U16,160.74 or
$2,486.27 per filed case. The amount is roughly equal to the 68% of the national average annual
wage in 2007. The effect of economic integration on corruption is both statistically and substan-
tively significant.
The results in Table 4.1 also show that economic development (GDP per capita) significantly
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decreases corruption. In Model 7, all else being equal, one standard deviation change in GDP per
capita decreases the level of corruption by 0.39 units, approximately U14,769.81 or $2,272.28
per filed case. A larger economy and more government expenditures are strongly associated
with higher levels of corruption. One standard deviation increase in these two variables will
result in more corruption by 0.27 and 0.50 units respectively (roughly U13,099.65/$2,015.33
and U16,487.21/$2,536.49 per filed case), when all other variables are constant. All else be-
ing equal, one standard deviation change in education reduces corruption by 0.30 units (about
U13,498.59/$2,076.71 per filed case) and the effect is statistically significant.
We have shown that economic integration significantly increases corruption by raising the level
of bribes involved in each case. The degree of corruption can also be related to the burden of
corruption on the entire population. Take a hypothetical example of two places with a population of
30 and 50 people each. There are 5 corruption cases in place A and 2 in Place B respectively, both
of which involve $500 bribes in total. According to corrupt funds per filed case, we would think
Place B is more corrupt than Place A. However, if per capita corruption losses are considered, Place
A has a higher level of corruption than Place B. To capture the second dimension of corruption, I
use recovered corrupt funds per capita as an alternative measure.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CORRUPTION IN CHINA 142
The first 5 models in Table 4.2 reproduce Models 3-7 in Table 4.1. We can see here that
in all models economic integration has a positive effect on per capita corruption losses, and its
coefficient is statistically significant beyond the conventional level. Substantively, we take Model
5 for example, where one standard deviation increase in the level of economic integration will raise
corruption levels by 0.33 units, which are about U1.39 or $0.21 per capita, when all other variables
are held constant. The results also indicate that economic development (GDP per capita) helps
reduce corruption burden while a large economy (GDP), high level of government expenditure,
and large size of public employees significantly contribute to more corruption losses. These results
are consistent with those in Table 1 that uses corrupt funds recovered per filed case as the dependent
variable.
The above two measures capture the degree of corruption in terms of the level of bribes in each
corrupt case and corruption losses per capita. The results have shown that economic integration
is positively and significantly associated with these two dimensions of corruption. The severity
of corruption may relate not only to the amount of bribes but also to the number of high-ranking
government officials involved. Thus, I construct a third measure of corruption—senior cadres
disciplined per 10,000 public employees.
I again reproduce Models 3-7 in Tables 4.1 and present the results in Models 6-10 in Table
4.2. All coefficients of economic integration are positive and they become statistically significant
(Model 7, 9 and 10) when the dummy of the four municipalities directly administrated by the
central government is controlled for. The results indicate that economic integration is strongly
associated with a high frequency of senor cadres involved in corruption. To interpret the substantive
effect, I focus on Model 10. All else being equal, one standard deviation increase in the level of
economic integration will raise the frequency of senior cadres involved in corruption by 0.19 units,
which are roughly 1.20 corrupt senior cadres per 10,000 public employees.
To summarize the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the most significant finding is that economic
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integration leads to more corruption in China in terms of the level of bribes in each corruption case,
the corruption losses per capita and the frequency of senior cadres involved. The results are robust
and consistent across model specifications even when we take into account law enforcement, pos-
sible endogeneity and selection bias, and various political and economic variables. These findings
strongly support my argument that economic integration leads to more corruption in China. Other
consistent findings include: corruption decreases with economic development while increases with
the size of economy; a higher level of government expenditure and a larger size of public employ-
ees are associated with more corruption. All other variables seem to have no consistent impact on
the three aspects of corruption.
4.5.2 Witnessed Corruption and Corruption Perceptions
The empirical results based on the measures of corruption cases have shown that higher levels of
economic integration are systematically associated with more corruption in China. However, the
dependent variables provide one caveat, as they reflect a combination of underlying true corrup-
tion levels and the efficacy of law. If economic integration helps improve domestic governance
and rule of law, thus leading to more corruption detections, the positive relationship between inte-
gration and corruption could undermine the claim in the chapter. Although I have employed three
variables—bureaucratic integration, a dummy of the four municipalities directly administrated by
the central government and the geographic distance between provincial capitals and Beijing—to
control for local government’s anticorruption efforts and law enforcement, these variables might
not be perfect. To check the robustness of the findings, I rely on survey data and use people’s
witnessed corruption and corruption perceptions as alternative measures. If economic integration
improves domestic governance and rule of law rather than lead to more corruption, people will
experience less corruption and have a more favorable opinion of corruption in the provinces with
higher degrees of economic integration.
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Table 4.3: DV: Witnessed Corruption and Corruption Perceptions
Model
Witnessed Corruption Corruption Perceptions
(1) (3)
Economic Integration 0.08*** 0.14**
(Factor Score) (0.03) (0.07)




Ln (Government Expenditure, 0.01 0.04
% GDP) (0.05) (0.12)




Public Employees’ -0.07 -0.64***











Robust standard errors in parentheses;
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The China Module of 2008 Asian Barometer Survey includes questions that ask inhabitants
whether they have witnessed corruption and their opinions about local corruption. I use the ques-
tion, “Have you or anyone you know personally witnessed an act of corruption or bribe-taking
by a politician or government official in the past year?”33 to construct an index of witnessed cor-
ruption, and the question, “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your
local/municipal government?”34 to generate a measure of the level of perceived corruption. For
33The choices are: 1. Witnessed; 2. Never Witnessed; 8. Can’t Choose; 9. Decline to Answer.
34The choices are: 1. Almost Everyone is Corrupt; 2. Most Officials are Corrupt; 3. Not a Lot of Officials are
Corrupt; 4.Hardly Anyone is Involved; 5. Decline to Answer.
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the index of witnessed corruption, I calculate the frequency of respondents who answered “Never
Witnessed” in each province and then reverse this variable.35 This measure is constructed based on
respondents’ personal experience. Thus, it is likely to capture the pervasiveness of corruption in
local governments, and is unlikely to be affected by law enforcement. For corruption perceptions,
I take the means of respondents’ perceived corruption scores within each province and reverse the
variable as a measure of corruption at the provincial level.36 By doing so, I obtain an index of
witnessed corruption and corruption perceptions for 26 provinces.37 The empirical results based
on these two alternative measures are presented in Table 4.3.38
Model 1 is estimated using witnessed corruption index. We can see that economic integration
has a positive and significant effect on the frequency of people witnessing corruption. This finding
is consistent with what we have found using objective corruption cases as proxies for corruption
levels. This rejects the notion that the positive relationship between economic integration and the
corruption measures based on objective cases is simply due to the improvement in domestic gov-
ernance and rule of law. Substantively, one standard deviation increase in the level of economic
integration will raise the frequency of witnessing corruption by approximately 8% (1.14 standard
deviations of the dependent variable), when all other variables are held constant. The effect is sub-
stantively large. In addition, we can see here that the regression signs of other explanatory variables
are quite consistent with those obtained based on the measures of corruption cases. In particular,
the results show that economic development is significantly associated with less witnessed corrup-
tion while the size of public employees is correlated with more witnessed corruption. The share of
female public employees has a positive impact on the frequency of witnessed corruption.
35The answer “Witnessed” could be biased because respondents might fear potential punishment.
36By taking the means, we lose the information of respondents who declined to answer. Alternatively, I calculate
the share of people who answered “Almost Everyone is Corrupt” and “Most Officials are Corrupt.” Empirical results
are substantively the same.
37The survey does not have information for Gansu, Hainan, Xinjiang, and Tibet. I exclude Ningxia Province
because it only has 8 observations due to the loss of information during the survey implementation (based on personal
contact with ABS staff).
38All explanatory variables are from the second period (2003-2007) in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
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In Model 2, I utilize the level of perceived corruption as the dependent variable. The empirical
results show that higher levels of economic integration are significantly associated with more per-
ceived corruption. All else being equal, one standard deviation increase in economic integration
will raise the level of perceived corruption by approximately 0.14 units, which are roughly 0.63
standard deviations of the dependent variable. Additionally, the results suggest that high levels
of economic development and public employees’ wages relative to private ones are strongly as-
sociated with a low level of perceived corruption, while the share of female public employees is
positively and significantly related to perceived corruption, all of which are consistent with the
findings based on corruption cases and the frequency of witnessed corruption.
Although we have concerns that the positive relationship between economic integration and
corruption measured by objective cases might be attributed to the fact that integration contributes
to the improvement of domestic governance and rule of law, thus leading to more corruption de-
tections. If this is really the case, we should observe that people witness fewer corruption activities
and perceive corruption more favorably in provinces with a higher level of economic integration.
However, I have found that economic integration is positively and significantly associated with
both witnessed and perceived corruption. These findings mitigate our worries that corruption cases
are simply the results of law enforcement and provide evidence that these measures based on cor-
ruption cases do capture the true level of corruption, thus providing strong support for my argument
that economic integration leads to more corruption in China.
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis of the IV Exclusion Restriction
One concern of the results above is the possible violation of the IV exclusion restriction. A valid
instrumental variable requires that it effects the dependent variable only through the endogenous
variable. A potential violation of the exclusion restriction presents one challenge to the regression
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results. In this case, geographic distance impacts corruption through the activities that are related to
distance. We have reasons to believe that geographic distance has an effect on corruption primarily
through the two major transnational economic activities—foreign investment and trade. However,
it is possible that geographic closeness influences corruption through labor movement, migration,
or even the media. This kind of effects should be at margin because cross-border labor movement
and migration are still limited in China and the government highly restricts foreign media. In
addition, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are all considered to be less corrupt
than China.39 Thus we should expect a negative effect of geographic closeness on corruption
through labor movement, migration, and foreign media. If this is the case, the 2SLS models tend
to underestimate the positive coefficient of economic integration on corruption. Nonetheless, we
might still worry that geographic closeness has an impact on corruption in some unobservable ways
and thus the exclusion restriction could be violated.
As suggested by Conley et al. (2012), I conduct sensitivity analysis to assess to what extent the
empirical results are sensitive to the possible violation of the exclusion restriction. The model can
be set up as follows:40
Y = Xβ + Zγ + ε (4.4)
X = Zλ+ υ (4.5)
Where Z is the (excluded) instrument (geographic closeness) for the endogenous variable of
X (economic integration); E(Xε) 6= 0 and E[Zε] = 0. γ is a parameter measuring to what extent
the exclusion restriction is satisfied. In a normal setup, the term—Zγ—does not appear in the
structural equation (4.4). If the exclusion restriction holds, then γ = 0. We can estimate the two
equations using a normal 2SLS regression. If the exclusion restriction is violated, γ 6= 0. Based
39According to the TI, for instance, in 2007 the corruption perceptions indices (CPI) of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan were 8.3, 7.5, 5.1, 9.3, and 5.7 respectively. China’s CPI was 3.5 which was far below the five
economies’ CPIs.
40See, Conley et al. (2012, 261).
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on these two equations, we can conduct sensitivity analysis using the prior knowledge about the
magnitude of γ.
In this case, we are more interested in the positive values of γ, because a negative γ will
increase the slope of economic integration. I focus on two of the approaches recommended by
Conley et al. (2012). The first approach is to specify a set of values for γ based on prior knowledge
and obtain a union of confidence intervals for β. I want to see how large the γ could be so that we
still obtain a significant positive coefficient of economic integration at the 95% level. The second
approach is “local-to-zero approximation” that adopts a large sample approximation and treats
the uncertainty of γ as sample uncertainty to obtain an approximate distribution for β (Conley
et al. 2012, 264-65). This approach allows the levels of confidence intervals of β to depend on
the probabilities of observing specific values of γ.41 Since we have reasons to believe geographic
closeness affects corruption primarily through the channels of inward FDI and trade, γ should be
small even if the exclusion restriction is violated. Thus, I choose a normal distribution for γ with
a mean of 0 and a variance of σ2 to capture the fact that there is a high probability of observing
γ = 0. I conduct sensitivity analysis on Model 7 in Table 4.1 and Models 5 and 10 in Table 4.2.
Results are presented in Table 4.4.
In Approach 1, we can see here that γ can be as large as 0.43, 0.23 and 0.1042 in these three
models, we still observe a positive and significant effect of economic integration on corruption.
The point estimates of economic integration are 0.19, 0.17 and 0.12 respectively. After we sub-
tract the direct effect of geographic closeness on corruption, all else being equal, one standard
41In the case of a Gaussian prior for γ, β̂approx ∼ N(β + Aµγ , V2SLS + Aσ2γA′), and A =
(X ′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′X)−1(X ′Z), where β and V2SLS are the point estimates and variance-covariance matrix obtained
from a normal 2SLS regression; µγ and σ2γ are the mean and variance of the prior distribution of γ; X and Z are the
endogenous and instrumental variables respectively. See, Conley et al. (2012, 264).
42If these numbers are the true coefficients of geographic closeness in equation 4.4, one standard deviation increase
in geographic closeness will raise recovered corrupt funds per filed case by U11,926.84 ($1,834.90), recovered corrupt
funds per capita by U1.10 ($0.17), and senior cadres disciplined per 10,000 public employees by 1.04 units when all
other variables are held constant. These numbers represent considerably large effects of geographic closeness on
corruption.
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Table 4.4: Sensitivity Analysis of the IV Exclusion Restriction
Dependent Variable
Corrupt Funds Recovered Corrupt Funds Recovered Senior Cadres Disciplined





Point Estimate β 0.19 0.17 0.12
(Economic Integration)
95% Confidence Interval [0.00, 0.37] [0.00, 0.35] [0.00, 0.25]
Approach 2




95% Confidence Interval [0.09, 0.88] [0.06, 0.60] [0.00, 0.38]
The sensitivity analysis is based on Model 7 in Table 4.1 and Models 5 and 10 in Table 4.2.
deviation increase in economic integration will still raise corrupt funds recovered per filed case
by U12,092.50, corrupt funds recovered per capita by U1.19, and senior cadres disciplined per
10,000 public employees by 1.13 units. These effects are substantively large. These results indi-
cate that economic integration affects corruption positively and significantly even if we allow for
a considerable deviation from the perfect instrumental variable. Next, I draw γ from prior normal
distributions in which σ= 0.25, 0.15 and 0.10 for Model 7 in Table 4.1 and Models 5 and 10 in
Table 4.2 respectively.43 Again, we can see that even if we take into account the uncertainty about
γ, the 95% confidence interval of economic integration’s coefficient is still above 0 in all three
43If these three numbers are the true coefficients of geographic closeness, all else being equal, one standard devi-
ation increase in geographic closeness will raise recovered corrupt funds per filed case by U11,078.77 ($1,704.43),
recovered corrupt funds per capita by U1.06 ($0.16), and senior cadres disciplined per 10,000 public employees by
1.04 units. In fact, we allow γ to vary beyond σ. Approximately 95% of the γ values range between −2σ and 2σ.
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models. This finding confirms that the positive effect of economic integration on corruption is not
sensitive to the potential violation of the exclusion restriction.
4.7 Conclusion
Today, it is widely believed that inward FDI and trade are the major driving forces of economic
growth. Both developed and developing countries are so eager to lure foreign investors and expand
trade that they often do not pay much attention to unintended consequences. This chapter argues
that economic integration, multinationals’ activities in particular,44 may increase the level of cor-
ruption in host countries. To test this argument, I draw original data on objective corruption cases
to measure corruption and use the frequency of residents’ witnessed corruption and the level of per-
ceived corruption as alternative measures. Empirical results show that economic integration has a
positive and significant impact on corruption in China. Economic integration increases the level
of corruption in terms of the amount of bribes in each case, the corruption losses per capita, and
the frequency of senior cadres involved. These findings are robust and consistent even when law
enforcement, possible endogeneity and selection bias, and various political and economic variables
are considered.
This study calls for attention to the unintended consequences of globalization. MNCs are strate-
gic investors seeking the highest possible returns globally. Given their advantages in the ownership
of proprietary assets, they are likely to adjust their investment strategies to explore business oppor-
tunities even in risky environments (see, e.g., Henisz 2000; Javorcik and Wei 2009). Corruption is
prevalent and often a part of business practices in many developing countries. Moreover, in these
countries the legal infrastructure is underdeveloped and the government regulations are ineffec-
44Additional empirical analyses based on simple OLS regressions indicate that FDI inflows has a more significant
and larger effect on corruption than imports in terms of corrupt funds recovered per capita and senior cadres disciplined
per 10,000 public employees.
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tive. In such circumstances, foreign investors are likely to engage in corruption as a strategy to
obtain business contracts, government services and advantages over their competitors, therefore
exacerbating the problem of corruption; likewise, the rent-seeking activities of competing for im-
port licenses and quotas can take illegal forms such as bribery, thus causing more corruption. It is
important to understand the effects of economic integration on corruption in the specific context of
domestic conditions.
The findings have direct implications for both domestic and global governance. Recently, good
governance has been placed on the agenda of many scholars and international organizations such
as the World Bank and the United Nations. The common notion is that a high quality of govern-
ment is the prerequisite for a country to achieve economic growth and broad social development
(Holmberg et al. 2009). The policy solutions suggested in this research tend to focus on interna-
tional development assistance and the reform or reconstruction of domestic institutions. If MNCs,
in some circumstances, undermine domestic governance through exacerbating corruption, more
efforts need to be devoted to regulating foreign business’ activities. Given MNCs’ cross-border
nature, it particularly demands close collaboration between host governments and the international
community.
In addition, most studies on corruption in China rely on qualitative evidence and connect the
causes of corruption to China’s bureaucratic system, organization structure and the reform nature of
the state such as the dual-pricing system, privatization and decentralization, while largely ignoring
international factors.45 As China has rapidly integrated into the global economy, undoubtedly,
international actors play a significant role in the domestic arena. In this chapter, I have shown
that economic integration is one significant determinant of corruption in China’s provinces. This
study engages with the broad literature on domestic consequences of international forces (see, e.g.,
Keohane and Milner 1996) and underscores the importance of taking international factors into
45For works on corruption in China, see, e.g., Guo (2008), Lü (2000a,b), Manion (1996, 2004), Ting (1997), and
Wedeman (2004, 2005).
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account when studying China’s economic reform and transition.
Finally, although the chapter has shown that multinationals’ activities may effect corruption
positively in certain countries, the findings do not reject that globalization in general helps im-
prove governance. Rather, it encourages scholars to explore the domestic conditions that shape the
influence of international factors. In addition, we still know little about how investors really behave
in a risky and corrupt atmosphere. That is, which types of firms are more prone to corruption, e.g.,
resource-seeking vs. marketing-seeking, high-skill vs. low-skill, or diasporan vs. non-diasporan?
How do foreign investors cope with risky locations? These questions are important to address in
order to further disentangle the causal mechanisms linking economic integration and corruption,
as they have significant policy implications for global anticorruption activities. Undoubtedly, these
questions cannot be answered simply by using aggregate data, but provide fertile future research
opportunities.
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4.8 Appendix
Table 4.5: Results of First Stage Regressions in Table 4.1
Model (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a)
Geographic Closeness 1.38*** 1.38*** 1.40*** 1.36*** 1.37*** 1.43***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Ln (GDP per capita) 1.08*** 1.08*** 0.94*** 1.09*** 1.01*** 0.87***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.25) (0.27)
GDP -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln (Government Expenditure, -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.56*** -0.59*** -0.56*** -0.52**
% GDP) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.25)
Public Employees 3.40 3.16 3.93 -0.02 0.74 4.39
(3.62) (3.70) (3.66) (4.19) (4.55) (5.62)
Time 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.25)
Bureaucratic Integration 0.03 -0.01 -0.06
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Four Municipalities 0.24 0.13 0.32
(0.24) (0.28) (0.28)








Constant -13.70*** -13.69*** -12.93*** -12.66*** -12.37*** -14.38***
(1.05) (1.06) (1.29) (1.23) (1.40) (1.92)
N 61 61 61 61 61 61
R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.86
F − Statistic
58.53 56.11 59.49 56.93 53.99 60.66
(Excluded Instrument)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ln (Corrupt Funds Recovered per Filed Case) 61 2.55 0.68 0.93 4.60
Ln (Corrupt Funds Recovered per capita) 61 1.34 0.62 0.07 3.00
Ln (Senior Cadres Disciplined per 10,000 Public Employees) 60 -1.03 0.41 -2.08 0.10
Frequency of Witnessed Corruption 26 0.13 0.07 0 0.25
Level of Perceived Corruption 26 2.44 0.21 1.96 2.81
Economic Integration (Factor Score) 61 -0.02 1.00 -1.60 1.96
Ln (GDP per capita) 61 5.68 0.55 4.83 7.63
GDP 61 8.26 5.37 0.40 22.18
Ln (Government Expenditure (% GDP) ) 61 -2.14 0.47 -2.95 -0.49
Public Employees (Proportion to Population) 61 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.19
Time 61 0.51 0.50 0 1
Dummy of Four Municipalities 61 0.13 0.34 0 1
Bureaucratic Integration 61 2.37 0.89 1 4
Ln (Distance-Beijing) 61 13.32 2.57 0 14.74
Ln (Education) 61 1.50 0.62 -0.27 3.24
Public Employees’ Relative Wages 61 1.11 0.20 0.77 1.96
Gender ( Share of Female Public Employees) 61 0.37 0.02 0.33 0.43
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